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Preface
This edited volume brings together a selection of peer-reviewed chapters that were
presented and discussed at the Colloquium on “Actors in International Investment
Law: Beyond Claimants, Respondents and Arbitrators”. The Colloquium was jointly
organised by the CERSA, research centre of the French National Centre for Scien-
tific Research (CNRS) and of the University Paris II Panthéon-Assas, the Law
Faculty of the University of Zaragoza, and the Athens Public International Law
Center (Athens PIL) of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, and was
held at the University Paris II Panthéon-Assas on 26 and 27 September 2019.
Traditional studies of actors in international investment law have tended to focus
on arbitrators, claimant investors, and respondent states. There is nothing surprising
about this choice. As the disputing parties, the claimant investor and the respondent
host state are a natural focus for studies in the field. As for arbitrators, one need only
recall William Park’s much-cited apophthegm: “Just as in real estate the three key
elements are ‘location, location, location’, so in arbitration the applicable trinity is
‘arbitrator, arbitrator, arbitrator’” (William W. Park (2002) Income Tax Treaty
Arbitration’ 10 George Mason Law Review 803, 813). Yet this focus on investment
dispute settlement’s “principal” actors has left a number of other seminal actors
outside the main scope of study in this field of law, a view that was duly reaffirmed
as the Colloquium unfolded.
This book’s purpose is to contribute to redressing this imbalance by critically
reviewing some public actors in international investment law that sometimes remain
outside the spotlight. Although the title of the book no longer reflects the intention to
exclude from its scope “claimants, respondents, and arbitrators”, these actors are not
covered. The book is also related to two other volumes simultaneously published by
Springer: Private Actors in International Investment Law (edited by Katia Fach
Gómez) and Transnational Actors in International Investment Law (edited by
Anastasios Gourgourinis). Collectively, these three books aim to not only make a
relevant academic contribution but also promote a scholarly discussion that lays the
foundations for future debates on international investment law.
v
The book opens with a chapter co-authored by Chrysoula Mavromati and Sarah
Spottiswood on “Voices That Shape Investment Treaties: Inside, Outside and
Among States”. The chapter argues that despite the habitual perception of invest-
ment treaties as instruments that reflect the interests of states and investors, in reality
they are shaped by manifold actors or “voices”. The authors describe IIAs as
multifaceted texts influenced by a variety of voices inside, outside, and among
states. The executive and the legislative branches of government, the judiciary,
national courts, business, civil society, academia, intergovernmental organisations,
and international courts and tribunals are part of “a rich tapestry of influences” that
treaty negotiators take to the negotiating table.
In the second chapter entitled “Beyond Protection: The Role of the Home State in
Modern Foreign Investment Law”, Tarcisio Gazzini canvasses the home state in
international investment law. The chapter reviews three stages in the evolution of the
position of the home state. First, it considers the home state’s normative focus on the
protection of its investors abroad. Second, it assesses its “marginalisation” with the
emancipation of foreign investors through investment arbitration. Third, it probes
into the new role of the home state reaching beyond the protection of its national
investors abroad and covering novel areas, such as by imposing obligations on these
investors. The chapter closes with an evaluation of the sustainability of this new
model and role of the host state.
In the following chapter, “National Courts as Actors in Investment Arbitration”,
Aniruddha Rajput focuses on national courts as actors in investment arbitration.
National courts both influence and are influenced by investment arbitration. The
interactions between national courts and arbitral tribunals are numerous and varied.
The fact that municipal law is sometimes part of the applicable law in investment
disputes allows national courts, the interpreters of municipal law, to influence
investment arbitration. National courts may compete for jurisdiction with arbitral
tribunals. They can facilitate investment arbitration by enforcing awards and they
can disrupt it by issuing anti-arbitration injunctions or by refusing enforcement.
Arbitral tribunals too can issue anti-suit injunctions, and especially they can review
national court decisions for violations of investment standards, such as for denial of
justice. The chapter delves into this complex two-way relationship that ultimately
allows investment tribunals to “have the last word”.
In “State Immunity and the Execution of Investment Arbitration Awards”,
Phoebe D. Winch addresses state immunity and the execution of investment awards
from the viewpoint of the forum state. The author canvasses the plea of state
immunity from the execution of investment awards in light of recent attempts by
award-creditors to attach their awards against assets located in jurisdictions consid-
ered to be favourable to enforcement, notably France and Belgium. In particular, the
author delves into substantive and procedural amendments to French and Belgian
laws on state immunity and suggests a way forward for investors that seek to execute
their investment awards in these jurisdictions.
The two ensuing chapters turn to an increasingly topical issue: the participation of
the home state in investment dispute settlement. In a chapter entitled “Trends and
ISDS Backlash Related to Non-Disputing Treaty Party Submissions”, Kendra
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Magraw addresses non-disputing treaty party submissions on issues of treaty inter-
pretation. Focusing on the non-disputing treaty party mechanisms of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the author searches potential links
between tribunals’ failure to pay due regard to treaty parties’ interpretations and
the current “backlash” against investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The chapter
explores this topic in light of the increasing popularity of non-disputing treaty party
provisions in new treaties and arbitration rules, such as in the amendments to the
Arbitration Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) and the Mauritius Convention on Transparency in ISDS of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
In “Not a Third Party: Home State Participation as a Matter of Right in Invest-
ment Treaty Arbitration”, Rebecca E. Khan makes an argument in favour of
non-disputing treaty party participation in investment arbitration “as a matter of
right”. The author points to the fact that non-disputing state parties tend to be treated
no differently than other amici curiae and posits that non-disputing treaty parties
should be accorded a special status. According to the author, this should allow them,
for instance, to be notified if one of their national investors files a dispute and grant
them the right to access documents related to the arbitration and make written
submissions. The chapter probes the state of play of home state participation as a
non-disputing party in investment arbitrations and discusses the attendant risks,
seeing that such participation may essentially amount to diplomatic protection.
In the next chapter on “Investor-State Dispute Prevention: The Perspective of
Peru”, Carlos José Valderrama draws on his experience as former head of Peru’s
legal defence team to discuss state perspectives on investment dispute prevention
and suggests tried-and-tested methods to prevent disputes. The author canvasses
risks that states face when confronted with a potential investor-state dispute and
argues that every dispute is a dispute too many. He analyses Peru’s dispute preven-
tion approach and studies some general considerations that must be taken into
account in order to prevent disputes. He concludes with a set of recommendations
for dispute prevention.
In the next chapter, entitled “The Role of Sub-Regional Systems in Shaping
International Investment Law-Making: The Case of the Visegrád Group”, Federica
Cristani addresses a rarely discussed sub-regional system, the V4 group, comprising
Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The author commences with an
overview of the V4 group, before turning to the regulation of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) within V4 states and at the EU level. She examines the termination of
intra-EU bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the relationship of the V4 group
with non-EU states. Moreover, the author emphasises the role the V4 group has
played in investment matters, including the encouragement and protection of foreign
investment, and argues in favour of the “soft power” that the group may exercise in
the field.
In “The Implications of Political Risk Insurance in the Governance of Energy
Projects: Τhe Case of Japan’s Public Insurance Agencies”, Thomas Nektarios
Papanastasiou discusses political risk insurance (PRI) in energy projects, with a
special focus on Japan’s public insurance agencies. PRI is provided by international
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organisations, such as the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) and by state-sponsored insurance agencies, known as export credit agencies
(ECAs). The chapter pays close attention to the PRI schemes of NEXI, Japan’s state-
sponsored ECA. PRI plays an important role in investments in energy projects,
owing to the complexity of the energy sector. PRI benefits are not limited to cash
payments. At the same time, these insurance schemes include various policy
requirements and performance standards that, in addition to influencing insured
investors, can affect the regulatory authority of host states and local communities.
For this reason, some ECAs, including NEXI, adopt measures to encourage sustain-
able investment projects, such as by imposing social and environmental obligations
and setting up ombudsmen, measures whose effectiveness is yet to be tested.
The book’s final chapter, written by Pascale Accaoui Lorfing, closes with the
“Screening of Foreign Direct Investment and the States’ Security Interests in Light
of the OECD, UNCTAD and Other International Guidelines”. The chapter enquires
into the scope and limits of the state’s right to take measures that it considers
essential to its national security, in light of guidelines and recommendations issued
notably by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The
author argues that, while non-mandatory, such guidelines can help states determine
the limits to their national screening mechanisms. The chapter further assesses the
impact of IIAs and customary law on regulatory measures geared towards the
protection of states’ essential security interests.
Paris, France Catharine Titi
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1
Abstract Investment arbitration awards often give the impression that investment
treaties are designed to reflect the interests of two actors: “investors” and “states”.
There are in fact a myriad of actors, or “voices”, behind each word in an investment
agreement. This chapter identifies three broad categories of voices: voices inside,
outside and among states. It explores the range of voices that influence investment
treaty text by reference to those three categories. The chapter argues that modern
investment treaties are multifaceted texts that are influenced by a range of voices
from within and outside of government.
1 Introduction
Investment arbitration awards often give the impression that investment treaties are
designed to reflect the interests of two actors: “investors” and “states”. There are in
fact a myriad of actors, or “voices”, behind each word in an investment agreement.
This chapter identifies three broad categories of voices that influence investment
treaty text and explores the range of voices within those categories that lead to the
final treaty text. It argues that modern investment treaties are multifaceted texts that
are influenced by a range of voices from within and outside of states.
To begin with, this chapter identifies three categories of voices as a tool to
categorise the range of voices that feed into investment treaty making. It explores
the rationale for identifying these categories and possible limitations of this
categorisation. Against this background, it analyses the first category of voices that
influence investment treaty text: voices from inside the state. The chapter then goes
on to consider the second category of voices that shape investment treaties: voices
originating outside the state. It then turns to the third category of voices: voices
among states. It also touches on the role of voices as expressed in past treaties. The
chapter concludes with some preliminary remarks on complexities arising from
balancing and prioritising of different voices in the negotiation of an investment
treaty and identifies areas for further research.
2 Three Categories of Voices That Influence Investment
Treaties
Three broad categories of voices that influence investment treaties can be identified:
voices inside, outside and among states. The first category, “voices inside the state”
refers to the various actors within the different branches and levels of a government.
Second, “voices outside the state” includes non-state actors such as businesses, civil
society and academics. Third, “voices among states” refers to multilateral and
bilateral interactions among states and the role of international institutions in
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investment treaty making. The chapter draws on case studies from different countries
and different negotiation processes that led to, or failed to lead to, existing treaties to
show how voices in each of these categories influence the negotiation of investment
treaties. The examples used are ascertained from publicly available sources.
The three categories of voices that influence investment treaties are not a perfect
categorisation. They are a helpful lens through which to view the range of voices that
are reflected in modern investment treaties. Some actors may not comfortably fit
entirely within any one category, and some may fit into more than one. The aim of
this categorisation is simply to draw attention to the diversity of voices that are
amalgamated into investment treaty text and show that voices within each category
influence the process in different ways.
It is also important to note that within each category and even within each kind of
“voice” that is identified there is unlikely to be one homogenous viewpoint. This
applies to ministers, officials and judges inside the state as much as it does to
businesses, civil society or even international institutions. It may be argued that
the pluralist nature of voices that influence investment treaties undermines the
usefulness of a study that seeks to provide an overview of the range of voices that
influence investment treaty making. However, there is a large benefit in identifying,
explaining and categorising the multitude of voices both for promoting a greater
understanding of the treaty-making process and as a starting point for further
research into the role of different voices in more detail. This chapter seeks to address
the current absence of research that outlines, on a detailed actor-by-actor basis, how
different voices influence the development of model treaty text and the negotiation
of investment treaties.
3 Voices from Inside the State
It is well-known that investment arbitration awards have involved challenges to
actions by different branches of government: the legislature,1 the executive2 and the
judiciary.3 Each branch of government also influences what wording appears in an
investment treaty. This part explains how actors within the different branches of
government, and in different levels of government, contribute to the contents of
investment treaties.
1See, e.g., Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and
Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 8 July 2016.
2See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003.
3See, e.g., Eli Lilly and Company v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award,
16 March 2017.
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3.1 The Executive
It is well known that investment treaties, like all treaties, are largely negotiated by
officials working in ministries in the executive branch of government, with the
direction and agreement of ministers. Treaty negotiation often occurs over a number
of “rounds” interspersed by periods that officials spend in capitals developing policy
and seeking instructions on the approach to take in the next negotiating round.
The process often formally starts with the creation, and sometimes also the
publication, of a negotiating mandate by both sides, although informal meetings
between ministers and officials from each party may precede this. The mandate will
be developed in ministries and agreed by ministers across government.
Policy officials, economists and lawyers within ministries first inform themselves
by consulting the myriad of voices from outside the State and among States
discussed below. This process involves collecting, analysing, considering,
discussing, presenting, refining and clarifying the range of policy and legal options
available. The result of this process is fed into national positions that are expressed in
the negotiating mandate and refined throughout negotiations by officials inside and
outside of the negotiating room.
Different ministers and ministries may have competing policy positions that need
to be reconciled. Investment treaties may raise issues that touch on the policy
priorities of numerous departments including, for example, those with responsibility
for the treasury, foreign relations, trade, environment, energy, business, agriculture,
tax, health and different levels of government. Governments ordinarily have a
process in place for making decisions which affect many policy areas and for
resolving competing policy positions. For instance, the decision making within the
UK Government is often based on the “collective agreement process”, also known as
“write-round”, which allows ministers with responsibility for different departments
to express their views frankly in discussion and reach agreement on policy
proposals.4
Negotiators may need to make reactive decisions or turn to fallback positions
during discussions with their counterparts. Moreover, there may be situations where
officials from either negotiating party cannot resolve an issue after many rounds of
negotiations, despite engaging in discussions about the range of policy and legal
options available. Difficult issues that are unable to be resolved at official level are
elevated to discussions between ministers and their counterparts in other
governments.
4See Cabinet Office, Collective Government Agreement Process Guidance, March 2013, https://
civilservicelearning.civilservice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/cabinet_office_collective_agreement_pro
cess_guidance_0.pdf.
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3.2 The Legislature
The legislature in many countries may shape the standards that are negotiated by
officials in the executive branch.5 Depending on the state’s constitutional arrange-
ments, the legislature may exert influence either before negotiations begin or once a
signed version of the treaty is taken to the legislature as part of ratification
procedures.
The most obvious way that the legislature may shape investment treaties is by
passing legislation to set out negotiating directives and, more broadly, prescribe the
limits of the negotiating mandate. US negotiators, for example, are guided by
negotiation objectives on foreign investment set out in the Bipartisan Congressional
Trade Priorities and Accountability Act 2015.6 If the negotiating objectives set out in
that legislation are advanced in a trade agreement and other requirements in the
legislation are met, the agreements are likely to benefit from advantageous congres-
sional procedures at the ratification stage, including a prohibition on amendments to
the legislation implementing the agreement. The US Congress decides whether the
requirements of the legislation are met so that the ratification process for a particular
trade agreement may be expedited.7
Parliamentary committees, such as Australia’s Joint and Senate Standing Com-
mittees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade and on Treaties, may conduct
inquiries before or during negotiations8 or once a treaty has been signed.9 Commit-
tees inform themselves with written and oral evidence provided by witnesses who
may be from businesses, academia or civil society. Members of parliamentary
committees, and the research staff who assist them, then prepare reports that make
recommendations to the government. These reports are in turn considered by the
government and interested civil society organisations and business who may refer to
the reports to bolster their positions.
Depending on the ratification process in each country, legislatures may be able to
shape investment treaties by refusing to ratify agreements due to concerns with
specific content, or to amend the negotiating mandate in the course of the negotia-
tions. This may force the executive back to the negotiating table. For instance, the
non-ratification of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) by Brazil has also been, in
5There is extensive academic debate about the role of Parliament in treaty making. See, e.g.,
Schütze (2017), p. 7.
619 USC § 3802.
7See Congressional Research Service, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, 21 June 2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43491.
8See, e.g., Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s trade and
investment relationship with Japan and the Republic of Korea, 3 June 2013, https://www.aph.gov.
au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url¼jfadt/
japanandkoreatrade/report.htm.
9See, e.g., Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Proposed Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, 7 February 2017, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_
Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/TPP/Report.
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part, attributed to resistance by the National Congress of Brazil.10 Another example
is when the European Parliament passed a resolution requesting the
European Commission “to replace investor-state arbitration with a new system for
resolving disputes between investors and states” in the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP).11 This bolstered the European Commission’s deci-
sion to pursue the Investment Court System in its future negotiations, including to
renegotiate the relevant provisions of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) which initially contained a traditional investor-state arbitration
mechanism.12
The voices of individual members of parliament may also influence the policy
positions taken by ministers. Opposition ministers and members of parliament may
meet with ministers privately or ask them questions in parliament. In this way, voices
from outside states that have lobbied members of parliament can inform and be
funnelled into a voice inside the state to influence investment treaties.
3.3 The Judiciary
Courts supervise investment arbitration proceedings and preside over enforcement
and execution of arbitral awards, but they also influence the existence and content of
investment provisions. For example, Colombia’s Constitutional Court has recently
ruled that certain provisions of the BIT between Colombia and France were “con-
ditionally constitutional” (“condicionalmente exequible”) subject to a joint interpre-
tative note being issued to clarify the meaning of certain standards of treatment.13
Opinion 1/17 of the Court of Justice the European Union (CJEU) provides
another illustration of how the judiciary may shape the content of investment
treaties.14 In that case, the CJEU was asked whether the Investment Court System
in CETA was compatible with EU law and the Court found that it was. This case
shows two ways in which courts influence investment treaties. First, the arguments
put by the European Commission and some member states show how EU treaty
negotiators sought to include “safeguards” in the investment chapter of CETA that
10Titi (2016) and Campello and Lemos (2015).
11European Parliament resolution of 8 July 2015 containing the European Parliament’s recommen-
dations to the European Commission on the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) (2014/2228(INI)).
12Puccio and Harte (2017).
13Sentencia C-252, Control de constitucionalidad del Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la República de
Colombia y el Gobierno de la República Francesa sobre el Fomento y Protección Recíprocos de
Inversiones, suscrito en la ciudad de Bogotá, el 10 de julio de 2014, y de la Ley 1840 de 12 de julio
de 2017, por medio de la cual se aprobó este tratado internacional, http://www.corteconstitucional.
gov.co/relatoria/2019/c-252-19.htm#_ftn233 cited in Prieto (2019).
14Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341.
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respected previous jurisprudence on setting up international courts by the EU.15
Second, the opinion could also be read as setting minimum standards for investor-
state dispute settlement provisions in EU agreements.16
Another example of influence by courts on investment treaties can be seen in the
expression of investment protections in US investment treaties, which often closely
mirror equivalent standards set in domestic law by US courts. For instance, the
factors set out in Annex B of the US Model BIT of 2012 for the determination of
whether an action or series of actions by a party has an effect equivalent to direct
expropriation, that is, formal transfer of title or outright seizure, are drawn from US
Supreme Court jurisprudence on compensable takings under the Fifth Amendment
to the US Constitution.17 In this way, US judicial decisions have indirectly
influenced or inspired the standards negotiated by the executive branch of the US
government.
3.4 Sub-national Governments
The influence of sub-national governments on the text of investment treaties may
also be important. Sub-national governments may be seen as a “microcosm”
containing, at a regional level, all the voices discussed in this chapter that influence
treaties from inside and outside the state. In most countries, it is the national
government that has constitutional power for treaty making which may affect the
influence of voices from sub-national governments in investment treaties. The
degree of influence and involvement of sub-national governments in the negotiations
of an agreement may vary depending on the constitutional division of competences
between the central, regional and local governments. For example, Canadian prov-
inces played a major role and were invited into the negotiation room in CETA
negotiations due to the comprehensive nature of the agreement which covered
aspects, such as government procurement and agriculture, which fell within the
competence of the provinces.18 Even in those countries where central governments
have exclusive power for treaty making on all subject matters, for example in India
and Australia,19 coordination may still occur between the central government and
regional or local governments, even if this may not be constitutionally required. For
example, Australian states and territories were consulted before, during and after the
negotiation of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement even though it is
15Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, [70]-[78].
16Bungenberg and Titi (2019).
17Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104 (1978). See Caplan and Sharpe
(2013), p. 755, 790.
18Paquin (2013).
19See Article 253 of the Constitution of India. See also, in relation to Australia, section 51(xxix) of
the Constitution of Australia.
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the central government that has exclusive constitutional power to negotiate
treaties.20
4 Voices Outside the State
Outside of the state, there are a wide range of voices, namely business organisations,
investors, non-governmental organisations, the media, academia and the legal pro-
fession, that play their own role in informing policies and thus influencing the text of
a treaty. These voices may use different channels, including contacting members of
the legislature or government departments, formal public consultations, official or
unofficial stakeholder engagements, interaction through social media, public cam-
paigns, publications and other methods of influencing those inside the state.
4.1 Business, Civil Society, Legal Community and Others
Different stakeholder groups, such as business, civil society and the legal community
in each state, may provide their views on investment treaties through the process of
stakeholder engagement run by governments.21 Stakeholder engagement mecha-
nisms act as “knowledge platforms”, which are intended to ensure sustained and up-
to-date information on the stances of the different stakeholder groups.22 Stakeholder
engagement can take various forms and may range from unofficial, ad hoc meetings
to dedicated formal events.23 Exchanges may occur between relevant government
departments and business associations, trade unions, academics, non-government
organisations (NGOs), the legal community and others. Although stakeholder
engagement is normally an ongoing activity built into everyday work of government
departments, enabling an inclusive and continuous dialogue, it is often intensified
when a government is in the process of reviewing existing policies and preparing
new proposals.
20See Parliament of Australia, Report 61: The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, June
2004, https://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapub/house/committee/jsct/usafta/report/fullreport_
pdf.ashx, pp. 36–42.
21See, e.g. public consultation on the US investment model agreement https://ustr.gov/about-us/
policy-offices/press-office/blog/2014/March/Stakeholder-Consultations-Investment-and-the-TTIP;
public consultation on Canada’s foreign investment promotion and protection agreements https://
www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/consultations/fipa-apie/index.aspx?lang¼eng.
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In this regard, public consultations are a common tool in the investment treaty-
making process not least because they enable reaching out to a wide range of
stakeholders. Governments use public consultations to seek views, evidence and
opinions from interested parties with a view to collecting empirical information for
analytical purposes, measuring expectations and identifying non-evident policy
alternatives when making a policy decision.24
An illustrative example of how public consultations have shaped the content of
investment agreements is in relation to the EU’s approach to investor-state dispute
settlement, the Investment Court System. Public consultation in 2014 on investment
protection and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the proposed TTIP
between the EU and the United States recorded an unprecedented mobilisation by
civil society in Europe. The consultation responses raised concerns around the
establishment and functioning of arbitral tribunals and the lack of appellate review
of ISDS awards. The public consultation and ensuing debate, that involved the
European Parliament, EU member states and civil society, led the European Com-
mission to develop the Investment Court System as its preferred mechanism for
resolving disputes between investors and states rather than ad hoc investor-state
arbitration.25
Lobbying activity between interest groups and members of the legislature is also
common. Feedback received from such meetings, together with input from other
sources, may form part of the evidence base on which investment policies are
designed and the content of model investment agreements is ultimately shaped.
4.2 Media
The news media can also be influential in shaping policies and, by extension, in
shaping a treaty’s content. It can serve both as a separate actor that carries its own
views, or as a vehicle that gives floor to voices that otherwise may not have found
their way to a broader audience. This is particularly the case with digital and social
media which have facilitated dissemination of information and dialogue among
interested parties on all possible issues, including investment policies and arbitra-
tion. For example, social media played a pivotal role in the development of the
movement opposing TTIP negotiations and in the backlash against ISDS. An
analysis of European online media shows that anti-TTIP groups dominated 60% of
online media coverage from June to November 2014.26 ISDS by far occupied the
24Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Background Document on Public
Consultation https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/36785341.pdf, p. 1.
25See European Commission, A Multilateral Investment Court, September 2017, http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156042.pdf.
26Bauer (2015).
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largest share in total online media coverage (roughly 40%), followed by genetically
modified organisms (13%), transparency (10%) and culture (10%).27
Social media is used by academics, NGOs and other groups to express views on
different matters, including investment policies. At the same time, in response to
demands for more transparency and with a view to receiving direct feedback from
the public, social media is being increasingly used by governments to communicate
different actions including legislative proposals, initiatives and updates on the
progress of trade and investment negotiations and thus serves as a platform for direct
feedback from the public.28
4.3 Academia
Academia also plays a key role in shaping developments in the field of investment
law and policy, and thus inevitably in informing the content of investment treaties.
For instance, Roberts argues that the rise of public law and public international law
paradigms in investment legal scholarship has both reflected and reinforced concerns
about the lack of transparency in investment treaty arbitration, with states responding
to legitimacy critiques by adopting various reforms aimed at increasing transpar-
ency.29 Broadly speaking, governments interact with academia directly and indi-
rectly. Academics may participate directly in advisory committees of experts which
are consulted by policymakers or may be commissioned to conduct evidence
reviews. Academics may also be seconded to government departments to support
policymaking.30
Aside from the direct involvement of academics in policymaking, the product of
their independent academic work also plays an influential role in shaping investment
treaties. There is indeed an increasing number of publications, including titles,
journals and blogposts dedicated to international investment law, offering views
and evidence from scholars and practitioners on investment law and policy matters.
Quite often dedicated government departments will have access to databases that
host such articles whereas, in other cases, such material may find its way to
government through direct exchanges between academics and government officials.
Conferences, colloquia and workshops hosted by research institutes, universities,
law firms and government departments enable government officials to engage with
scholars and practitioners and bring any key take-away points back to their minis-
tries to inform decision-making and eventually the content of an investment treaty.
27Ibid.
28For instance, the UK government and individual UK government departments maintain twitter
accounts on which they publish information on their services, initiatives, actions etc.
29Roberts (2013).
30Sasse and Haddon (2018).
10 C. Mavromati and S. Spottiswood
Finally, there have also been instances of academics seeking to influence invest-
ment treaty making through different forms of activism. For example, on 31 August
2010, approximately 50 academics signed a statement strongly criticising the
existing investment treaty regime.31 The statement was produced against the back-
drop of several ongoing processes at the time, such as the EU’s development of a
common investment policy, the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations and regional
initiatives in Latin America to reform investment law and arbitration. It called on
states to review their investment treaties with a view to withdrawing from or
renegotiating them and urged states to take steps to replace or curtail the use of
investment treaty arbitration while strengthening their domestic justice system.32
5 Voices Among States
Third, voices among states play a distinct role in shaping and informing national
positions, which are ultimately reflected in the content of investment treaties. These
voices include international organisations, multilateral fora, bilateral discussions, the
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals and international agreements.
5.1 International Organisations
Policymakers and treaty negotiators heavily draw on research carried out by inter-
national organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD).33 International organisations observe trends across the world and
select, classify and analyse data in relation to, for example, investment policies,
existing regulatory, legal and institutional frameworks, investment agreements and
arbitral awards. UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub, for instance, offers a wealth of
tools and information on investment policies and investment agreements, including
possible policy options which may be considered by policymakers and treaty
negotiators when drawing up investment policies and model treaties.34
31Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, Aug. 31, 2010.
32Ibid.
33OECD, Investment Policy, https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/; UNCTAD,
International Investment Policies for Development, https://unctad.org/en/pages/publications/Intl-
Investment-Policies-for-Development-(Issue-Series).aspx.
34For further information on UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub, see https://investmentpolicy.
unctad.org/.
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5.2 Multilateral Fora
At the same time, many international organisations host regular fora which bring
together government representatives from around the world to exchange information
and experiences on investment law and policies with a view to developing good
practices. These allow treaty negotiators to remain up to date on different trends,
discuss concerns and explore points of convergence or divergence with other
countries, which can further facilitate discussions on a bilateral level when negoti-
ating an investment treaty. One such forum is the OECD Freedom of Investment
Roundtables which bring together governments from around the world to discuss
investment issues.35
Aside from the existing institutionalised fora, a great deal of work is carried out
by ad hoc intergovernmental working groups which are set up to address specific
issues. These working groups may develop rules which may then be adopted or
incorporated into investment treaties. A recent example of an intergovernmental
forum that delivered successfully on its mandate in the investment field is the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Working Group II
which produced the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-
State Arbitration and the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-
based Investor-State Arbitration.36 There are also a number of working groups that
are currently shaping developments in the investment treaty field, including
UNCITRAL Working Group III on the reform of investor-state dispute settlement
and the ICSID Rules Amendments State Consultations.37 The discussions that are
being held in these working groups are informative for treaty negotiators as they
bring together an unprecedented number of governments which are jointly trying to
address shared concerns around the future of investor-state dispute settlement
drawing on their investment treaty experience. Discussions in these working groups
are supported by extensive academic work and empirical research by the
UNCITRAL and ICSID Secretariats but also by other participants, including aca-
demics, practitioners and civil society organisations. Other than assisting with the
specific discussions around multilateral reform, these contributions serve as a source
of information and evidence for governments when reviewing their investment
policies and model investment agreements.
35For further information on the OECD Freedom of Investment Roundtables, see https://www.oecd.
org/daf/inv/investment-policy/foi.htm.
36See United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor State Arbitration,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/transparency.
37UNCITRAL Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, https://uncitral.un.
org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state; ICSID Rules and Regulations Amendment Process,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments.
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5.3 Bilateral Discussions
Additionally, government officials regularly meet in the margins of international
meetings, and also during dedicated bilateral meetings between governments (for
example, at ministerial or diplomatic visits), which provide an opportunity for policy
ideas and textual solutions to be developed between states. These meetings may be
ad hoc or in the context of special bilateral working groups set up to facilitate
discussions and negotiations between countries.
5.4 Arbitral Awards and International Judgments
Arbitral awards are arguably among the “loudest” voices in the treaty-making
process. Depending on the approach taken, arbitral awards could be considered to
fall either into the category of “voices among states” or “voices outside the state”. If
arbitral awards are viewed as a product of tribunals that are set up by states to
perform an adjudicatory function, they can be seen to fall within the realm of “voices
among states”. However, if emphasis is placed on the fact that arbitral awards are
issued by an independent tribunal outside the state, then it may be more intuitive to
classify them as “voices outside the state”. As noted earlier, the categorisation of
voices in this chapter primarily serves presentational purposes.
Arbitral awards encompass tribunals’ interpretation of treaty provisions, which
enables treaty negotiators to test the boundaries of treaty language, identify any gaps
or imperfections in existing treaties and fix those in future treaties. One recent
example can be seen in additions of carve-outs for tobacco control measures in
various investment chapters following the investment treaty disputes brought by
tobacco companies against Australia and Uruguay.38
However, it is not just arbitral awards that may influence the words and content of
a treaty; the decisions of international courts could be highly influential too. The
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the World Trade Organi-
sation (WTO) and other international courts and tribunals may be drawn on by
investment treaty negotiators as a comparative device. One can discern, for instance,
the influence of the ICJ’s Barcelona Traction judgment39 in the inclusion of indirect
investments, most notably in the form of shareholdings, in investment treaties, as a
38See, e.g., Article 29.5 of the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership and Article
22 of the Singapore – Australia Free Trade Agreement. These provisions were added following
Philip Morris Asia Limited v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, 17 December 2015 and Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products SA and
Abal Hermanos SA. v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 8 July 2016.
39Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (New Application, 1962), Belgium
v. Spain, Judgment, Merits, Second Phase, (1970) 9 ILM 227.
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result of the finding in that judgement about the limited standing of shareholders
under customary international law.40
5.5 Other Investment Treaties and International Agreements
Finally, investment treaties may carry influence from investment treaties between
other states which respectively reflect a myriad of other voices. This is demonstrated
by the way that similar provisions can be seen in a number of different treaties
between unrelated parties. It has been observed to this effect that most investment
treaties were negotiated from a relatively small set of similar model BITs, which
makes them “bilateral in form but somewhat multilateral in substance.”41 For
example, although there may be slight differences in the definition of “investment”
between treaties and over time, there are ascertainable common features that show
the capacity for “cross-fertilisation” between investment agreements.42
Moreover, quite often investment treaties incorporate disciplines found in other
international agreements, thus broadening considerably the scope of voices that
shape the content of an investment treaty. Investment agreements, for instance,
increasingly import language from the general exceptions and security exception
clauses found in the WTO Agreements.43
6 Voices Over Time
Past investment treaties concluded by the state or model investment agreements that
incorporate voices from these three categories are also heard by governments when
negotiating newer treaties or in the process of developing a model investment
agreement. Past treaties may often serve as a starting point, but as they reflect the
prevailing political and socio-economic conditions at a particular time, some content
may prove outdated or imperfect over time, particularly in light of subsequent
arbitral awards, in which case their viability and contemporariness may need to be
reviewed.
As with all voices that feed into the words on the page of a treaty, the weight to be
given to these past voices is one question that must be considered in the treaty-
making process. There is value in treaty provisions that relate to investors and cross-
border commerce remaining constant where it creates certainty and predictability in
40Baumgartner (2016), pp. 261–262.
41Roberts (2013).
42See, e.g., UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in Investment
Rulemaking, February 2007, https://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf, pp. 7–10.
43Mitchell et al. (2018).
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business transactions and government decision making. However, the need for
certainty must be weighed against the inevitable need to modernise a treaty to reflect
social, legal, political or economic developments and the desire for treaties to reflect
the policies of different administrations.
7 Balancing Voices in Treaty Making
Voices in each of the three categories (inside, outside and among states) in one state
may influence its model treaty, which is a document that contains that state’s
preferred treaty provisions. However, treaties must have more than one party and
as investment treaties represent a negotiated outcome, the influence that different
voices from each state party exert on the final text varies. It may be difficult to
discern from the final text how each voice that influences each state party has been
reflected in the text and ultimately shaped the final outcome.
There are questions about how these voices are considered, weighed, filtered and
prioritised by treaty negotiators in the process of negotiating and drafting an
investment agreement. It may be that certain voices are “louder” or given priority
due to the preponderance of evidence or viewpoints, ministerial or legislative
preference or social or economic significance, but there is scope for further work
to analyse these influences.
There are also questions around the effectiveness and legitimacy of any balancing
exercise conducted by states which are ripe for further research. Balancing the range
of voices feeding into the process of treaty making is a complex task, particularly
where voices conflict with other voices both from one state and from different
negotiating parties. Further complexities also arise in the case of large multi-party
modern treaties with investment provisions, such as the Comprehensive and Pro-
gressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, where a multitude of voices must be combined
and distilled into one single agreement.
8 Conclusion
The text of investment treaties is an amalgamation of different voices from inside,
outside and among states. Legislatures, ministers, courts, officials, businesses, civil
society, academics, other states, intergovernmental organisations, international tri-
bunals and other treaties are all part of a rich tapestry of influences that treaty
negotiators from each state take into the negotiating room. What emerges in the
text of a treaty must necessarily weigh and distil this collection of voices heard by
each party and between the parties to the treaty. By giving a comprehensive
overview of the range of voices that feed into the investment treaty-making process,
it is hoped that this study will shed further light on the process of investment
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treaty making whilst serving as fertile ground for further research on how these
voices are balanced in the text of an investment treaty.
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Abstract The chapter examines the evolution of the role of the home state in
foreign investment law. Traditionally, such a role was essentially limited to norm-
setting and protecting nationals and national companies abroad. Protection was
typically offered through diplomatic protection, which was based on the legal fiction
that the state was vindicating its own right. The conclusion of modern investment
treaties, the progressive emancipation of foreign investors and the development of
investor-state arbitration meant a marginalisation of the home state. Some recent
treaties, however, have paved the way for a new role for the home state that goes well
beyond protection of its nationals and national companies. Innovative provisions
have introduced obligations and responsibilities for the home state, especially with
regard to the fight against corruption and the liability of its own investors. It remains
to be seen to which extent these provisions will spread across the international
community of states.
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1 Introduction
The aim of the chapter is to reflect on the role the home state plays in foreign
investment law in the light of some recent developments and in particular some
innovative provisions contained in investment treaties or model treaties. The chapter
is divided in three parts that follow a chronological order: the role traditionally
played by the home state; the role played by the home state in modern foreign
investment law; and the role the home state may play in the future.1
2 Role of the Home State Before the Development
of Foreign Investment Law
Before the full development of international investment law as we know it today, the
role of the home state was essentially limited to protecting its subjects at the
international level. As pointed out by the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ) in 1924, it was—and still is—“an elementary principle of international law
that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to
international law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable
to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels”.2
In protecting its subjects, the home state performed three main functions. First, it
contributed to the setting of normative standards for what was essentially the
protection of aliens and their properties abroad. This occurred at the level of
customary international law through legal claims and counterclaims put forward—
and often fiercely resisted—in official documents, such as diplomatic correspon-
dence in the context of international disputes.3
At the same time, states concluded increasingly sophisticated agreements, inter
alia, for the promotion and protection of foreign investment. These agreements took
typically the form of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties and similar
instruments. Initially dealing with a rather heterogeneous range of issues, these
treaties progressively focused on economic matters. The most sophisticated of
1Unless otherwise indicated, treaties and investment decisions referred to in this paper are available,
respectively, at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements, and
https://www.italaw.com.
2Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. UK), 1924 PCIJ (ser. B) No. 3, 30 August 1924,
p. 12. In literature, see in particular Salacuse (2015), esp. Ch. 4; Miles (2013); Polanco (2018). See
also Dumberry (2016), esp. Ch 2.
3For the famous diplomatic correspondence between Mexico and the United States in the 1930s in
relation to the rules governing expropriation in the context of the Mexican economic reforms, see
e.g. the documents reproduced in Hackworth (1942) vol. III, 228. Less known, but equally
interesting is the contemporaneous correspondence between the British and the Mexican govern-
ments, see Correspondence with the Mexican Government regarding the Expropriation of Oil
Properties in Mexico, 8 to 20 May 1938, Cmd. 5758.
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these treaties can be considered as the precursors of modern bilateral investment
treaties (BITs).4
Secondly, the home state played an important role in the adjudication of disputes
concerning alleged violations of the international rules on the treatment of aliens and
their properties. The typical mechanisms were claims commissions, mixed arbitral
tribunals, and occasionally resort to the Permanent Court of Permanent Justice and
later the International Court of Justice (ICJ).5 These disputes were clearly interstate
disputes in which the home state asserted its own rights or, more precisely, “its right
to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law”.6
This is evidenced by the fact that the home state was the claimant,7 and therefore
was in control of the presentation of the claim and the submission of evidence,
although the affected nationals could marginally be involved in the proceedings.
That the claim belonged to the home state was further confirmed by the calculation
of compensation. As pointed out by the PCIJ, “the damage suffered by an individual
is never [. . .] identical in kind with that which will be suffered by a state; it can only
afford a convenient scale for the calculation of the reparation due to the State”.8
Thirdly, with regard to the enforcement of the rules on the protection of nationals
and their properties, the home state characteristically acted in diplomatic protection,
which was based on the legal fiction that “an injury to the national was an injury to
the State”.9 The home state did not hesitate to intervene militarily in a period in
which, “from the nature of things and the absence of any common superior tribunal,
nations [were] compelled to have recourse [to go to war], in order to assert and
vindicate their rights”.10 The action of the home state typically took the form of what
was elegantly—but by no means less brutally—called gunboat diplomacy.11 Signif-
icantly, the first treaty limitation on the use of military force related precisely to the
4For two interesting examples, compare the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion between the United States and Bolivia (1858) at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/
bolivia01.asp, and the much more sophisticated Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between
the United States and Ethiopia (1951), 206UNTS 41. In the second agreement the parties committed
themselves to accord “at all times fair and equitable treatment” to the respective nationals and
companies, and to expropriate their properties only for public purposes and against “prompt
payment of just and effective compensation” (Article VIII).
5See Parlett (2011), esp. Ch. 2.
6Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. UK), 1924
PCIJ (ser. B) No. 3, 30 August 1924, p. 12.
7As expressly held by the Germany-United States Mixed Claims Commission in Administrative
Decision II, 1 November 1923, VII UNRIIA 23, p. 26.
8Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów, PCIJ, Series A, No. 17 (1928), p. 28.
9International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006), Commentary to
Article 1, para 4.
10Phillimore (1885), vol. III, p. 77.
11Borchard (1929), p. 121; Tomz (2007).
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recovery of contract debt claims claimed by one government from another govern-
ment as due to the former’s nationals.12
The exercise of diplomatic protection was opposed by several Latin American
states, which developed the so-called Calvo doctrine.13 According to the doctrine,
foreigners were entitled to the same protection as nationals and could not lay claim to
more extensive protection.14 An important corollary of the doctrine was that states
could not intervene in diplomatic protection. Latin American states sought to
exclude diplomatic protection through the inclusion in contracts with foreigners of
the so-called Calvo clause.15
3 Role of the Home State in Foreign Investment Law
3.1 Normative Function
The first function sketched in the previous section, namely norm-setting, is still
firmly in the hands of states. The legal protection of foreign investment has changed
radically with the conclusion since 1959 of more than 3000 bilateral investment
agreements or economic integration agreements containing provisions on invest-
ment.16 The conclusion of these agreements recorded a spectacular increase in the
1990s and 2000s.
States remain the masters of these agreements. They negotiate, amend, interpret
and terminate them (unilaterally or by mutual consent) in accordance with the terms
of the agreements themselves and the law of treaties. Contrary to FCN treaties,
modern BITs focus exclusively on the promotion and protection of foreign invest-
ment. They contain increasingly sophisticated definitions and substantive and pro-
cedural rules.17
12Convention Respecting the Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts
(The Hague Convention II), concluded on 18 October 1907, at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_
century/hague072.asp.
13The doctrine was originally elaborated by Andrés Bello, see Montt (2009), pp. 41–44. It was
proclaimed in Article 9 of the 1933 Convention on the Duties and Rights of States, 26 December
1933, 165 LNTS 19.
14Calvo (1896), p. 231. See also Hershey (1907), p. 1; Shea (1955); Orrego Vicuña (2003), p. 19;
Schreuer (2005).
15See Summers (1933), p. 459; Lipstein (1945), p. 130.
16According to UNCTAD’s website, 3291 investment agreements have been concluded and 2649
of them have entered into force, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements.
17To appreciate the evolution of BITs, it is sufficient to compare a BIT concluded by the United
States in the 1990s with the BIT concluded with Uruguay on 4 November 2004. In literature, see in
particular Dolzer and Stevens (1995); Sacerdoti (1997), p. 251; Vandevelde (2010); Van Harten
(2010); Salacuse (2015); Brown (2013).
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3.2 Adjudication
The real breakthrough, however, has occurred with regard to the second function,
namely adjudication of disputes. Modern investment agreements systematically
provide for two categories of disputes: interstate disputes and disputes between
investors and the host state. While interstate disputes remain rather exceptional,
according to UNCTAD, the number of known investor-state disputes is approaching
1000.18 Virtually all investment treaties19 give the concerned foreign investors
access to international arbitration tribunals, normally without any obligation to
exhaust domestic remedies beforehand.20 The rationale behind these provisions is
precisely to remove the dispute from the domestic arena and insulate it from any kind
of pressure, including political pressure.21
These provisions propel foreign investors into the realm of international dispute
settlement, a development that can be explained in two ways.22 According to the first
explanation, the agreement creates a legal relationship between the host state and the
investor, the latter being the holder of substantive rights. Violations of these rights can
be vindicated directly by the investor. As held by a tribunal, investment arbitration is
“a remedy exercisable by an investor by itself and in its own right against the host
state”.23 It is worth noting that some investment treaties, such as the BIT between
Peru and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU), expressly recognise
“that investors of one of the Contracting Parties are entitled to prevail directly their
rights against the other Contracting Party through the arbitration.”24
18At https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement. On the current discussion
on the reform of investment arbitration within UNCITRAL, see https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_
groups/3/investor-state. On asymmetries of investment arbitration, see in particular Toral and
Schultz (2010). See also Laborde (2010) and Van Harten (2012).
19For two exeptions, see the BIT between Bulgaria and Cyprus, concluded on 17 November 1987
and entered into force on 18 May 1988, and the free trade agreement (FTA) between the United
States and Australia, concluded on 18 May 2004 and entered into force on 1 January 2005.
20See Paulsson (1995), Sornarajah (2000), McLachlan et al. (2007) and De Brabandere (2015).
21See, for instance, Gas Natural SDG v Argentina, ICSID ARB/03/10, Decision on Jurisdiction,
17 June 2005, paras 29 ff.
22Douglas (2003), especially pp. 181–184; De Brabandere (2015), Ch. 2.
23Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005, para. 150. In
Gas Natural SDG v Argentina, ICSID ARB/03/10, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005, para.
34, the tribunal held that “the foreign investor acquires rights” under the treaty. In Corn Products
International, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID ARB (AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, 15 January 2008,
para. 168, the tribunal held that NAFTA contracting parties intended “to confer substantive rights
directly upon investors”. In Case No. A/18, 5 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. (1984-I) 251, p. 261, the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal emphasised that “it is the rights of the claimant, not of his nation, that are to
be determined by the Tribunal”. See also, UK Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Occidental
Exploration & Production Company and Ecuador, 9 September 2005, [2005] EWCA Civ 1116,
para. 18.
24Article 11.2, second sentence, of the BLEU-Peru BIT, concluded on 12 October 2005 and entered
into force on 12 September 2008.
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Alternatively, a second and more conservative explanation splits substantive and
procedural provisions. From this perspective, substantive rules continue to be
binding exclusively upon states, while investors are permitted to file requests for
arbitration in case of violation.25 From this perspective, the right of investors is
derivative as states have transferred the right to seek the enforcement of the obliga-
tions contained in the treaty to their respective foreign investors. According to a
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tribunal, foreign investors “are
permitted for convenience to enforce what are in origin the rights of Party states”.26
In spite of the different theoretical foundations, however, the ultimate result is in
good substance the same. In sharp contrast with disputes described in the previous
section, in investment arbitration the claim is put forward and managed by the
investor itself. The investor first attempts to reach a friendly settlement, makes a
selection between the possible fora (if more than one are available), is involved in the
appointment of the members of the tribunal, is in charge of all litigation strategies,
submits all written documents, participates in the hearings, and ultimately is the
recipient of compensation, if any is due.27 As pointed out by a tribunal, “[t]he State
of nationality of the Claimant does not control the conduct of the case. No compen-
sation which is recovered will be paid to the State”.28 Quite the contrary, the idea of
investment arbitration is precisely to keep the state as much as possible away from
the proceedings.
The emancipation of investors as fully independent actors allowing them to bring
and manage their own claims before arbitral tribunals means that claims brought
against the host state by a foreign investor and by the home state are independent,
even if they refer to the same measures or conduct. In Plama v. Bulgaria, the tribunal
convincingly held that even if the investor cannot invoke the relevant provision on
the settlement of investor-state disputes (Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT)),29 the right of the home state to invoke the state-state dispute settlement
provision (Article 27 of the ECT) remains intact.30
25This seems to be the preferred position of Canada,Methanex v.United States, Second Submission
of Canada Pursuant to NAFTA Article 1128, 30 April 2001, para. 9, at https://www.
investorstatelawguide.com/documents/documents/UN-0015-29%20-%20Methanex%20v.%20US
%20-%20Canada%201128%20Subm%202.pdf.
26Loewen Group, Inc v. United States, ICSID ARB (AF)/98/3 (NAFTA), Award, 26 June 2003,
para. 233. NAFTA was concluded on 17 December 1992 and entered into force on 1 January 1994.
27This is without prejudice to the possibility of negotiations between the host and the home state, or
the institution of proceedings by the latter against the former.
28As pointed out in Corn Products International, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID ARB (AF)/04/1, Decision
on Responsibility, 15 January 2008, para. 173 and footnote 70, only exceptionally is the investor
not fully in control of the claim. This is the case of Article 2103(6) of NAFTA, according to which
the home state and the host state can effectively preclude a putative claim of expropriation based
upon a taxation measure by determining that the measure in question was not an expropriation.
29Concluded on 17 December 1994 and entered into force on 16 April 1998.
30Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005, para. 150.
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Furthermore, the home state cannot prevent its own investors from filing a request
for arbitration, not even if it has started state-state proceedings. In Empresas
Lucchetti v. Peru, the host state asked for the suspension of the investor-state
proceedings since the claimant’s allegations at the heart of the dispute were the
object of a concurrent state-state arbitration. The tribunal held that the conditions for
a suspension of the proceedings were not met and rejected the request without further
discussion.31
The independence of each claim is further demonstrated by the fact that some
treaties expressly preclude the possibility of international claims brought by the
home state if the investor has started arbitration proceedings, unless the host state has
failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in the dispute. Article 27(1) of
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) offers an excellent example. It pro-
vides that “[n]o Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an
international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another
Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitra-
tion under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to
abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute”.32 Finally, in
investor-state disputes, the home state can make—and has indeed made—non-
disputing party submissions expressing disagreement with the position of its own
investors, an issue that will be discussed below.33
Yet, in spite of the developments concerning the settlement of disputes through
arbitration, diplomatic protection retains its importance, especially before resort to
arbitration. Diplomatic action continues to be used for the purpose of facilitating the
settlement of the dispute,34 and even of pushing the host state to consent to
arbitration.35 From this perspective, diplomatic protection has not been disposed
of by arbitration, but rather plays a complementary role.36
Furthermore, it is worth noting that diplomatic protection has undergone a
profound evolution. The International Law Commission has considered the legal
31Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. Peru, ICSID ARB/03/4, Award, 7 February
2005, paras 7 and 9.
32For other examples, Article 34.3 of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Comprehensive Investment Agreement; Article 14.13(i) of the Indian Model BIT; Article 30.1 of
the Belarus-India BIT, signed on 24 September 2018 (not in force yet). See also Appendix III,
Article 4 of the Arbitration Rules of the Stockholm Chamber Commerce.




34This is fully consistent with Article 27 of the ICSID Convention. See the action of the German
Government in relation to the claim brought by Fraport against the Philippines in Polanco
(2018), p. 226.
35See Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Costa Rica, ICSID ARB/96/1, Final Award,
17 February 2000, paras 24–26.
36See Polanco (2018), p. 230.
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fiction behind the traditional exercise of diplomatic protection as unnecessary in
contemporary international law and recognised that states may exercise it in their
own right, that of their nationals, or both.37 From this perspective, in CSM v.
Argentina, the tribunal did not hesitate to hold that “the State of nationality is no
longer considered to be protecting its own interest in the claim but that of the
individual affected”.38
3.3 Enforcement
With regard to the third function, namely enforcement, the introduction of invest-
ment arbitration has also meant a significant retreat of the home state once the
investor has instituted arbitral proceedings and possibly the relegation of diplomatic
protection to the hypothesis of failure by the host state to comply with the award
rendered by the arbitral tribunal. A minority of investment treaties (around 12%)
expressly preclude resort to diplomatic protection during arbitral proceedings, apart
from informal diplomatic exchanges genuinely meant to facilitate the settlement of
the dispute.39
It remains to be seen whether diplomatic protection is still available during
arbitral proceedings when the relevant treaties are silent on the issue. In Italy
v. Cuba, the ad hoc arbitral tribunal held by majority that “tant que l’investisseur
ne s’est pas soumis à l’arbitrage international contre l’Etat d’accueil, son droit à la
protection diplomatique subsiste”.40 The statement hints a contrario to the fact that
diplomatic protection is not available once arbitral proceedings have been instituted.
This position seems to be shared by some scholars. According to one view, invest-
ment arbitration is based on a trade-off since “the potential respondent State accepts
to arbitrate with a private entity and [. . .] is relieved from the risk of being exposed to
diplomatic protection by the investor’s Home State”.41
Yet, other authors are sceptical about the exclusion of diplomatic protection
during arbitration proceedings in the absence of a specific treaty provision in this
37Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries (2006), Article 1, Commentary, para.
5, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2006) Vol. II, Part II, 27.
38CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/01/8, Decision on Jurisdiction,
17 July 2003, para. 45 (relying on Bederman (2002), pp. 253–256). Quoted with approval in
Italy v. Cuba, Interim Award, 15 March 2005, para. 65. In the Final Award, 1 January 2008, para.
141, the Tribunal seems more hesitant when holding that the home state acting in diplomatic
protection still makes the claims its own (“s’approprie”).
39Paparinskis (2008), pp. 281–297.
40Italy v. Cuba, Interim Award, 15 March 2005,para 65; Final Award, 1 January 2008, para. 141.
41Kaufmann-Kohler (2013), pp. 324–325. See also Kokott (2002), esp. p. 31; Juratowitch (2008),
pp. 21–22.
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sense.42 They have insisted on the absence of sufficient evidence on the emergence
of customary rules preventing states from exercising diplomatic protection once
arbitral proceedings have been instituted. According to this view, the very fact that
some treaty provisions—such as Article 27 of the ICSID Convention—preclude
diplomatic protection during arbitral proceeding proves that the two remedies are
autonomous and may well coexist as long as the concerned states have not agreed
otherwise.
The delicate relationship between diplomatic protection and investment arbitra-
tion has resurfaced in the context of the 2014 Rules on Transparency of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), whose Article 5
(2) in fine directs the tribunal to take into account, when allowing non-disputing
party submissions, “the need to avoid submissions which would support the claim of
the investor in a manner tantamount to diplomatic protection”.43
It is well known that several investment treaties, such as NAFTA,44 the Compre-
hensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European Union and
Canada,45 or the BIT between Peru and Japan,46 offer the non-disputing state parties
the possibility of presenting formal written submissions on the interpretation of the
relevant treaty provisions with a view to assisting the tribunal in its search of the
common intention of the parties as recorded in the treaty.47 Obviously, the interpre-
tation put forward in the non-disputing party submission may influence the decision
of the tribunal since interpretation “[i]nvolves understanding the intention” of the
parties to the treaty.48 Indeed, this is precisely the purpose of the submissions,
namely to safeguard the “legitimate”49 or “systemic”50 interest of the treaty parties
to the treaty in the correct interpretation of the treaty.
Non-disputing party submissions relate to the interpretation of certain treaty
provisions and as such must be abstract and detached from the merits of the dispute.
42Polanco (2018), p. 222, notes that “in the absence of a specific provision in an investment treaty or
the applicable arbitral rules, there should be no limitation on having both [Investor-State Arbitra-
tion] and diplomatic protection claims in parallel”. See also Paparinskis (2008), pp. 281–300.
43See https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Trans
parency-E.pdf.
44Article 1128 of NAFTA.
45Article 8.38(2) of CETA, concluded on 30 October 2016 and entered into provisional application
on 21 September 2017, with the exclusion of the chapter on investment.
46Article 18(17) of the Japan-Peru BIT, concluded on 21 November 2008 and entered into force on
10 December 2009.
47In 2015, the estimation was that well under 1% of investment treaties provide explicitly for
submissions by non-disputing parties, see Gordon and Pohl (2015), p. 26.
48Mobil Investments Inc. & Murphy Oil Corporation v. Canada, ICSID ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision
on Liability and on Principles of Quantum, 22 May 2012, para. 254, quoted with approval in Mesa
Power Group LLC v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2012-17 (NAFTA and UNCITRAL), Award,
24 March 2016, para. 405.
49Kinnear (2006).
50Paparinskis and Howley (2015), p. 196.
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If they are not, the tribunal should simply discard them. Whether a submission is in
favour of the investor should be incidental. The reference to “tantamount to diplo-
matic protection” in Article 5(2) of the 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency51
can indeed be read as excluding submissions intended to advance the cause of the
investor by taking position on the specific circumstances of the pending dispute
instead of clarifying the non-disputing party’s position on certain points of treaty
interpretation. Otherwise the state would unduly interfere with the proceedings and
affect their independence and fairness.
The risk is however more apparent than real. According to an arbitrator, the
respondent state and the non-disputing state(s) inevitably “club together” to share the
same interpretation at the expense of the investor.52 Whatever the merits of this view
and the negative connotation attached to it, the statement demonstrates that the home
state does not necessarily share the position of its own nationals and has moved away
from its role as protector. Indeed, the attitude of the home state must be seen through
the lens of mutual interest and reciprocity, the engines of the development of
international law. From this perspective, the home state is more interested in the
proper interpretation of the treaty rather than in the outcome of the specific dispute
before the tribunal. In other words, what really matters to the home state is ensuring
that all investors falling within the scope of the treaty enjoy exactly the protection the
contracting parties had agreed to grant them, nothing less and nothing more.
Ultimately, in addition to diplomatic protection, the home state may adopt the
measures permitted under general international law to induce compliance by the host
state with its investment obligations or final and binding investment awards.53 Such
measures may typically take the form of acts of retorsion, which consist in unfriendly
measures always available to states—since they are not inconsistent with any
relevant international obligations—possibly including withdrawal from the World
Trade Organization’s (WTO) Generalized Systems of Preferences.54 Alternatively,
the home state may resort to countermeasures. This presupposes a prior breach of
international law—in this case non-compliance with investment obligations or
investment awards—, it implies a conduct otherwise contrary to international law
and must respect all conditions required under the rules on state responsibility.55
It remains however doubtful whether, in the case of a plurilateral investment
treaty, the right to adopt countermeasures may be extended also to what the
International Law Commission has qualified under Article 54 of the Articles on
51See https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Trans
parency-E.pdf.
52C. N. Brower, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Mesa Power Group LLC v. Canada, PCA
Case No. 2012-17 (NAFTA and UNCITRAL), Award, 24 March 2016, para. 30.
53See Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 1109; Echandi (2012).
54See Alford (2014); Titi (2014); Polanco (2018), pp. 205–209.
55See International Law Commission, Articles on State Responsibility (2001), especially Articles
49 to 53, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2001) Vol. II, Part II, 20. Countermea-
sures have normally been discussed as circumstances precluding wrongfulness see, in particular,
Paparinskis (2008).
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the Responsibility of States as “States other than the injured State”—or, for the
purpose of this chapter “states other than the home state”. Since the obligations
imposed by the treaty are clearly based on reciprocity and not “established for the
protection of a collective interest of the group”,56 the right to adopt countermeasures
clearly only concerns the home state. Indeed, these obligations are divisible, in the
sense that a state may breach them with regard to one but not necessarily all other
states parties to the treaty.57
4 Towards a New Role for the Home State
The role the home state is going to play in the future, and indeed the role it has
already started to play, must be appreciated in the context of the reform that the entire
investment treaty regime is currently undergoing.58 After the golden period between
1990 and the 2000s, the popularity of investment treaties has significantly dropped.
States are now rather reluctant to conclude investment agreements, although region-
alism is still on the rise.59 A significant number of BITs have been terminated and
their global number has started to decline. States have responded differently to the
three main concerns raised with regard to investment treaties: their manifestly
unbalanced content;60 the safeguard of regulatory powers, which many states per-
ceive as inadequate;61 and the lack of legitimacy and other shortcomings of invest-
ment arbitration.62
56Article 48(1)(a) of the Articles on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission (2001) Vol. II, Part II, p. 20.
57Contra Echandi (2012), p. 122.
58See UNCTAD, Reforming Investment Dispute Settlement: A Stocktaking, IIA Issues Note No
3 (May 2019) https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/news/hub/1608/20190329-reforming-invest
ment-dispute-settlement-a-stocktaking. See also UNCTAD, Reform Package for the International
Investment Regime (2018 edition) https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/uploaded-files/document/
UNCTAD_Reform_Package_2018.pdf.
59See UNCTAD, The Rise of Regionalism in International Investment Policymaking: Consolida-
tion or Complexity?, IIA Issues Note No 3 (June 2013) http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.
aspx?OriginalVersionID¼532. On investment agreements concluded by the European Union or
under negotiation, see the Commission’s website https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-
markets/investment/index_en.htm. On African regional agreements, see Special Issue, 18 Journal
of World Investment & Trade (2017).
60In Spyridon v. Romania, ICSID ARB/06/1, Award, 7 December 2011, para. 871, the tribunal
conceded that the relevant BIT “imposes no obligation on investors, only on contracting States”.
61As pointed out by the Commonwealth Investment Experts Group Meeting for the African Region,
“[o]ne common issue is the need to clarify the interaction between international investment
instruments and domestic investment policy as well as policy in other areas – for e.g., sustainable
development and environmental regulation. Governments must always be concerned about ensur-
ing that there is sufficient policy space for them to engage in reconciling competing interests”,
Kampala, Uganda, 20-21 October 2011, on file with author.
62See, in particular, Waibel et al. (2010); Kalicki and Joubin-Bret (2015).
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Some states have modernized their BITs with a view to bringing them in line with
the development of international law, rebalancing and better defining their substan-
tive provisions, and recalibrating the host state’s exposure to arbitration.63 States
have also adopted new and more sophisticated model BITs, as the Model Text for the
Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty adopted in 2015 (hereinafter Indian Model BIT),
which will be used in the negotiations of BITs between India and other states and can
also be expected to inspire other governments.64 Other states have reconsidered their
investment treaty policy and eventually decided to switch to domestic legislation.
The adoption of the South African Protection of Investment Act (2015), which is
largely pegged to the South African Constitution, is a good example.65
The concerns under discussion are real and have been addressed primarily by
striking a better balance between, on the one hand, the rights and obligations of the
host state and, on the other hand, those of investors. Moreover, a few legal instru-
ments have introduced provisions imposing obligations upon the home state and
enhancing the collaboration between the host and home states, most prominently in
the promotion of sustainable development, the fight against corruption and the
liability of foreign investors.
From this perspective, the Economic Community of West African States’
(ECOWAS) Supplementary Act of 2008 can be considered as having pioneered a
new approach.66 Several of its innovative provisions have subsequently made their
way into other African treaties as well as treaties outside that continent. The
ECOWAS Supplementary Act includes an entire section on the rights and obliga-
tions of the home state, dealing with four issues, namely facilitation of foreign
investment, disclosure of information, liability of investors, and the fight against
corruption.67
In accordance with the ECOWAS Supplementary Act, first, the home state may
facilitate cross border investment and is obliged to inform the host state of the
measures adopted in this regard.68 Second, and more incisively, the home states
shall, on request and subject to a confidentiality caveat, promptly provide a potential
host state with the information expected to enable the latter to comply with its
63See, for instance, the Morocco-Nigeria BIT, concluded on 3 December 2016 (not entered into
force yet).
64See https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20
Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf. For the agreements concluded since the adop-
tion of the Model BIT or under negotiation see https://www.dea.gov.in/bipa?page¼10.
65See https://www.thedti.gov.za/gazzettes/39514.pdf. For a much more pro-investor piece of leg-
islation, see the Law Relating to Investment Promotion and Facilitation adopted by Rwanda in 2015
(N 06/2015) https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws/laws/82/rwanda-investment-
law.
66Supplementary Act A/SA.3/12/08 Adopting Community Rules on Investment and the Modalities
for their Implementation with ECOWAS (hereinafter ECOWAS Supplementary Act), concluded on
28 December 2008 and entered into force on 19 January 2009.
67Section VI of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
68Article 27 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
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obligations under the treaty and domestic legislation. The home states shall also, on
request, promptly provide information on standards that may apply to investors, and
most prominently, those related to social and environmental impact assessments.69
On the latter point, it is worth stressing that the home state may contribute to
standard-setting and to the review of standards applicable to the authorisation and
management of investments made by its own investors in the host state. The main
aim of these provisions is to optimise the impact of investment projects as well as to
enhance compliance by the host state with its international commitments.
With regard to the liability of its own investors, the ECOWAS Supplementary
Act imposes upon the home state the obligation to ensure that its legal system allows
for, or does not prevent or unduly restrict, civil action before its courts in relation to
liability for damages resulting from alleged acts or decisions made by investors in
the territory of the host state. The host state laws on liability shall apply to such civil
proceedings.70
The above provision on liability has been reproduced in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Model BIT Template (2012),71 in the BIT
between Morocco and Nigeria,72 and more importantly the 2015 Indian Model
BIT.73 However, and quite significantly, the provision has not been included neither
in the BIT concluded between India and Belarus on 24 September 2018,74 nor in the
Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Treaty concluded between India and Brazil
on 25 January 2020.75 This is a clear reminder that states may be reluctant to accept
international obligations in this respect.
As pointed out by the Indian Law Commission in its analysis of the 2015 Indian
Model BIT, the provision aims at removing or minimising jurisdictional constraints
that could prevent civil action before the tribunals of the home state, most promi-
nently under the forum non conveniens doctrine on grounds that there is a more
appropriate forum to hear the case.76 This would be typically the case of a dispute
69Article 28 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act. Article 5 of the Morocco-Nigeria BIT provides
that “[t]he Parties shall exchange information concerning investment, particularly through the Joint
Committee. Whenever possible, the information shall, reveal, in advance, useful data on procedures
and special requirements for investment, business opportunities and expectations for major parties
projects”.
70Article 29 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
71See https://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf,
Article 17.
72Article 20 reads: “Investors shall be subject to civil actions for liability in the judicial process of
their home state for the acts or decisions made in relation to the investment where such acts or
decisions lead to significant damage, personal injuries or loss of life in the host state”.
73Article 13, entitled Home State Obligations.
74Not entered into force yet.
75Not entered into force yet.
76Law Commission of India, Report 260 http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report260.
pdf, p. 37. On the doctrine, see amongst many, Brand and Jablonski (2007) and Gardner (2017). On
the resilience of the doctrine, see Holly (2019).
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such as the one related to the infamous Bophal incident,77 which was expressly
mentioned by the Indian Law Commission.78
Enhancing the liability of the home state has found the support of Nobel Prize
economist Joseph Stiglitz, who emphasised, with regard to the liability of multina-
tional companies under the United States Alien Tort Act,79 that civil claims “will not
harm economic development of least developed countries, United States businesses
operating abroad, or investment in the United States”.80
Coming back to the ECOWAS Supplementary Investment Act, investors must
refrain from engaging in practices of corruption.81 Connivance in corruption certi-
fied by a court of the host state would deprive the investor of the right under the
treaty to bring a claim against the host state.82 Interestingly, not only the host but also
the home state may object, on grounds of violations of the above provision, to the
jurisdiction of any tribunal before which the investor has brought a case under the
treaty.83
Moreover, the host state must make corrupt practices criminal offences and
investigate, prosecute and punish them with appropriate sanctions.84 The home
state, in turn, must ensure that any money or other benefits obtained through these
practices is not recoverable or deductible through any fiscal or tax policies. The
home state must also provide all available information that might assist a tribunal
dealing with a claim brought under the treaty in determining whether there has been
a breach of an anti-corruption obligation.85
Furthermore, both the host and the home state may initiate proceedings against
the investor in case of breaches of the prohibition to become involved in corruption,
or in case of persistent failure to comply with domestic obligations related to
hygiene, security, health and social welfare, human rights and fundamental labour
standards, as well as corporate governance and practices.86 The dispute will fall
within the jurisdiction of a tribunal established in accordance with the
77For a recent discussion of the complex litigation in the United States that followed the Bophal
incident, see Krishna (2020). See also, Muchlinski (1987), p. 545; Baxi (1986).
78Law Commission of India, Report 260 http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report260.
pdf, pp. 36–37.
7928 USC § 1350. See in particular Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 US 10, 17 April
2013. In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018), 24 April 2018, the United States
Supreme Court held by a five-four Justice majority that foreign corporations cannot be sued under
the Act https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf.
80Brief of Joseph E. Stiglitz as amicus curiae, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum CO et al,
11 December 2011 https://harvardhumanrights.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/brief-of-joseph-e-
stiglitz.pdf.
81Article 13 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act. See also Article 17 of the Morocco-Nigeria BIT.
82Article 18.1 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
83Article 18.1 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
84Article 30.1 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
85Article 30.3 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
86Article 18. 3 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
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Supplementary Act. This part of the provision remains obscure as the Supplementary
Act expressly provides only for the judicial settlement of a dispute between the host
state and investors.87 This serious shortcoming notwithstanding, the provision shows
that states can go as far as envisaging a role for the home state in the judicial
enforcement of the obligations of its own nationals under the treaty.
The above provisions design a role for the home state that is much more complex
than the traditional norm-setting and protection of national investors and invest-
ments. They have introduced new responsibilities for the home state that, at least
potentially, enhance the collaboration with the host state, increase the standard of
liability for foreign investors, and ultimately may improve the legitimacy of foreign
investment law.
5 Conclusions
Traditionally, the home state acted as the protector of national investors and could
make investors’ claims its own for the purpose of diplomatic protection. The
establishment and development of increasingly sophisticated and efficient interna-
tional mechanisms for the settlement of disputes between investors and the host state
have profoundly modified the situation. On the one hand, foreign investors have
been fully emancipated and can normally bring their own claims before international
arbitral tribunals. They are in control of the entire process of adjudication, although
they may need the support of their own state in case of non-compliance with the
arbitral award. On the other hand, the home state has been relegated to a rather
marginal role as demonstrated, inter alia, by the scarcity of state-state investment
disputes. During the proceedings, the presence of the home state has become much
more discrete and it is not necessarily supportive of the national investors’ claims, as
in the case of non-disputing party submissions.
Recently, however, a few investment treaties provide for a more active role of the
home state. Although such treaties still remain rather isolated, it is possible to detect
a relatively clear trend. Home states are progressively called to play a role that goes
well beyond the traditional protection and may contribute to the reform of the
investment treaty regime. Such a role is emerging in areas where the public interest
is of paramount importance, such as the protection of the environment, the fight
against corruption, and the liability of multinational companies. Yet, borrowing from
the nomenclature of Hollywood’s Oscar awards, the home state will probably never
be nominated for a leading role. This will remain the domain of the host state and
foreign investors. But in due time the home state may receive a nomination for a
supporting role.
87Article 33.6 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act.
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Abstract National courts are actors in investment arbitration since they influence
the functioning of investment arbitration and are themselves in turn influenced by
investment arbitration. The influence of national courts on investment arbitration is
larger than the influence of other international courts and tribunals, since national
law is part of the applicable law in investment arbitration and national courts are
authorised to interpret and apply national law. National courts influence investment
arbitration by competing for jurisdiction through the exhaustion of local remedies,
umbrella clauses, and the fork-in-the-road rule. National courts facilitate investment
arbitration by enforcing awards and at the same time disrupt it when rejecting
enforcement or issuing anti-arbitration injunctions. Investment tribunals can restrain
national courts by issuing anti-suit injunctions. Above all, they can review the deci-
sions of national courts on grounds of denial of justice, fair and equitable treatment,
the effective means test, and indirect expropriation. The the relationship between
national courts and investment tribunals is such that the later have the last word,
although the role of national courts as actors is certainly noteworthy.
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1 Introduction
Legal dictionaries define the term “actor” in diverse ways. An actor is a “person who
instigates or is involved in a legal action”.1 The actor may be involved in the legal
proceedings as a party2 or may be someone whose conduct is in question in the legal
proceedings.3 Broadly seen, an actor is someone involved in legal proceedings in
one way or another.4 National courts are actors in investment arbitration. They may
be involved directly when their decisions form the basis of a cause of action in
investment arbitration proceedings. The activities of national courts may also affect
the functioning of investment arbitration. National courts function as actors in
investment arbitration by performing distinct roles. They may compete for jurisdic-
tion, act as facilitators of the process and outcome of investment arbitration pro-
ceedings, or obstruct the arbitration process and its outcome. It is, therefore,
necessary to investigate their role as actors in investment arbitration.
National courts can influence investment arbitration in specific situations or have
a systemic influence on the overall functioning of investment arbitration. They can
potentially interfere with investment arbitration both at the pre-award stage and at
the post-award stage. In the pre-award phase, national courts may issue anti-
arbitration injunctions or compete for jurisdiction with investment tribunals. In the
post-award phase, the award delivered could be enforced or challenged before
national courts, except for awards issued under the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID
Convention).
After this introduction, the second section deals with the influence of national
courts on the system of investment arbitration by setting out the general framework
of the relationship between national courts and investment arbitration. The following
sections discuss specific aspects of this influence. The third section discusses the
situations and ways in which national courts compete for jurisdiction with invest-
ment tribunals. The fourth section shows the actions of national courts as a disruptive
force, in the form of anti-arbitration injunctions and counteraction by investment
tribunals through anti-suit injunctions. The fifth section presents the ways in which,
through recognition and enforcement of investment awards, national courts can
either facilitate or destroy the outcome of investment arbitration proceedings. The
sixth section elaborates on the situations where actions of national courts form the
1Oxford English Dictionary Online (2019) Oxford University Press. https://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/1963?redirectedFrom¼actors; Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, (1856). https://www.constitution.
org/bouv/bouvier_a.htm.
2Sheppard SM (ed) (2011) The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary, Compact Edition, p. 32.
3Garner BA (ed) (2009) Black’s Law Dictionary 10th edition, p. 42; Collins Online English
Dictionary (2019) Actor, n. HarperCollins Publishing. https://www.collinsdictionary.com/
dictionary/english/actor.
4Burton WC (ed) (1992), Legal Thesaurus, 2nd edition, p. 9.
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basis of the subject-matter of a dispute before an investment tribunal. The last section
concludes.
2 Framework of the Relationship Between National Courts
and Investment Tribunals
Traditionally, an international tribunal will treat a decision of a national court as a
question of fact.5 In practice, this relationship has changed because ever-larger issues
of national law are coming before international courts and tribunals and more issues
of international law are adjudicated in national courts.6
National court decisions contribute towards the formation of customary interna-
tional law. They may serve as evidence of state practice7 or opinio juris8 or, in
appropriate cases, as proof of the “existence and content of rules of customary
international law, as a subsidiary means for the determination of such rules.”9
They are an obvious basis for general principles of law, as a source of international
law.10 If called upon to determine the existence of a rule of customary international
law or general principle of law, an investment tribunal would have to take into
account decisions of national courts. Additionally, legal principles contained in
the decisions of national courts can be adapted and applied in international adjudi-
cation once they go through the process of “abstraction, generalization and
adjustment”.11
National courts have a larger influence in investment arbitration proceedings due
to the peculiar status of national law as part of the applicable law in investment
arbitration proceedings.12 Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) do not offer a
5Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Decision on the Merits,
(1926) PCIJ Series A.- No. 7, p. 19; Brownlie (2003), pp. 38–40.
6Nollkaemper (2006), pp. 301–303, 312–321.
7Draft Conclusion 6 (2), Draft conclusions on identification of customary international law.
International Law Commission, A/73/10, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_
articles/1_13_2018.pdf.
8Draft Conclusion 10 (2), Draft conclusions on identification of customary international law.
International Law Commission, A/73/10, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_
articles/1_13_2018.pdf.
9Draft Conclusion 13, Draft conclusions on identification of customary international law. Interna-
tional Law Commission, A/73/10, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/1_
13_2018.pdf.
10Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), 1927, PCIJ Rep. Series A.-
No. 9, p. 31; Yotova (2017), p. 298.
11Weil (1992), pp. 146–147.
12See Article 42 of the ICSID Convention; Canada-Argentina BIT (1993); Argentina-Spain BIT
(1991); Canada-Costa Rica BIT (1999). For the role and relevance of national law, see generally
Kjos (2013) and Sasson (2017).
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hierarchy between national and international law. However, in situations where there
is a direct conflict, national law will have to give way. The decisions of national
courts are authoritative pronouncements on matters of national law and an invest-
ment tribunal will take these decisions into account when interpreting and applying
the appropriate national law.13
Article 8.31 (2) of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agree-
ment (CETA) acknowledges the relevance of decisions of national courts in the
following terms:
For greater certainty, in determining the consistency of a measure with this Agreement, the
Tribunal may consider, as appropriate, the domestic law of the disputing Party as a matter of
fact. In doing so, the Tribunal shall follow the prevailing interpretation given to the domestic
law by the courts or authorities of that Party and any meaning given to domestic law by the
Tribunal shall not be binding upon the courts or the authorities of that Party.
The provision treats national law as a matter of fact, but in other cases, where such
interpretation is not adopted by the parties, national law would continue to operate as
‘applicable law’, rather than a mere ‘matter of fact’. In any event, this provision
makes it necessary for an investment tribunal to follow the interpretation of national
law as given by national courts. For other treaties, decisions of national courts would
be applicable as authoritative pronouncements alongside international law, particu-
larly in common law jurisdictions where the rule of precedent applies.
The role and influence of national courts in investment arbitration is different
when compared to commercial arbitration. National courts are an influential actor in
commercial arbitration since these proceedings—even if international in nature—are
conducted within the context of the national legislation on arbitration. National
courts can issue interim orders prior to or even in pending arbitration proceedings,
and they can even be involved in the appointment of arbitrators. A commercial
arbitral tribunal can seek the support of the national court in relation to the presence
of witnesses or procurement of evidence, or other related matters. National courts
perform a general supervisory function. They cannot and do not have the same
relationship with investment tribunals. Investment arbitration is “delocalised”. It
draws its authority from a BIT, which is an international treaty, unlike commercial
arbitration which is based on a contract between the parties and national arbitration
legislation recognising the arbitration proceedings and their outcome. Analogies
with the relationship of national courts with international commercial arbitration
for the purpose of investment arbitration is unhelpful.
13Malicorp Limited v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18, para. 103 (c).
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3 Overlap of Jurisdictions
National courts function as actors in investment arbitration through competition for
jurisdiction. The outcome of this competition may fully or partially deprive, either
the national court or the investment tribunal of its jurisdiction. The overlap of
jurisdiction may arise in the application of the following rules: exhaustion of local
remedies, contractual versus treaty claims, umbrella clauses, and fork-in-the-road
clauses.
The jurisdiction of national courts is preserved through the exhaustion of local
remedies rule in the BIT. Some treaties provide for an absolute exhaustion of the
local remedies rule, whereby an investor cannot commence investment arbitration
until a final decision is rendered by national courts.14 Some other BITs require local
remedies to be pursued for a certain duration before initiating arbitration proceed-
ings.15 Some investment tribunals have ignored the exhaustion of local remedies
rule, where local remedies would be futile.16 If an investment tribunal upholds the
exhaustion of the local remedies rule, the jurisdiction of national courts would run its
full course, even dispensing with the need of an investment arbitration proceeding.
But if an investment tribunal does not uphold the exhaustion of local remedies rule,
the tribunal would be depriving national courts of their jurisdiction.
Investment disputes are complex and involve several issues. Some of these issues
may overlap with the jurisdiction of national courts or a contractually chosen forum,
thereby creating the overlap between contractual and treaty claims. Strictly speaking,
disputes arising from contractual relationships can be distinguished from disputes
arising from the breach of the BIT. The contractual disputes could be decided by a
national court or a contractually chosen forum, which would normally seek support
and protection from a national court. Whereas, the disputes arising from the breach
of the BIT could be decided by an investment tribunal. The dichotomy of this
jurisdiction was recognised by the ad hoc annulment committee in Vivendi
v. Argentina in the following words:
whether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a breach of contract
are different questions. Each of these claims will be determined by reference to its own
proper or applicable law—in the case of the BIT, by international law; in the case of the
[contract], by the proper law of the contract, in other words, the [national law].17
14Article 10(5) of the Gemany-Israel BIT; Article 7(2) of the Romania-Sri Lanka BIT.
15Article 8(2) of the Albania-Lithuania BIT; Article 10 of the France-Morocco BIT; Article 8(3)-
(4) of the Jordan- Romania BIT; Article 9(3) of the China-Côte d’Ivoire BIT; Article 15 (2) of the
Indian Model BIT of 2015.
16Lowen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, 26 June 2003, para. 169;
Urbaiser v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Decision on Jurisdiction, 19 December 2012,
paras 194, 202–3; Ambiente Ufficio v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on Juris-
diction, 8 February 2013, paras 597, 601–11, 615–21; İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Turkmenistan,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24, Award, 8 March 2016, para. 260.
17Vivendi v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, para. 96.
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The presence of a contractual clause does not exclude the jurisdiction of an
investment tribunal to decide investment disputes.18 However, the reverse is not
always true. There is a disparity between the jurisdiction exercised by national courts
and investment tribunals with the latter having the upper hand—not only do they
have broader jurisdiction but they can also decide which aspects of the dispute to
retain.
Despite the possibility of parallel proceedings before national courts and invest-
ment tribunals deciding different aspects of the same dispute, investment tribunals
take over the entire dispute. Investment tribunals have achieved this through an
expansive interpretation of ‘umbrella clauses’. The debate about the precise scope
and interpretation of umbrella clauses and the possibility of investment tribunals
having jurisdiction over contractual disputes played out in the SGS v. Pakistan and
SGS v. Philippines cases. In SGS v. Pakistan, the tribunal distinguished between
contractual and treaty rights and declared that it would not entertain contractual
disputes, leaving these to be decided by the arbitral tribunal chosen by contract.19
Additionally, the contractual disputes would not be converted into investment
disputes through the umbrella clause.20 The tribunal in SGS v. Philippines disagreed
and criticised the conclusions in SGS v. Pakistan.21 The tribunal recognised the
distinction between contractual obligations and treaty obligations and did not agree
that contractual obligations are converted into treaty obligations through an umbrella
clause.22 The tribunal in SGS v. Philippines found that the institution of arbitration
was premature and the investor ought first to approach the local courts to adjudicate
the contractual disputes.23 If such an approach is adopted, then the jurisdiction of
national courts is conserved. But the debate is far from over and all depends on the
approach a particular tribunal takes.
Some tribunals have decided that umbrella clauses can transform contractual
disputes into treaty disputes.24 Several others have interpreted umbrella clauses in
18Vivendi v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, para. 98.
19SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, paras 156–62.
20SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, paras 163–74.
21SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, paras 121–7.
22SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, para. 128; Joy Mining Mach.,
Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004, 13 ICSID
Rep. 123 (2008), para. 81.
23SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, para. 155.
24Bosh International v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/I 1, Award, 25 October 2012, para. 252;
BIVAC BV v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, 29 May 2009, para. 142; LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/
1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para. 171.
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a manner that does not include violation of contractual provisions, unless there was a
breach of treaty provisions.25 If the breach of a contractual clause is proved to
amount to a treaty breach then the investment tribunal will have jurisdiction. In
situations where tribunals have taken one these approaches; the jurisdiction of
national courts is excluded.
Some tribunals have adopted a narrow interpretation of umbrella clauses. They
have declined jurisdiction over contractual disputes through expansive interpretation
of umbrella clauses.26 In these situations, the jurisdiction of national courts remains
intact.
The nature of the cause of action before a national court or investment tribunal
differs since the right to bring a claim would be based either on a contract or a BIT,
although, the underlying transaction in many cases is the same. Yet, investment
tribunals normally decide which aspects of the dispute they wish to retain and leave
the rest for national courts or a contractually chosen forum. Umbrella clauses are
losing their lustre since recent treaty practice shows the reluctance of states to
include them in their BITs. This reduces the prospect of investment tribunals taking
over contractual disputes that would fall within the jurisdiction of national courts.
Fork-in-the-road provisions, if applied, exclude the jurisdiction of an investment
tribunal if the governmental action that forms the basis of an investment claim is
litigated before national courts. Fork-in-the-road provisions allow the investor to
choose whether to sue the host state before national courts or initiate investment
arbitration. Once an investor decides to sue the host state before national courts,
investment arbitration can no longer be commenced. Fork-in-the-road provisions can
be invoked only if the parties to the dispute, the cause of action and the relief sought
are the same.27 These requirements are often not met, since the party sued in national
courts under a contract may be a state entity and the host state may not be a party to
these proceedings. Likewise, the cause of action in national courts would arise from
a contract whereas in investment arbitration from a BIT.
A foreign investor has to establish itself in a host state and function in accordance
with its laws. National courts are the default judicial institutions with jurisdiction
25Eureko BV v. Poland, Partial Award, 19 August 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 335 (2007), para. 260;
Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 28 September
2007, para. 310; El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, para. 82.
26Impregilo SpA v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 22 April 2005,
para. 216; Toto Costruzioni Generali v. Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 11 September 2009, para. 202; Joy Mining Mach., Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/1 1, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004, 13 ICSID Rep. 123 (2008); Vivendi
v. Argentina, Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, 8 ICSID Rep. 490 (2005),
para. 101.
27Pantechniki SA Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21,
Award, July 29, 2009; Total SA v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability,
27 December 2010, para. 1443; Toto Costruzioni Generali v. Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/
12, Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 September 2009, para. 203; H&H Enters. Invs., Inc. v. Egypt,
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Award, 6 May 2014.
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over investment activity within the host state. In the absence of an investment treaty,
a foreign investor would have to approach national courts in the event of a dispute.
The compulsory dispute resolution clause in an investment treaty excludes the
otherwise default jurisdiction of national courts. There is thus an overlap as well
as a close relation between national courts and investment tribunals. The ultimate
winner of the contest for jurisdiction depends on the language of the BIT and,
ultimately, on the approach that an investment tribunal will adopt.
A national court may assert jurisdiction through the principles discussed above.
However, the outcome of this contest for jurisdiction is mostly decided by invest-
ment tribunals, since these issues tend to be raised before them. The only opportunity
national courts have is to review the decisions of investment tribunals at the
enforcement stage. National courts could then examine whether the assumption of
jurisdiction was proper. In most cases, the national court where enforcement of an
investment award is sought would not be the same court that was deprived of its
jurisdiction. It could very well be a national court of another state, which may or may
not be sympathetic to another national court on account of its loss of jurisdiction.
Additionally, the national court where enforcement proceedings take place would
have its own standards to apply, which may or may not take into account the fact that
the jurisdiction of another national court was taken over by the investment tribunal.
National courts could hardly be said to be an organised force, like investment
tribunals. Arbitrations conducted within the framework of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) function in a certain environment and
culture. Although they do not have any formal relation to each other, they are said to
have a common public policy objective.28 There are several connecting factors
between investment tribunals, such as repeat arbitrator appointments and reliance
by tribunals on each other’s decisions. National courts rarely deal with issues arising
from international investment law and have no occasion or interest to function in an
organised manner. This inevitably puts arbitral tribunals ahead in the race with little
or no prospects for the national courts to assert jurisdiction. In addition, national
courts have a heavy caseload of their own and have little incentive to enter such a
competition.
4 Anti-arbitration and Anti-suit Injunctions
National courts can act as a disruptive force for pending or ongoing investment
arbitration proceedings by issuing anti-arbitration injunctions. Likewise, an invest-
ment tribunal can issue an anti-suit injunction. An anti-arbitration injunction is an
order issued by the national court directing an investment tribunal to halt the
arbitration proceeding or the parties to not pursue the arbitration. An anti-suit
injunction is an order by an investment tribunal almost always addressed to the
28Schreuer (2009), pp. 4–5.
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parties and directing them not to commence or not to pursue proceedings parallel to
the arbitration before national courts. An anti-suit or anti-arbitration injunction is
issued on the premise that a decision-maker has an “inherent power to protect its own
jurisdiction in cases where the risk of inconsistent decisions in parallel or duplicate
proceedings instituted in other fora have rendered this necessary.”29
Whether national courts are able to act in relation to investment arbitration
proceedings depends on whether they follow the practice of issuing anti-arbitration
injunctions and on what grounds. Anti-arbitration injunctions are not governed by
international law and there is no standard provided by international law. The latter is
developed within the domestic legal system. Thus, the practice on issuance of
anti-arbitration injunctions differs between national jurisdictions. Even national
legislations on arbitration normally do not contain provisions on anti-arbitration
injunctions. National courts that issue anti-arbitration injunctions have considered
the authority to issue them to emanate from their inherent powers.30
If national laws, expressly or impliedly, allow the issuance of anti-arbitration
injunctions, a discussion on their appropriateness remains of theoretical value. A
practical approach would be to identify and scrutinise the grounds for issuing an anti-
arbitration injunction. The grounds, scope of their interpretation (whether broad or
narrow), and the frequency of their issuance would determine the extent to which a
certain national court can affect investment arbitration proceedings. Even where
anti-arbitration injunctions are issued, the extent of influence national courts may
exert on arbitration proceedings will depend on the depth and persuasiveness of their
reasoning and that of the reasoning of an investment tribunal declining to follow that
anti-arbitration injunction. Some national courts do not issue anti-arbitration injunc-
tions.31 Others issue them on the basis of narrow grounds.32
29Paul Donin de Rosiere v. Iran, Award No. ITM 64-498-1, (1986) 13 Iran-US Claims Tribunal
193, 194.
30Sana Hassib Sabbagh v. Wael Said Khoury, [2019] EWCA Civ 1219 (United Kingdom); South
Carolina Insurance Co v. Assurantie Maatshappij De Zeven Provincien NV [1987] AC 24 (United
Kingdom); Union of India v. Vodafone Plc. and Anr., 2018 SCC Online Del 8842 (India).
31Switzerland does not permit anti-arbitration injunctions being issued by national courts, Air (PTY)
Ltd v. International Air Transport Association, Tribunal de Première Instance 2 May 2005, Case
No. c/1043/2005-15 SP, translated in (2005) 23 ASA Bulletin 739, 739.
32In India, the courts have “the jurisdiction to restrain international treaty arbitrations which are
oppressive, vexatious, inequitable or constitute an abuse of the legal process”, Vodafone Interna-
tional Holdings BV v. Government of India [I], PCA Case No. 2016-35, Judgment of the High
Court of Delhi Vacating Order of 22 August 2017, 7 May 2018, para. 104; In the United Kingdom,
the criteria to be met are: (1) the court has jurisdiction; (2) the discretion can be exercised if (a) the
injunction does not cause injustice, (b) the continuation of arbitration would be oppressive,
vexatious, unconscionable or an abuse of process; (3) the discretion should be used sparingly and
(4) delay would be material, if not fatal to the application, J Jarvis & Sons Ltd. v. Blue Circle
Dartford Estates Ltd, [2007] EWHC (TCC) 1262, para. 40. US courts apply the so-called “China
Trading Test”: (1) the court must have jurisdiction, (2) parties must be the same and (3) the decision
in the action before the court issuing the injunction must dispose of the foreign court or tribunal
proceedings, China Trade and Dev Corp. v. Yong 837 F.2d 33, 36-7. In France, an anti-arbitration
injunction may be issued only if the arbitration agreement is manifestly null and void and this is
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A national court’s potential to influence investment arbitration proceedings
depends not only on whether it can issue an anti-arbitration injunction, but also on
whether that injunction will be respected. Some investment tribunals have proceeded
with the dispute without being perturbed by an anti-arbitration injunction.33 In such
cases, national courts may be ineffective actors.
An arbitral tribunal may issue an anti-suit injunction preventing a party from
commencing proceedings before national courts.34 These are interim orders aimed at
preserving the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.35 Like investment tribunals
disregarding anti-arbitration injunctions, a national court may disregard an anti-
suit injunction. In Chevron v. Ecuador, the tribunal issued an interim order directing
the state to ensure that the national court did not proceed with the case.36 The
national court proceeded despite the interim order and concluded the case. The
tribunal found that to be a violation of its order and directed the state to compensate
the investor.37 The tribunal reasoned that the proceedings were unjust, although the
parties to the proceedings in the national court were not the same as the disputing
parties before the tribunal.38
National courts may also issue anti-suit injunctions restraining a party from
approaching national courts and directing it to participate in arbitration proceedings.
Such examples are probably absent but are nevertheless a possibility.39 On such
occasions, the concerned national court would be a facilitator of investment
arbitration.
raised by one of the parties, Article 1458 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure. In Sweden, an
anti-arbitration injunction may be issued only if the validity of the arbitration agreement is in
question. See New Arbitration Regime in Sweden (1999), World Arbitration & Mediation Report
154 (10), pp. 154–155.
33Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Decision
on Jurisdiction II, 14 April 1988, para. 60; Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Award, 7 July 2004, para. 55; Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. United
Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Decision on Annulment, 5 July 2007, paras 59, 78;
Saipem SpA v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Interim
Measures, 21 March 2007, paras 31, 68; Saipem SpA v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07,
Award, 30 June 2009, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Pakistan, Procedural Order
No. 2, 16 October 2002, 8 ICSID Reports 293, pp. 298, 305.
34SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Pakistan, Procedural Order No. 2, 16 October 2002,
8 ICSID Reports 293, p. 305.
35Articles 17(2)(b), 17H & 17I of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, UN doc A/61/17, Annex 1. For a review of decisions of ICSID tribunals, see Gill
(2009), pp. 553–564.
36Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Order for
Interim Measures, 9 February 2011.
37Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Second
Partial Award on Track II, 30 August 2018, para. 9.17.
38Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Second
Partial Award on Track II, 30 August 2018, para. 9.16.
39See Rozas (2005), pp. 79–80.
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There is a difference in attitudes towards anti-arbitration and anti-suit injunctions.
An anti-arbitration injunction is frowned upon and seen as unnecessary interference
with the arbitration proceedings, whereas an anti-suit injunction is looked upon
favourably in academic discourse.40 This asymmetry expects national courts to
perform a limited role in comparison with investment tribunals, while exercising
similar powers. In practice, the situation is divergent and context-specific.
5 Enforcement of Investment Arbitration Awards
National courts have the most critical role at the stage of enforcement of investment
awards. While they can facilitate investment arbitration by enforcing awards, they
can also defeat arbitration by declining enforcement. A non-ICSID Convention
award would have to be enforced in a national jurisdiction. There are three aspects
of enforcement that are discussed in this section: recognition, enforcement, and
challenge. In the process of recognition, a national court is approached by the
winning party to seek endorsement of the award; enforcement involves undertaking
actual steps to enforce the award; and in the case of a challenge, the losing party
seeks the set-aside of the award.41 In all three instances (collectively referred to as
‘enforcement’ for convenience), national courts influence investment arbitration
since they determine the fate of the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. National
courts may uphold or set aside the award. An award may be challenged by a host
state or a foreign investor, where the investment tribunal has dismissed a claim.42
An ICSID Convention award is self-executing since it is treated as the decision of
the highest court of each state party to the Convention.43 Arguments have been
advanced that the grounds applicable to review and set-aside of a judgment of the
highest court will apply to an ICSID award.44 This opens the possibility of a
challenge of an ICSID arbitration award before a national court, albeit on limited
40Schwebel (2005), p. 13; Lew (2008), p. 287.
41Harisankar (2015).
42See Petrobart Ltd v. Kyrgyz Republic, Judgment of the Supreme Court of 28 March 2008, Case
No. 2113-06; Bayview Irrigation District # 11 and others v. Mexico, Ontario Superior Court,
Judicial Review 07-CV-340139-PD2, Judgment of 5 May 2008.
43Article 54 (1) of the ICSID Convention.
44Letter of Argentina, dated 7 April 2008 cited in: Letter from United States Department of State to
Ms Claudia Frutos-Peterson, Secretary of the ad hoc Committee (Siemens), 1 May 2008, https://
www.italaw.com/documents/Siemens-USsubmission.pdf. In the reply to the letter of the United
States, Argentina acknowledged that the ICSID setup was different from that of other arbitration
rules and it did not allow the award to be refused enforcement on the grounds mentioned in the
New York Convention. However, Argentina argued that “the State i.e. the award debtor is to subject
compliance with ICSID awards to the same or substantially the same procedures that are applicable
to compliance with final judgments of local courts against the States”. Argentina also referred to a
US District Court decision which had “altered” the award rendered by the tribunal by granting post-
award interest. https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0793.pdf.
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grounds. Additionally, in the light of sovereign immunity, there may be occasions
when national courts decline enforcement of an ICSID award.45 In non-ICSID Con-
vention arbitrations, recognition and enforcement take place according to the Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
Convention), thereby making national courts prominent actors.
National courts have preserved their jurisdiction to entertain enforcement pro-
ceedings of investment arbitration awards under the New York Convention. They
have treated investment arbitration awards as arising out of a commercial relation-
ship to allow them to exercise jurisdiction.46 The New York Convention does not
specify which national court will have jurisdiction to recognise or enforce an award.
It is normally presumed that it will be the national court of the seat of arbitration.
This is because Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention stipulates that an award
could be set aside if the arbitration agreement is not valid “under the law where the
award was made”. The same provision also states that an award would not be
enforced if the arbitration agreement were “not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected it”. Therefore, even the national court whose laws apply to the
substance of the dispute is a relevant jurisdiction. Since the national law of the host
state is applicable, the recognition or enforcement of an investment arbitration award
can be challenged before its national courts.47 Additionally, all those jurisdictions
where the assets of the losing party (normally the host state) are located are relevant
jurisdictions for enforcement, thereby making multiple national courts potential
actors.
The enforcement proceedings are brought under the relevant national legislation
on arbitration, which incorporates and implements the New York Convention. In
Ecuador v. Occidental, the UK courts rejected the investor’s argument of “non-
justiciability”, according to which the investor had objected to the institution of
proceedings in the UK courts on the ground that it would involve interpretation of
laws and actions of another sovereign.48 The investor had alleged that since the
challenge would involve interpretation of international law, the proceedings were
non-justiciable. The court rejected the argument on the basis that although the
interpretation of international law was non-justiciable, these proceedings related to
the rights of a municipal entity, i.e. a foreign investor, and would therefore be subject
45Blue Ridge Investments, L.L.C. v. Argentina, 902 F. Supp. 2d 367 (SDNY 2012) (United States);
Benvenuti & Bonfant Ltd. v. Banque Commerciale Congolaise and others, Judgment of July
21, 1987, Cour de Cassation, 115 Journal du Droit Interational 108 (1988) (France); AIG Capital
Partners v. Kazakhastan, [2005] EWHC 2239 (Comm.) (United Kingdom).
46Mexico v. Metaclad, Judgment of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, 2 May 2001, para. 44;
Mexico v. Feldman Karpa, Canada, Ontario Court of Appeal, 11 January 2005, para. 41; Czech
Republic v. CME Czech Republic BV, Sweden, Seva Court of Appeal, 15 May 2003, 9 ICSID
Reports 439, 493; BG Group PLC v. Argentina, US Supreme Court, CASE No. US 12-138 (2014),
pp. 6–8.
47Blackaby et al. (2015), p. 614.
48Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production Company, Judgment, 29 April 2005, EWHC
774, para. 30.
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to control under the municipal arbitration laws of the seat of arbitration.49 National
courts have accepted the jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to an investment
arbitration award under their domestic law if the seat of the arbitration was in their
country. The presence of a sovereign state and the fact that international law was the
law applicable to the dispute would not amount to a sufficient ground to decline
jurisdiction.50 Presence of a foreign investor, i.e. an entity subject to national laws,
has been considered to be a sufficient basis to review an investment award under
national arbitration laws.51 To tackle objections to jurisdiction, national courts have
applied doctrines peculiar to their national system. The Stockholm District Court
used its national procedural law doctrine of assertion to affirm that the statements
made by the claimant fell within the scope of the arbitral tribunal.52 Reliance on
national laws and particularly national procedural laws and enforcement regimes
under the New York Convention expand the role of national courts.
The enforcement proceedings are like any other national proceedings even
though they have an international element in the subject-matter of the dispute. The
extent of involvement of a national court depends on the grounds for interference
with enforcement, as contained in the domestic law. Prominent grounds for declining
enforcement of an award are the invalidity of the arbitration agreement,53 excess of
jurisdiction,54 non-arbitrability,55 and public policy.56 National courts retain the
discretion to interpret and apply such grounds.
Host states challenge awards on the ground that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to
decide the dispute or that it exceeded its jurisdiction.57 National courts make their
own assessment of correctness of the finding of an investment tribunal on jurisdic-
tion.58 National courts would interfere and set aside an award fully or partially, if
49Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production Company, Judgment, 29 April 2005, EWHC
774, paras 73–76. The decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal, Judgment of Court of Appeal,
4 July 2007, EWCA Civ 656.
50Russian Federation v. Sedelmayer, Judgment of Stockholm District Court, 12 December 2002,
Case No. T6-583-98, (English translation in 2 Stockholm International Arbitration Review (2005)),
p. 16.
51Russian Federation v. Sedelmayer, Judgment of Stockholm District Court, 12 December 2002,
Case No. T6-583-98, (English translation in 2 Stockholm International Arbitration Review (2005)),
p. 16.
52Russian Federation v. Sedelmayer, Judgment of Stockholm District Court, 12 December 2002,
Case No. T6-583-98, (English translation in 2 Stockholm International Arbitration Review (2005)),
p. 17.
53Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention.
54Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention.
55Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention.
56Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.
57Czech Republic v. Saluka Investments BV, Judgment of the Federal Court of Switzerland,
7 September 2006.
58Poland v. Saar Papier Vertriebs GmbH, Swiss Federal Court, 20 September 2000, para. 4.b
(paraphrased translation in Hobér and Eliasson (2010), p. 640).
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there is excess of jurisdiction.59 InMexico v. Metaclad, the Supreme Court of British
Columbia found the tribunal to have exceeded its jurisdiction since “transparency”
was not part of customary international law and the award was consequently
partially set aside.60 National courts can investigate the reasoning and basis of a
conclusion arrived at in an award even when the issue relates to international law.
Awards whose subject-matter cannot be resolved through arbitration, will not be
enforced by the national court on the ground of non-arbitrability. Normally, disputes
regarding the grant of intellectual property rights or competition are non-arbitrable.61
The determination of arbitrability is made by national courts based on national
legislation and jurisprudence. In investment arbitration, disputes involve a mix of
public and private interests. This raises the possibility of invoking
non-arbitrability.62 The inevitable consequence is a larger role for national courts.
Public policy is that plain expansive ground leaving extensive discretion to the
national court enforcing the award.63 All depends upon the approach the national
court in question takes. An investment award could be challenged on the ground of
violation of public policy of the state where enforcement proceedings are under-
way.64 Even where another court has enforced an award, a national court can
consider the validity of the award under its own national laws.65
National courts have shown a high degree of deference to the conclusions of
investment tribunals but do not generally decline jurisdiction to entertain the chal-
lenge.66 National courts have undertaken broad assessments of awards at the stage of
enforcement. Although theirs is not an appellate review, they have adopted liberal
standards of review.67 A national court may review whether the interpretation of an
investment tribunal accords with international law or with the national law of another
state that is relevant to the dispute. In the Yukos case, The Hague District Court
found that the conclusions of the arbitral tribunal on the provisional application of
the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) was incorrect. The court found the investment
tribunal to have committed an error regarding the “context” in which the ECT was to
59Attorney General of Canada v. SD Myers, Federal Court of Canada, 13 January 2004, p. 21.
60Mexico v. Metaclad, Judgment of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, 2 May 2001, paras 70,
76, 79.
61Blackaby et al. (2015), p. 19.
62Reinisch (2010), pp. 678–679.
63Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA and Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan,
SCC Case No. V 116/2010, Judgment of the UK Commercial Court on the Enforcement of the
Award, 6 June 2017, para. 87.
64Poland v. Saar Papier Vertriebs GmbH, Swiss Federal Court, 20 September 2000, para. 3.b
(paraphrased translation in Hobér and Eliasson (2010), p. 641).
65Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA and Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan,
SCC Case No. V 116/2010, Judgment of the UK Commercial Court on the Enforcement of the
Award, 6 June 2017, paras 92–93.
66Hobér and Eliasson (2010), pp. 668–669.
67Poland v. Saar Papier Vertriebs GmbH, Swiss Federal Court, 20 September 2000, para. 4.a
(araphrased translation in Hobér and Eliasson (2010), p. 640).
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be interpreted68 and the object and purpose of the ECT and the nature of interna-
tional law.69 Additionally, since the Russian Federation had not yet ratified the
Energy Charter Treaty and the Russian laws and Constitution do not consider a
treaty as binding unless ratified, it did not have any effect. The court embarked upon
an interpretation of Russian law to find that the investment tribunal was in error. The
court reasoned that Article 45 of the ECT allowed provisional application to the
extent that the treaty is not contrary to national law. Russian national law did not
permit arbitration of investment disputes.70 Hence, the dispute resolution provisions
of the ECT would not be applicable and the investment tribunal did not have
jurisdiction.71 In situations where the error goes to the determination of whether
the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of an investment tribunal, the national court
can arrive at a different conclusion than the tribunal and set aside an award.
The practice of national courts is diverse and, in some cases, they have exercised
broad discretion while reviewing investment arbitration awards. The level of inter-
ference with substantive issues of law will be based on the position of the national
law and the approach of the national court. In the Dutch legal system, as in many
other jurisdictions, foreign law is treated as a question of law72 rather than as a
question of fact. This inevitably gives greater latitude to the court to interpret foreign
law. Even in jurisdictions where national law is treated as a question of fact, the
national court could receive expert evidence and interpret and apply foreign law.73
Presence of an additional layer of regional courts could impede enforcement.74
Though not strictly national courts, they are regional in nature and do impact
investment arbitration as actors. In the Achmea case,75 the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) concluded that disputes arising from bilateral investment
treaties between EU member states (intra-EU BITs) cannot be decided in investment
arbitration since they involve interpretation of EU law, a function that is the
monopoly of the CJEU.76 The case presents the possibility of arbitrability and
68Russian Federation v. Veteran Petroleum Ltd, The Hague District Court, Judgment, 20 April
2016, paras 5.12–5.13.
69Russian Federation v. Veteran Petroleum Ltd, The Hague District Court, Judgment, 20 April
2016, paras 5.19–5.20.
70Russian Federation v. Veteran Petroleum Ltd, The Hague District Court, Judgment, 20 April
2016, paras 5.33–5.34.
71Russian Federation v. Veteran Petroleum Ltd, The Hague District Court, Judgment, 20 April
2016, para. 5.96.
72Russian Federation v. Veteran Petroleum Ltd, The Hague District Court, Judgment, 20 April
2016, para. 5.34.
73See Lazard Bros. v. Midland Bank [1933] A. C. 289, 297 (H. L. 1932) (United Kingdom); Gold
v. Reinblatt, [1929] S.C.R. 74, [1939] I (United States); Re Low [1933] 2 DLR 6o8 (C.A.) (United
States); Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 45.
74Reinisch (2010), p. 681.
75CJEU, Slovakia v. Achmea, Case C-284/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1.
76CJEU, Slovakia v. Achmea, Case C-284/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1, paras 53–59.
National Courts as Actors in Investment Arbitration 51
mutual trust posing a challenge to enforcement of investment awards and reveals the
role regional courts can play as actors in investment arbitration.
Involvement of multiple national courts and regional courts with their diverse
jurisprudence allows them to affect investment arbitration in multiple and distinct
ways. Even where actions of different national courts are not coordinated, they may
influence arbitration proceedings and their outcome. In the Stati case, the investor
succeeded in seeking enforcement in Sweden, the seat of arbitration, and in pursuing
assets of the state in Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United
States.77 The investor however had to withdraw from the proceedings in UK courts,
where it was pursuing assets for enforcement, due to the fear of allegations of fraud
being investigated by the UK Courts and the prospect of the award being set aside.78
6 Actions of National Courts Challenged Before Investment
Tribunals
National courts are also actors in light of the fact that their conduct can be challenged
before an investment tribunal. State responsibility for actions of national courts is
attracted if national courts have violated a rule of international law. A host state may
be responsible for failure to apply the New York Convention in good faith and
thereby decline to enforce a commercial arbitration award.79 Actions of a national
court may also result in denial of justice, a breach of fair and equitable treatment
(FET), effective means, or indirect expropriation.
Even if within the internal constitutional structure of a state national courts are
independent, their actions are attributable to the state and the state is responsible for
the conduct of its national courts.80 Hitherto dormant, the customary rule of denial of
justice has been invoked in investment arbitrations.81 It is inadequate for national
courts to provide formal justice, i.e. avenues for redress but no real justice. The
77See Stati v. Kazakhstan: The winner takes it all?, Global Arbitration Review, 11 July 2018,
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1171805/stati-v-kazakhstan-the-winner-takes-it-all.
78Charlotin D, Stati and Ascom v. Kazakstan: UK Appeals Court allows claimants to avoid fraud
trial, after they decide to abandon enforcement efforts in that jurisdiction, available at: https://www.
iareporter.com/articles/stati-and-ascom-v-kazakhstan-uk-appeals-court-allows-claimants-to-avoid-
fraud-trial-after-they-decide-to-abandon-enforcement-efforts-in-that-jurisdiction/.
79Romak SA (Switzerland) v. Uzbekistan, PCA Case No. AA280, Award, 26 November 2009;
Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd v. Czech Republic, PCA, Final Award, 12 November 2010; GEA
Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, 31 March 2011; Saipem
SpA v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Award, 30 June 2009;White Industries Australia
Limited v. India, UNCITRAL, Award, 30 November 2011; Desert Line Projects LLC v. Yemen,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, 6 February 2008.
80Rajput (2018), pp. 148–149, 157–158.
81Paulsson (2005), pp. 38–56.
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standard of denial of justice requires the presence of a fair and functional judicial
system.82
Denial of justice will have to arise from the specific facts of the case in question
and not from general perceptions about the functioning of the judiciary.83 The
responsibility of a state for denial of justice for a decision of its national courts
would not arise if a reader can follow its reasoning.84 Conversely, if the decision of a
national court does not contain a reasoning that is logical and coherent, the decision
may result in denial of justice. National courts are thus required to be careful in their
reasoning and ensure that the proceedings are fair and so reflected in the record. The
obligation of national courts is not to render a correct decision but only to adhere to
fair procedures.85
Denial of justice is considered to be a part of fair and equitable treatment. Fair and
equitable treatment functions as an independent standard for judging the actions of
national courts. Legitimate expectations is a core element of FET, as developed in
the jurisprudence of investment tribunals. In White Industries v. India, the tribunal
rejected the investor’s argument that there is a legitimate expectation of a certain
judicial outcome. That case involved a certain desired interpretation of the
New York Convention.86 In Tatneft v. Ukraine, the tribunal remarked in passing
(obiter) that it would be a part of legitimate expectations that the legal framework in
the host state is predictable and its organs, including the judiciary, function in a
consistent manner.87 Consistency in decision-making is expected from national
courts as a part of legitimate expectations.
A state is said to have violated the effective means standard if it fails to guarantee
access to justice.88 National courts are expected to manage their caseload in a manner
that prevents undue delays. Congestions in the court system resulting in undue
delays could be treated as a breach of effective means.89 Interference from other
branches, such as the executive, in judicial activity would be a breach of effective
82Paulsson (2005), pp. 60–61.
83Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)04/6, Award, 16 January 2013,
para. 228; Swisslion DOO Skopje v. North Macedonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/16, Award, 6 July
2012, para 26.8; İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24,
Award, 8 March 2016, para 8.1.10.
84Mr Franck Charles Arif v. Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award, 8 April 2013,
paras. 481–482; Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, Final
Award, 26 March 2008, para 80.452-4.
85Paulsson (2005), pp. 81–82.
86White Industries Australia Limited v. India, UNCITRAL, Award, 30 November 2011,
paras 10.3.13, 10.3.15.
87OAO Tatneft v. Ukraine, UNCITRAL, Award on Merits, 29 July 2014, para. 407.
88Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil SA v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19,
Award, 18 August 2008, para 391.
89Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case
No. 2009-23, Partial Award on Merits, 30 March 2010, paras 264–265; White Industries Australia
Limited v. India, UNCITRAL, Award, 30 November 2011, paras 11.3.2, 11.4.14-15.
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means.90 The effective means test is seen as an effort by tribunals to expand treaty
protection to cover judicial activity that would not be covered by denial of justice.
Despite the concerns regarding the standard’s scope, appropriateness and impact of
effective means on the judicial activity of national courts,91 it remains a tool in the
hands of investment tribunals to control the actions of national courts.
Situations where decisions of national courts result in loss of value of the
investment have been treated as indirect expropriation.92 In Saipem v. Bangladesh,
the tribunal considered that a decision of national courts not to enforce a commercial
arbitration award is an expropriation of the right to arbitrate and of the outcome of
that arbitration proceeding, that is, of “residual contractual rights under the invest-
ment as crystallized in the [commercial arbitration] award”.93 Tribunals have
announced that they would not be reviewing decisions of national courts. But in
effect, in cases involving non-enforcement of commercial arbitration awards by
national courts, the tribunals have reviewed the decisions of national courts.94
In the absence of a BIT, actions of national courts could be challenged before an
international court or tribunal on the ground of denial of justice, provided local
remedies were exhausted and the home and host states expressed their agreement to
refer the dispute to an international court or tribunal. BITs allow the foreign investor
to raise the ground of denial of justice without the involvement of its home state.
Denial of justice is a difficult standard to meet. Other standards, especially effective
means and indirect expropriation, are less stringent and can be met relatively easily.
The possibility of a potential challenge before an investment tribunal imposes
restrictions on how national courts exercise jurisdiction.
7 Conclusions
Investment arbitration has contributed to the expansion of national courts’ partici-
pation in matters of international law. National courts face issues relating to inter-
national investment law when it comes to facilitating arbitration, the enforcement of
awards, or when their actions are challenged before investment tribunals. National
courts and investment tribunals mutually influence each other.
National courts compete for jurisdiction with investment tribunals. Experience
shows that they rarely manage to take over the jurisdiction of investment tribunals.
90Petrobart Limited v. Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. 126/2003, Arbitral Award, 29 March 2005,
p. 77.
91Demirkol (2019), pp. 46–48.
92For a discussion of relevant cases, see Demirkol (2019), pp. 50–55.
93Saipem SpA v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Award, 30 June 2009, paras 128,
130, 133.
94Saipem SpA v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Award, 30 June 2009, para. 155;White
Industries Australia Limited v. India, UNCITRAL, Award, 30 November 2011, paras. 10-4.17-
10.4.22.
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The ultimate word is with investment tribunals and they may leave some aspects of
the investment dispute for national courts or they may take it over entirely. Even
when some aspects of the dispute are left for national courts, those proceedings tend
to be of nominal relevance only, since an investment award would comprehensively
settle the dispute. National courts influence investment arbitration in various ways.
As facilitators, national courts can be responsible for enforcing an investment
arbitration award, they can even issue anti-suit injunctions, restraining a party
from commencing proceedings before other national courts, or they can issue a
pro-arbitration order. As a disruptive force, national courts can affect the commence-
ment and continuation of proceedings through anti-arbitration injunctions or by
setting aside an investment arbitration award.
The above discussion shows that the influence of national courts is rising since
one of the parties, and especially states, frequently approach national courts.
National courts have not shied away from exercising jurisdiction, although the
standards they apply depend on the national law and legal culture of the state
concerned. The growing involvement of national courts has increased the possibility
of them influencing the functioning and outcome of investment arbitration.
The presence of national courts as an actor entails complications and uncer-
tainties. Each national court functions differently and applies different rules and
standards. It becomes difficult to conceptualise a unified framework of the involve-
ment of national courts as actors. This is also an outcome of the discretion implicit in
how national courts act in relation to investment arbitration. The involvement of
national courts, due to the legal and cultural divergences of those jurisdictions,
represents a plurality of approaches rather than a uniform overarching framework.
Finally, the role of national courts as actors in investment arbitration depends on
the language of the BIT in question, but also on its interpretation and the general
ideological orientation that a certain investment tribunal takes. There are no
straitjacket-defined ways for national courts to become actors in investment arbitra-
tion. The extent of their intervention is conditioned on the interplay between the
application of national and international law.
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Abstract The doctrine of state immunity occupies a fundamental place in interna-
tional law. The application of the doctrine, largely left to the national laws of states,
is not consistent. One particular area of inconsistency is the treatment of the plea of
state immunity from execution of arbitral awards resulting from investor-state
disputes. The issue of state immunity from execution has come to the fore in light
of a number of recent attempts by award-creditors to attach their awards against the
assets of a foreign state located in jurisdictions considered to be
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“pro-enforcement”, such as France and Belgium. This chapter considers the plea of
state immunity and the execution of investment arbitration awards from the perspec-
tive of the forum state. In particular, it addresses the introduction of procedural and
substantive amendments to French and Belgian laws on state immunity following
these attempts by award-creditors to seize foreign state assets located in their
respective jurisdictions. The chapter posits a way forward for investors seeking to
navigate the landscape governing state immunity from execution.
1 Introduction
The doctrine of state immunity occupies a fundamental place in international law and
international relations, enabling the state and its representatives to fulfil essential
public functions.1 The character of state immunity as an established rule of interna-
tional law has been recognised by both civil and common law jurisdictions, and
“adopted as a general rule of customary international law solidly rooted” in state
practice.2 As will be explored in this chapter, the application of the doctrine is largely
left to each state’s national laws, as there is no single international regime in force
governing state immunity. In practice, this has resulted in a lack of uniformity in the
application of the rules of state immunity as between states, as well as in the internal
jurisprudence of states.
One particular area of inconsistency, which is the focus of this chapter, is in the
treatment of the plea of state immunity from execution of arbitral awards resulting
from investor-state disputes. This inconsistency in approach tends to motivate
award-creditors to be selective in their choice of forum in which to commence
enforcement proceedings and ultimately execute an award. The issue of state
immunity from execution has come to the fore in light of a number of recent attempts
by award-creditors to attach their awards against the assets of a foreign state located
in jurisdictions considered to be “pro-enforcement”, such as France and Belgium.
The success of these attempts in seizing foreign state assets has often strained
diplomatic relations between states, prompting legislative intervention in these
jurisdictions in order to clarify the rules on state immunity from execution, often
in a way that safeguards foreign state property against attachment.
This chapter will briefly consider the reasons underlying the inconsistency in
approaches to the application of the rules of state immunity from execution, as well
1Crawford (2019), p. 470; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece
intervening) Judgment [2012] ICJ Rep 99, para. 57.
2Fox and Webb (2013), p. 13 citing Al-Adsani v. UK (2002) 24 EHRR 11; Jones v. Minister of
Interior of Saudi Arabia & Ors [2006] UKHL 26; see also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State
(Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) Judgment [2012] ICJ Rep 99, para. 56; Report of the
International Law Commission on the work of its Thirty-second session, UN GAOR, 35th sess,
Supp No 10, UN Doc A/35/10 (5 May-25 July 1980) p. 147, para. 26.
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as the recent attempts by award-creditors to execute awards against foreign state
property located in France and Belgium (Sect. 2). Section 3 outlines the legislative
responses in France and Belgium to these proceedings and the introduction of
procedural and substantive amendments to their respective laws on state immunity.
The focus of this section is on the plea of state immunity from the execution of
investment arbitration awards, from the perspective of the forum state. Section 4 of
the chapter proposes possible alternatives for investors to enforcement and posits a
way forward for investors seeking to navigate the landscape governing state immu-
nity from execution.
2 State Immunity from Jurisdiction and Execution
State immunity acts as a procedural bar, ensuring that states and their representatives
remain immune from the jurisdiction of foreign states’ courts.3 The state may claim
immunity at two stages of the proceedings: first, from the jurisdiction of the forum
(which is known as “immunity from jurisdiction”), and secondly, from the execution
of any resulting judgment (which is known as “immunity from execution”). The
question of immunity from execution does not arise until jurisdiction has been
established and the plaintiff (in this context, the investor) has received a judgment
or arbitral award in its favour which it is seeking to enforce.4
2.1 From Absolute to Restrictive
At its inception, state immunity was absolute, meaning that a state would be immune
from any foreign proceedings unless it provided its consent. Over time, this absolute
approach was eroded in many jurisdictions to apply in a more restrictive fashion,
only affording immunity to the state’s sovereign acts. While this is true insofar as
immunity from jurisdiction is concerned, the erosion of absolute immunity has been
slower in the context of immunity from execution. National courts generally treat a
state’s immunity from execution as absolute, subject only to limited exceptions.5
While some consider this to be an “understandable” approach, owing to the fact that
measures of constraint are far more intrusive than the exercise of declaratory
3Crawford (2019), p. 470; Fox and Webb (2013), p. 11.
4Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, with commentaries,
adopted by the International Law Commission in Report of the International Law Commission on
the work of its forty-third session, UN GOAR, 49th sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/46/10 (29 April-
19 July 1991), p. 56.
5Van den Berg (1989), p. 13.
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jurisdiction by a foreign court,6 others have described the plea of immunity from
execution as the “last bastion” of state immunity.7
2.2 Lack of an International Regime
There have been attempts to address the lack of consistency in the application of the
rules of state immunity, with a small number of conventions dealing with state
immunity.8 However, to date, there is no single international regime in force
governing state immunity.
2.2.1 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and Their Property
Described as the “only sustained effort” to create a universal codification of inter-
national norms regarding state immunity, the United Nations Convention on Juris-
dictional Immunities of States and Their Property (UNCSI)9 provides a
“comprehensive code for the immunity of a State and its property”.10 The relevant
provision for the purposes of this chapter is Article 19, which deals with state
immunity from post-judgment measures of constraint (such as attachment, arrest
or execution).11 Article 19 provides for three exceptions to the general immunity
afforded to foreign state property, which have been recognised by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ)12—where the state has expressly consented to the taking of
such measures, where the state has allocated or earmarked property for the satisfac-
tion of the claim which is the object of that proceeding, or where it has been
6Crawford (2019), pp. 488–489.
7Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, with commentaries,
adopted by the International Law Commission in Report of the International Law Commission on
the work of its forty-third session, UN GOAR, 49th sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/46/10 (29 April-
19 July 1991), p. 56.
8For example, International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the
Immunity of State-owned Vessels, opened for signature 10 April 1926, (1937) 179 LNTS
199 (entered into force 8 January 1936), dealing with the immunity and liability of state ships in
commercial use; European Convention on State Immunity, opened for signature 16 May 1972,
(1972) 74 ETS 16 (entered into force 11 June 1976), a regional treaty in force between eight
European states (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland,
United Kingdom), which adopts a restrictive approach to state immunity.
9United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, opened for
signature 2 December 2004 (not yet in force).
10Fox and Webb (2013), p. 284.
11The equivalent provision for pre-judgment measures of constraint is Article 18 of the UNCSI.
12Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) Judgment [2012]
ICJ Rep 99, para. 118.
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established that the property is in use or intended for use by the state for other than
government non-commercial purposes.13 However, the UNCSI, while an influential
instrument, has not yet entered into force. At the date of writing, the UNCSI has
22 ratifications, acceptances, approvals and accessions collectively, eight short of the
required amount.14 This includes ratification by France (noting that it has only
incorporated Articles 18, 19 and 21 into domestic law), but not Belgium.
2.2.2 New York Convention and ICSID Convention
The two key international conventions governing enforcement of arbitral awards are
not forthcoming with any guidance as they only make scant provision for issues of
state immunity. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)15 does not expressly mention state immu-
nity, leaving this question to national laws. The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Conven-
tion)16 which governs the recognition and enforcement of investor-state dispute
awards issued under the auspices of the delocalised ICSID Convention regime,
does not contain any rules on state immunity. Article 54(3) provides that the
execution of ICSID awards is governed by local laws, and Article
55 (an “interpretation” of Article 54)17 states that the ICSID Convention does not
seek to modify the laws of contracting states with respect to immunity from
execution. Together, the two provisions have created enormous difficulties for
investors attempting to enforce awards, earning their title as the “Achilles’ heel” of
the ICSID regime.18
2.2.3 Divergence in National Approaches
As a result of the comparative void left by international conventions, questions of
state immunity are largely left to be resolved by national laws and interpretation by
national courts.19 However, the divergence in the application of the doctrine of state
immunity is “conspicuous not only as between various States but also in the internal
13The so-called “commercial property” exception was considered by the High Court of Australia in
Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v. Republic of Nauru (2015) 258 CLR 31.
14Article 30 of the UNCSI.
15Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for
signature 10 June 1958 (1959) 330 UNTS 38 (entered into force 7 June 1959).
16Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and National of Other
States, opened for signature 18 March 1965 (1966) 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force
14 October 1966).
17Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 1142.
18Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 1144.
19Juratowitch (2016), p. 200.
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jurisprudence of States”20 and as between civil and common law countries. Codifi-
cation of state immunity started with the adoption of the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act in the United States,21 followed by the introduction of similar legislation in
the United Kingdom, Australia and other common law jurisdictions.22 Although
these regimes are broadly similar, adopting the restrictive doctrine of immunity, they
have subtle and important differences. The “unusual situation” resulting from this
trend is that many common law regimes now have legislation in force dealing with
state immunity, whereas in civil law countries, the question of state immunity has
traditionally been left to the judiciary.23
The approaches adopted by different states to the application of the doctrine of
state immunity will not be explored in this chapter. It suffices to note for the purposes
of this contribution one practical consequence resulting from this divergence in
approach—a sort of “forum shopping” by award-holders in determining the optimal
forum in which to seek the enforcement and, ultimately, the execution of an award.24
Seeking the enforcement and execution of an arbitral award through the domestic
courts of a foreign state in which assets belonging to the debtor state are located
tends not to be a straightforward matter. For investors who have obtained awards
under the ICSID regime, the process is slightly more streamlined, as all parties to the
ICSID Convention have an obligation to recognise an award as binding and enforce
the pecuniary obligations arising under such an award as if it were a final judgment
of a domestic court.25 Thus, such investors are able to obtain recognition and
enforcement of ICSID awards before the courts of contracting states to the ICSID
Convention (akin to a process of “exequatur”), and the courts do not have the ability
to decline recognition and enforcement of the award for reasons of, for example,
public policy. As for those investors who have obtained an award under the auspices
of any other arbitral rules, it is necessary to first seek recognition and enforcement of
20Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the International Law
Commission: Preparatory work within the purview of article 18, paragraph 1, of the International
Law Commission—Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General (1949), UN Doc A/CN.4/1/
Rev.1, para. 52.
21Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 USC 97 §§1602-11 (1976).
22State Immunity Act 1978 (UK), c 33; Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth); State Immunity
Act, RSC 1985, c. S-18 (Canada); State Immunity Act (Singapore, c 313, 1979 rev ed); Foreign
States Immunities Act 1981 (South Africa).
23Bjorklund (2009), pp. 309–310.
24Matute C (2016), “Forum Shopping in the Execution of ICSID Awards: Is it Time to Revive the
UN Convention on State Immunity?”Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 24 June 2016. While there are some
evident difficulties in terminology by the seemingly inconsistent and interchangeable use of the
terms “enforcement” and “execution”, it is the author’s view that the two terms should be
understood as referring to different concepts. At a high level, “recognition and enforcement”
means domesticating the award (akin to exequatur in civil law jurisdictions), whereas “execution”
refers to the actual attachment or seizure of foreign state property. See Juratowitch (2016),
pp. 216–219; see discussion in Eiser Infrastructure Ltd v. Spain [2020] FCA 157, [89]-[176] per
Stewart J.
25Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention.
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the award by the national courts of the jurisdiction in which the investor is seeking to
execute its award. While such recognition is facilitated by the widely ratified
New York Convention,26 it is not automatic and there are clear grounds on which
the debtor state might seek to have the recognition and enforcement of the award
refused.27 Recognition and enforcement will not, however, be the final step for the
investor, who must also seek execution of the award by identifying non-immune
assets of the debtor state which can be attached or seized in satisfaction of the debt
arising under the award.
2.3 Enforcement
In the context of investor-state dispute settlement, the incentive of protecting
reputation encourages host states subject to investment treaty claims to comply
voluntarily with arbitral awards.28 Indeed, it should be noted that for the most part,
states are compliant with such awards. Notwithstanding this incentive, a handful of
states have refused to comply with awards, prompting a spate of enforcement pro-
ceedings by award-creditors.29 Examples of two of these proceedings commenced
by NML Capital Ltd (NML), an affiliate of a New York based hedge fund of a type
sometimes described as a “vulture fund”,30 and the three controlling shareholders of
Yukos Oil Company (Yukos) respectively, seeking the attachment of Russian assets
located in France and Belgium, are introduced below.
2.3.1 NML and Republic of Argentina
After Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt in 2001, affiliates of NML pur-
chased, at a little over half their face value, bonds issued by the Government of
Argentina. On 11 May 2006, NML, as beneficial owner, obtained a summary
judgment on the bonds in the order of US$284 million from a Federal Court in
26Article III of the New York Convention.
27Article V of the New York Convention.
28Bonnitcha et al. (2017), p. 78.
29For example, the enforcement proceedings pursued by Mr Franz Sedelmayer and Société NOGA
against the Russian Federation. Mr Sedelmayer successfully executed his award against Russian
property located in Germany and Sweden (Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, 26 W 101/02,
26 September 2002; Oberlandesgericht Köln, 22 U 98/07, 18 March 2008; Russian Federation
v. Sedelmayer, Sweden Sup Ct, No Ö 170-10, 1 July 2011). In contrast, the enforcement pro-
ceedings commenced by Société Noga in France, the US and Switzerland, were not as successful.
30
“Vulture funds feed on the debts of sovereign states that are in acute financial difficulty by
purchasing sovereign debt at a discount to face value and then seeking to enforce it”: NML Capital
Limited (Appellant) v. Argentina (Respondent) [2011] UKSC 31, para. 1, per Lord Phillips.
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New York.31 Relying on an express waiver of immunity from enforcement
contained in the governing bond agreement, NML commenced enforcement pro-
ceedings in Belgium and France (among other jurisdictions) in an attempt to garnish
Argentina’s assets. NML was unsuccessful in attaching Argentinian diplomatic
goods located in Belgium, as a Belgian Court held that the general waiver of
immunity in question did not include diplomatic assets unless it specifically men-
tioned those goods.32 The French courts arrived at a similar conclusion, lifting a
provisional attachment of the bank accounts of the Argentine Embassy and Perma-
nent Delegation of Argentina to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) on the basis that the waiver was not express and
specific.33 This line of reasoning is explored in greater detail below.34
2.3.2 Yukos and the Russian Federation
Perhaps the best-known example of enforcement proceedings is the attempt by the
three controlling shareholders of Yukos to execute their respective arbitral awards,
totalling over US$50 billion,35 against assets of the Russian Federation located in the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Germany, and India. All
enforcement proceedings had been either terminated or suspended, following the
decision of The Hague District Court to set aside the largest ever award issued by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration on jurisdictional grounds.36 However, the District
Court’s decision has recently been reversed by The Hague Court of Appeal,37 and
the arbitral awards have been reinstated. The Russian Federation has appealed this
decision. It will be interesting to observe the approach of the award creditors to their
enforcement proceedings. This section discusses the efforts of the shareholders to
execute their awards against Russian assets located in France and Belgium to date.
31NML Capital Ltd v. Argentina, No 05 Civ 2434 (SDNY, 2006).
32NML Capital Ltd v. Republique d’Argentine, Cour de cassation de Belgique, 22 November 2012,
C.11.0688.F, p. 18.
33Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 1, 28 September 2011, 09-72.057.
34See Sects. 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.
35Hulley Enterprises Limited, Yukos Universal Limited, and Veteran Petroleum Limited. Hulley
Enterprises Ltd (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 226, Award, 18 July 2014;
Yukos Universal Ltd (Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Award, 18 July
2014; Veteran Petroleum Ltd (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 228, Award,
18 July 2014.
36The Court found that the Permanent Court of Arbitration had no jurisdiction to hear the case, as
the Russian Federation had not ratified the Energy Charter Treaty (under which the case was
brought). The former Yukos shareholders appealed this decision in The Hague Court of Appeal. In
September 2019, the Court conducted oral hearings in relation to the appeal.
37The Hague Court of Appeal upheld the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction based on an “alternative
interpretation” of the Energy Charter Treaty’s provisional application clause submitted by the
investors on appeal.
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At the time, France enjoyed a reputation as a pro-enforcement jurisdiction, with
French courts promoting recognition and allowing the enforcement of arbitral
awards that had been set aside in their country of origin.38 The shareholders enjoyed
initial success, with the granting of an exequatur by the Tribunal de grande instance
de Paris in December 2014. Following this decision however, a number of attach-
ments were made but subsequently lifted. For example, the Tribunal de grande
instance de Paris upheld Russia’s immunity from execution in respect of land near
the Eiffel Tower on which Russia was constructing a cathedral.39 The award-
creditors were similarly met with mixed success in Belgium. In June 2015, Belgian
courts froze the bank accounts of Russia’s EU, Belgian and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) missions and ordered a number of Russian and international
organisations to present any information regarding Russian owned assets.40 Russia
declared this to be an “openly unfriendly act” and threatened retaliatory measures,41
and Belgium unfroze the assets after only a few days.42
Even if the Yukos shareholders were to revive their enforcement proceedings in
France and Belgium following the recent decision of The Hague Court of Appeal, it
is likely that they would face challenges going forward. The enforcement landscape
in France and Belgium has undergone legislative change, introducing procedural and
substantive amendments which may have the effect of deterring, or at least rendering
more difficult, enforcement proceedings going forward.
3 Legislative Amendments in France and Belgium
In the wake of the Yukos enforcement proceedings, new legislation was introduced
in France and Belgium codifying national law on state immunity from the execution
of judgments and arbitral awards in December 2016 and September 2015 respec-
tively. The relevant legislation in France was introduced as a rider to the “Loi Sapin
II” on transparency, anti-corruption and the modernisation of the economic life,
38For example, Cour de cassation, Société Hilmarton Ltd v. Société Omnium de traitement et de
valorisation (OTV), 92-15.137, 23 March 1994; Cour de cassation, Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia
v. Société Rena Holding et Société Moguntia Est Epices, 05-18.053, 29 June 2007.
39Hulley Enterprises v. Russia and Société Bouygues Batiment Ile de France, Tribunal de grande
instance de Paris, No RG 15/00323, 28 April 2016.
40Dilevka S, Attachment of Russia owned assets in Belgium (22 June 2015) Russian Arbitration
Association http://arbitrations.ru/en/press-centr/news/attachment-of-russian-owned-assets-in-bel
gium/.
41The Economist, The Yukos Affair: A ghost bites back (27 June 2015) http://www.economist.
com/news/business/21656191-shareholders-what-was-once-russias-biggest-oil-company-scent-vic
tory-ghost-bites-back.
42Gololobov (2015), p. 9 citing Brussels Says Blocked Russian Accounts Being Unfrozen (21 June
2015) Reu te r s (UK) ht tp : / /uk . reu te r s .com/ar t i c l e /uk- russ i a -yukos-brusse l s -
idUKKBN0P10DW20150621.
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introduced by the Minister of Finance, Michel Sapin.43 The law introduced a raft of
reforms targeted towards French anti-corruption laws and also contained some
important changes to the treatment of measures of constraint available over foreign
state assets. The Belgian law, Article 1412quinquies of the Belgian Code Judiciaire,
introduced a general principle that assets located in Belgium belonging to a foreign
state are immune from execution. Both laws were accorded urgent treatment,44 were
the subject of highly contested debates, and were motivated by the desire to protect
diplomatic relations by avoiding diplomatic incidents at all costs.45
The French and Belgian laws have a similar structure, conferring a general state
immunity,46 subject to three exceptions: waiver, allocated or earmarked assets, and
commercial property.47 It is worth noting two substantive and procedural require-
ments introduced by each law—an “express and specific” waiver (Sect. 3.1) and
preliminary judicial authorisation (Sect. 3.2).
3.1 First Requirement: Express and Specific Waiver
First, the laws introduce a requirement that any waiver be “express and specific”.48
This applies in respect of all foreign state property in Belgium,49 and in respect of
diplomatic property in France (an “express” waiver is sufficient for other state
property in France). The requirement had been introduced in the jurisprudence of
the French and Belgian courts, which is explored below.
3.1.1 Development of Case Law in France
In France, the task of developing and applying the relevant rules of state immunity
was left to the courts, owing to the lack of comprehensive statutory rules governing
43Loi no 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à
la modernisation de la vie économique.
44The Belgian law entered into force on 13 September 2015, 73 days after its proposal.
45Projet de loi—Étude d’impact (France) (30 March 2016), p. 91; Proposition de loi—Rapport
(Belgium) (23 July 2015) Doc 54-1241/005, p. 3.
46Article 1412quinquies §1er of the Code Judiciaire (Belgium); Article 59 L. 111-1-1 of the Loi
Sapin II (France).
47Article 1412quinquies §2, 1-3 of the Code Judiciaire (Belgium); Article L111-1-2, 1-3 and
Article L111-1-3 of the Loi Sapin II (France).
48The French law requires that any waiver be “expresse et spéciale” (Article L. 111-1-3); the
Belgian law requires that a foreign state has “expressément et spécifiquement” consented (Article
1412quinquies § 2, 1).
49Note, however, that the Belgian Cour constitutionnelle has since annulled the requirement of the
word “specifically” in Article 1412quinquies insofar as it applies to non-diplomatic assets (see Sect.
3.1.2 below).
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the matter (prior to Loi Sapin II, the legislature had only introduced two articles
dealing with state immunity).50 The French courts have not approached the question
of immunity from execution in a consistent manner.
At one end of the spectrum is the decision of the highest court in the French
judiciary, the Cour de cassation, in Creighton v. Qatar.51 The Cour de cassation
held that an arbitration clause containing a submission to the Rules of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce constituted a valid waiver of immunity from jurisdic-
tion and execution. The decision represented a departure from prior reasoning of the
judiciary—that immunity from jurisdiction and execution were “not
interconnected”52 and the waiver of one did not remove the right to invoke the
other.53 The decision has been criticised as taking a “very far-reaching step” in the
development of French law.54
Following this decision, the French courts developed a line of reasoning with
respect to state immunity from execution against diplomatic property. In Ambassade
de la fédération de Russie en France v. Société NOGA,55 the Cour d’appel de Paris
refused execution against diplomatic assets. The foreign state, the Russian Federa-
tion, had signed an arbitration clause and an explicitly drafted waiver of “tout droit
d’immunité”.56 The Swiss company sought to execute its award against, inter alia,
certain bank accounts located in France in the name of the Russian embassy, the
Russian commercial delegation, and its permanent delegation to UNESCO.57 The
Cour d’appel de Paris refused execution as the waiver was too general. It held that
diplomatic immunity was governed by the distinct legal regime of the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR),58 which cannot be presumed to come
within the general waiver of immunity from execution.59 This approach was later
50Article L. 153-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code; Article L. 111 of the French Code of
Civil Enforcement Procedures.
51Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 6 July 2000, 98-19.068.
52Socifros v. USSR, Cour d’appel d’Aix, 23 November 1938 reported in (1938) 9 Ann Dig 236, 237.
53République Islamique d’Iran et consorts v. Sociétés Eurodif et Sofidif, Cour d’appel de Paris,
21 April 1982 reported in (1982) 65 International Law reports 93, 97; Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia v. Société Europeenne d’Etudes et d’Entreprises, Tribunal de grande instance de Paris,
6 July 1970 reported in (1971) Journal de Droit International 98.
54Gaillard (2002), p. 250.
55Ambassade de la fédération de Russie en France v. Société NOGA, Cour d’appel de Paris, No
2000/14157, 10 August 2000, reported in (2001) Rev Arb 114.
56This phrase translates as “any right of immunity”.
57Miles (2009), pp. 67–68; Blane (2009), p. 471; Caroit et al. (2015), p. 237.
58Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature 18 April 1961, (1962)
500 UNTS 95 (entered into force 24 April 1964).
59Gaillard (2002), p. 251.
State Immunity and the Execution of Investment Arbitration Awards 67
affirmed, in a case involving an even more broadly drafted waiver.60 One can be
sympathetic to the justification for the more stringent standard by according recog-
nition of the special status of diplomatic activities as being at the heart of sovereign
activity.
The Cour de cassation confirmed in the first of four cases relating to the immunity
of Argentina from execution of awards in favour of NML that, pursuant to customary
international law, diplomatic missions of foreign states enjoy an autonomous immu-
nity which can only be waived in an express and specific manner.61 In three cases
decided on the same day in 2013, the Cour de cassation extended this reasoning by
finding that, pursuant to customary international law as reflected in the UNCSI, a
waiver in respect of property or categories of property used or intended to be used for
governmental purposes must be express and specific. The Cour de cassation’s
reading of the UNCSI has been criticised.62
In an unexpected turn, the Cour de cassation “loosened up” this requirement in
République du Congo v. Commisimpex (Commisimpex);63 a case concerning a
dispute between the Republic of the Congo (Congo) and a Congolese company
(Commisimpex) regarding the performance of a contract to construct a women’s
hospital in the Qatari capital, Doha. In 2011, Commisimpex sought to enforce an
award issued in its favour. Commisimpex was initially successful in obtaining
attachment of Congolese assets in Paris, including numerous accounts held in the
name of the Congo’s diplomatic mission and its UNESCO delegation.64
Commisimpex relied on a general waiver in a letter of undertaking from the
Congo, waiving its right to “invoke, in the context of the settlement of a dispute
[. . .] any immunity of jurisdiction as well as any immunity of execution”.65 The
60République du Cameroun v. Winslow Bank & Trust, Cour d’appel de Paris, 26 September 2001,
reported in (2001) Dalloz IR 3017; the waiver included all immunities that the Republic “would be
entitled [. . .] to invoke for itself or for its assets [. . .] or any other immunity it may have,” specifying
that “the borrower consents [. . .] to [. . .] the execution against any assets (no matter what they are
used for or designated to be used for).”
61Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 1, 28 September 2011, 09-72.057.
62Franc-Menget (2013), p. 997; Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 1, 13 May 2015,
13-17.751.
63Langlois and Ioannou (2016).
64Franc-Menget (2015), p. 507; Franc-Menget Land Archer P, “French Supreme Court decision in
Commisimpex dispute heralds significant change in approach to sovereign immunity” on Herbert
Smith Freehills Public International Law Notes (4 June 2015) http://hsfnotes.com/
publicinternationallaw/2015/06/04/french-supreme-court-decision-in-commisimpex-dispute-her
alds-significant-change-in-approach-to-sovereign-immunity/.
65The terms of the general waiver in French were as follows: “à invoquer dans le cadre du
règlement d’un litige [. . .] toute immunité de juridiction ainsi que toute immunité d’exécution”
(Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 1, 13 May 2015, 13-17.751); Franc-Menget L and
Archer P, “French Supreme Court decision in Commisimpex dispute heralds significant change
in approach to sovereign immunity” on Herbert Smith Freehills Public International Law Notes
(4 June 2015) http://hsfnotes.com/publicinternationallaw/2015/06/04/french-supreme-court-deci
sion-in-commisimpex-dispute-heralds-significant-change-in-approach-to-sovereign-immunity/.
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discharge of the assets was ordered at first instance and affirmed on appeal. The Cour
d’appel de Versailles adopted the words of the Cour de cassation in NML Capital
Ltd v. Argentina,66 noting that diplomatic missions of foreign states benefit from an
absolute immunity from execution which can only be waived in an “expresse et
spéciale” manner.67 The Congo’s general waiver did not meet this requirement.
On appeal to the Cour de cassation, Commisimpex was successful.
Commisimpex’s primary argument was that the Cour d’appel had misunderstood
the nature of customary international law by finding that diplomatic assets enjoy an
absolute immunity, the waiver of which must be express and specific. Rather,
Commisimpex submitted that no such general consensus existed, as required by
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The Cour de
cassation accepted this argument. It held, reversing its 2013 decision and
abandoning the “specific” requirement, that the rules of customary international
law “n’exigent pas une renonciation autre qu’expresse à cette immunité.”68
By introducing the Loi Sapin II, the French Government substantially reinstated
the position that existed prior to Commisimpex. That is, affording an almost absolute
immunity to diplomatic assets by requiring an express and property-specific waiver.
Following the introduction of this law, the Congo challenged the decision of the
Cour de cassation, on the grounds that the new rules expressly provide that a creditor
is prohibited from attaching diplomatic assets in the absence of an express and
specific waiver. The Cour de cassation departed from its previous jurisprudence,
abandoning what it described as an “isolated doctrine”,69 and held that an express
waiver was not sufficient without specificity for the purpose of seizing diplomatic
assets.70 In doing so, the Cour de cassation was cautious to justify its position by
reference to older jurisprudence (most likely referring to the NML decision
discussed above) and to the need for consistency and legal certainty, as opposed to
the new Loi Sapin II, which it acknowledged could not apply retroactively to the
dispute.71 As such, the Cour de cassation confirmed that the seizure of the Congo-
lese bank accounts should be lifted.
66Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 1, 28 March 2013, 10-25.938; Cour de cassation, civile,
Chambre civile 1, 28March 2018, 11-10.450; Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 1, 28March
2013, 11-13.323.
67Cour d’appel de Versailles, 15 November 2012, 11-09.073; see also, Franc-Menget (2015), n 8.
68This phrase translates as “do not require a waiver from this immunity [that is anything] other than
express.” Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 1, 13 May 2015, 13-17.751. The Cour de
cassation ultimately referred the case to the Cour d’appel to rule on the merits of the legality of the
seizure.
69The language used by the Cour de cassation was as follows: “la doctrine isolée résultant de
l’arrêt du 13 mai 2015” (Cour de cassation, 1er chambre civile, 10 January 2018, 16-22.494).
70Cour de cassation, 1ère chambre civile, 10 January 2018, 16-22.494.
71See discussion in Malet-Deraedt (2018), pp. 337–338.
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3.1.2 Development of Case Law in Belgium
The justification underpinning the application of the requirement that a state consent
“expressément et spécifiquement” to the attachment of all of its assets (not just
diplomatic property) located in Belgium is less clear. The Chambre des
représentants introduced this requirement into parliament, explaining that it
removed all ambiguity around the word “express”.72 By way of authority, it cited
a judgment of the Belgian Cour de cassation of 22 November 2012, concerning the
dispute between NML and the Republic of Argentina referred to above.73 NML
commenced enforcement proceedings in Belgium and sought to attach Argentinian
diplomatic goods. The court noted the argument that neither the VCDR, nor any
other convention in force, nor customary international law provides for a “specific”
waiver for the bank accounts of diplomatic missions.74 However, the court held,
disagreeing with the lower court’s decision, that a general waiver of immunity did
not include diplomatic assets unless it specifically mentioned those goods.75
Article 1412quinquies codifies the reasoning of the Belgian Cour de cassation,
and extends the express and specific waiver requirement to all property. The Belgian
Cour constitutionnelle has, however, since annulled the requirement of the word
“specifically” in Article 1412quinquies insofar as it applies to non-diplomatic
assets.76 In light of the difficulty of meeting the requirements introduced by Article
1412quinquies, Yukos and NML commenced proceedings to set aside the new law
on the ground that it was unconstitutional.77 The Cour constitutionnelle noted that
the reference to the word “specifically” was problematic as it was not contained in
the UNCSI, nor had it been referred to by the ICJ in this context. On this basis, the
word “specifically” had to be annulled in respect of property that was not used for
diplomatic purposes. The Cour constitutionnelle confirmed the validity of the
balance of Article 1412quinquies.
3.2 Second Requirement: Preliminary Judicial Authorisation
The second aspect of the laws worth noting is the introduction of a requirement that a
creditor obtain prior authorisation from a judge ( judge des saisies) before taking any
72Proposition de loi—Amendements (Belgium) (22 July 2015) Doc 54-1241/004.
73See Sect. 2.3.1; NML Capital Ltd v. Republique d’Argentine, Cour de cassation de Belgique,
22 November 2012, C.11.0688.F.
74NML Capital Ltd v. Republique d’Argentine, Cour de cassation de Belgique, 22 November 2012,
C.11.0688.F, p. 9.
75NML Capital Ltd v. Republique d’Argentine, Cour de cassation de Belgique, 22 November 2012,
C.11.0688.F, p. 18.
76Belgian Constitutional Court, Rolnummers 6372 en 6373, Arrest nr. 48/2017, 27 April 2017, p
30 [B.21].
77Belgian Constitutional Court, Rolnummers 6372 en 6373, Arrest nr. 48/2017, 27 April 2017.
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measures of constraint. This obliges a creditor with an enforceable title (exequatur)
to request authorisation from the attachment judge in France or Belgium by dem-
onstrating in ex parte proceedings that the property is suitable for seizure. This
requirement already existed for provisional measures in France.
The motivation behind the introduction of this requirement was primarily to offer
greater judicial security to foreign states,78 and to ensure that creditors cannot seize
foreign state property, including immune property, before a plea of state immunity
from execution is considered. This also ensures that the interests of the foreign state,
including any immunity claims it may make, are adequately protected. The Belgian
drafters opined that seizures of property could be done in such a short period of time
and sometimes without intervention by a judge that one could not presume a perfect
knowledge of international law on the part of those who were participating in the
seizure.79 The French drafters were concerned with certain creditors who, knowing
that their request is not entirely legitimate, apply for execution to bailiffs who do not
necessarily know the subtleties of international law. Although these creditors are
generally unsuccessful, in the interim period, the creditors are in a position of power
to engage in discussions with the foreign state.80 The intention was for the prelim-
inary judicial authorisation procedure to act as a “filter” against applications by
creditors, limiting their “abusive” seizures.81
3.2.1 Compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights
The requirement for preliminary judicial authorisation has been criticised as impos-
ing an unduly onerous burden on award-creditors to prove that targeted property is
non-governmental, particularly as states are under no obligation to assist with
collating evidence. Its compatibility with the right to court access secured by Article
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)82 has also been called into
question. Critics of the law argue that it may preclude meaningful court access, as the
execution of an award is considered as “forming an integral part of the ‘process’ at
the heart of article 6”.83
However, in their challenge in the Cour constitutionnelle,84 Yukos and NML
unsuccessfully argued that the requirements were disproportionate and violated the
ECHR since they precluded a creditor from effectively enforcing a judgment or an
78Proposition de loi—Rapport (Belgium) (23 July 2015) Doc 54-1241/005, p. 7.
79Proposition de loi—Rapport (Belgium) (23 July 2015) Doc 54-1241/005, p. 9.
80Compte rendu intégral—Séance publique du jeudi 7 juillet 2016 (France) Sénat No 76 S (8 July
2016), 12540 (M. Sapin).
81Projet de loi—Rapport No 3785 (France) (26 May 2016), p. 278.
82European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, opened for
signature 4 November 1950, [1950] COETS 1 (entered into force 3 September 1953).
83Hornsby v. Greece (1997) 24 EHRR 250.
84Discussed above in Sect. 3.1.2.
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award rendered against the foreign state.85 A similar claim brought against France
was found by the European Court of Human Rights to be inadmissible for failure to
exhaust domestic remedies.86 To date, the European Court of Human Rights has held
that the grant of state immunity in accordance with international practice does not
infringe Article 6.87 It has held that “the grant of immunity to a State in civil
proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international law to
promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of another
State’s sovereignty”.88
3.2.2 Executive Authorisation
The requirement for some form of pre-attachment authorisation is not unique to
France and Belgium. Indeed, some states require executive authorisation for enforce-
ment measures against the property of foreign states.89 Unlike the regime of
pre-attachment judicial review in place in France and Belgium, the power to prevent
the attachment of assets located in the Netherlands, or render an attachment null and
void, is vested in the Dutch Ministry of Justice. Bailiffs in the Netherlands who assist
with the attachment proceedings are statutorily obliged to report to the Dutch
Ministry of Justice once a request for attachment of a foreign state’s assets has
been received which may be in violation of the state’s international obligations.90
Should the executive branch exercise its power to prevent, or render null and void, an
attachment of assets, the award-creditor must demonstrate in court proceedings that
the relevant assets are not covered by sovereign immunity, which shall be presumed
by Dutch courts.91 This approach has been criticised as it has been seen to politicise
the decision to grant or deny an attachment of assets.92 A similar requirement for
executive authorisation has been successfully challenged as being contrary to the
85Belgian Constitutional Court, Rolnummers 6372 en 6373, Arrest nr. 48/2017, 27 April 2017.
86NML Capital Ltd v. France, ECHR, Decision, App no 23242/12, 13 January 2015.
87Crawford (2019), p. 490; Kalogeropoulou and others v. Greece and Germany (2002) 129 ILR
537; Al-Adsani v. UK (2001) 123 ILR 24.
88Al-Adsani v. UK (2001) 123 ILR 24 [54].
89E.g. Article 18 of the Execution Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, No. 57/96)
provides that “[a]n act of execution or an act of securing canot be issued against the property of a
foreign State without previous consent of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Croatia, except
when a foreign State agrees on execution or securing.”
90Barten and Krestin (2017).
91In 2016, the Dutch Supreme Court confirmed a general presumption of immunity from enforce-
ment of judgments and arbitral awards against a foreign state’s assets: see Morning Star Interna-
tional Corporation v. Republic of Gabon, ECLI: NL: HR: 2016: 2236, 30 September 2016.
92Reinisch (2006), p. 813.
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constitutional right of access to court enshrined in Article 24 of the Italian
Constitution.93
3.3 Legislative Developments in Russia
It would be remiss not to mention in this context the legislative developments that
have taken place in the Russian Federation, following the numerous attempts of
execution against its property. On 1 January 2016, a new law came into force in
Russia “On the jurisdictional immunities of foreign States and property of a foreign
state in the Russian Federation”.94 The law implements a version of restrictive
immunity from execution, despite the nation’s traditional adherence to absolute
immunity, subject to reciprocity. The law grants Russian courts the power to lower
the level of protection afforded to foreign states based on the degree of immunity
afforded to the Russian Federation in that foreign state.95 The consistency between
legislating in respect of state immunity on the basis of reciprocity and the forum
state’s obligation to afford immunity has been questioned.96 Putting questions of
validity to one side, the approach of the Russian Federation may work to reduce the
protection enjoyed by foreign states in future enforcement proceedings.
4 Alternatives to Enforcement and Looking Forward
While the phenomenon of non-compliance with arbitral awards has the potential to
undermine the utility of investor-state dispute settlement entirely, leaving award-
creditors with a pyrrhic victory, the majority of debtor states do in fact comply with
arbitral awards.97 The practice of a few states should not be seen as representing the
majority. Indeed, states tend to prefer to abide by decisions of tribunals to avoid the
consequences of non-compliance for a state’s reputation with private and public
93Decreto Legge, Article 1, 30 August 1925, No. 1621, becoming law by Statute of 15 July 1926,
No. 1263. The law provided that “there shall be no attachment, seizure or, in general, measures of
execution against the movable or immovable property, vessels, funds, securities and any other
assets belonging to a foreign State, without the authorization of the Minister of Justice.” See
Reinisch (2006), p. 814.
94Federal Law No 297-FZ, “On the jurisdictional immunities of foreign States and property of a
foreign state in the Russian Federation”, entry into force 1 January 2016. In the joint “Declaration of
the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion of International Law”
(25 June 2016), the Russian Federation confirmed the applicability of the doctrine of state
immunity.
95Article 4 of the Federal Law No 297-FZ.
96Fox and Webb (2013), p. 14.
97Kehoe (2009), p. 265; Saunders and Salomon (2007), p. 469.
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sources of international finance.98 One cannot deny, however, the potential for
non-compliance. This section considers the alternatives to execution available to
award-creditors and posits a way forward for investors seeking to navigate the
landscape governing state immunity from execution.
4.1 Alternatives to Enforcement
When faced with a state claiming immunity from execution, two broad alternatives
to enforcement are available to an award-creditor.99 First, the parties may reach a
settlement agreement. While prompt payment may follow, this would usually be at
the cost of a significantly lower amount, particularly given the leverage a claim of
immunity provides a state in settlement discussions. In addition, states have a
number of concerns when faced with the prospects of reaching a settlement agree-
ment in circumstances necessarily lacking transparency (for example, through a
mediated settlement agreement). Such concerns were canvassed by a 2017 Survey
on Obstacles to Settlement of Investor-State Disputes conducted by the National
University of Singapore’s Centre for International Law. Ranking among the highest
obstacles preventing states from settling a dispute included the desire to avoid or
defer responsibility to an independent decision-maker and the fear of future prose-
cution for corruption.100
The second option is for the award-creditor to lobby its home state to exert
political pressure on the debtor state, similar to a traditional diplomatic protection
claim.101 A claim of diplomatic protection is available as a state will still be under an
obligation to abide by an award even though it has submitted a plea of immunity
from execution, which operates as a procedural bar. Such a claim is contemplated by
Article 27 of the ICSID Convention, which provides for the right of diplomatic
protection in case of non-compliance by a respondent state with an award. In
exercising diplomatic protection, a home state might also invoke the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 64 of the ICSID Convention, which provides for
the referral to the ICJ of any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of
the ICSID Convention. It has been noted that providing for diplomatic protection to
98Schreuer (2007), p. 348.
99Bonnitcha et al. (2017), pp. 78–79.
100Brown and Winch (2019), p. 324, citing Centre for International Law, National University of
Singapore, “Report: Survey on Obstacles to Settlement of Investor–State Disputes” (26 May 2017),
pp. 11–13.
101For example, following the lobbying by Azurix Corp and Blue Ridge Investment, two investors
with awards in their favour against Argentina, the US suspended trade benefits for Argentina:
Bonnitcha et al. (2017), p. 81.
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secure compliance with an award is designed to “counterbalance any State immunity
that is preserved by Art. 55”.102 However, in practice, diplomatic protection has
played little, if any, practical role.
4.2 Looking Forward
In light of the generally high rate of compliance by foreign states with investment
arbitration awards, it is unlikely that any type of global reform of the rules of state
immunity would be pursued. For now, it seems that it will be the responsibility of the
investor to prudently navigate the different requirements under national laws neces-
sary to ensure success in any enforcement proceedings. Many commentators have
suggested that investors obtain an explicit waiver of immunity from execution from
the state, such as the model clause proposed by ICSID.103 It has been noted that a
waiver of immunity from execution that covers only commercial property will have
little, if any, effect as, under most domestic laws, commercial property will not enjoy
immunity, whereas a waiver of immunity from execution for non-commercial
property is particularly important.104 It goes without saying that such a waiver will
be difficult to obtain in practice, and is only likely to be relevant where the investor
and the host state have entered into a contractual relationship, in which the negoti-
ation of such a clause may be contemplated. The validity of such a waiver and the
scope of property it captures will, once again, turn on the national law in force in the
country where execution is sought.105 Close attention should be given to the
requirements contained in such laws, particularly in light of the shifting legislative
landscape governing state immunity from execution.
5 Concluding Remarks
While the challenge posed by a plea of state immunity from execution is not unique
to the investment arbitration context, it is a useful prism through which to consider
the impact of such a plea on the execution of arbitral awards resulting from investor-
state disputes. In determining where to commence enforcement proceedings, award-
creditors have typically been attracted to pro-enforcement jurisdictions, which has
led to a series of enforcement proceedings commenced by award-creditors, notably
102Schreuer (2007), p. 348.
103International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID—Model Clauses,
Section VII, “Waiver of Immunity from Execution of the Award”, Clause 15 http://icsidfiles.
worldbank.org/icsid/icsid/staticfiles/model-clauses-en/15.htm.
104Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 1170.
105Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 1166.
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in France and Belgium. The imposition of judicial measures of constraint on the
assets of a foreign state has, however, had clear political consequences, prompting
intervention by French and Belgian legislatures.
This chapter has considered the plea of state immunity and the execution of
investment arbitration awards, and the introduction of the requirements for prelim-
inary judicial authorisation and an express and specific waiver by Loi Sapin II and
the equivalent Belgian law. A plea of state immunity from execution will continue to
pose a significant hurdle for award-creditors in attachment proceedings. While the
majority of states tend to comply with investment arbitration awards, in light of the
experiences of award-creditors such as NML and Yukos, investors should be prudent
in their approach to transacting with foreign states and remain cognisant of the
national law in force in the country where execution may be sought, including any
particular requirements which must be satisfied in order to successfully attach
foreign state assets in satisfaction of a debt arising under an award.
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Trends and ISDS Backlash Related
to Non-Disputing Treaty Party Submissions
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Abstract Some international investment agreements (IIAs) allow states that are
parties to a treaty, but are not party to a specific dispute under that treaty, to intervene
on a limited basis in order to make submissions on matters of treaty interpretation.
Such mechanisms have proved to be highly valued by treaty parties, as evident by
the many recently-concluded IIAs containing increasingly sophisticated
non-disputing treaty party (NDTP) provisions. This chapter: (1) provides the back-
ground on NDTPs mechanisms, with a focus on the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) (the first-known IIA to contain such a provision); (2) examines
the possible connection between tribunals failing to give due regard to treaty parties’
interpretive positions (again focusing on NAFTA) and the current backlash against
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS); and (3) analyses trends in recently-
concluded IIAs. It is argued that the apparent lack of deference given by tribunals
to NDTP submissions may be contributing to the current backlash against ISDS,
based on two discernible trends: (1) an increase in the number of IIAs containing
NDTPs provisions; and (2) provisions that now state that not only are treaty
interpretations made by treaty parties binding on tribunals (such provisions also
have their genesis in NAFTA), but that, in addition, tribunals’ decisions must be
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consistent with such agreed interpretations (the latter an innovation of a NAFTA
party in 2003). Such trends are also visible at the institutional and multilateral levels,
such as the revision of the Arbitration Rules of the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Mauritius Convention on Transpar-
ency in ISDS of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), and show no sign of slowing down.
1 Introduction
One unusual aspect of international investment dispute settlement that has developed
since its early days and has gained increasing momentum in recent years is that
certain international investment agreements (IIAs) allow states that are parties to a
treaty, but are not parties to a specific dispute under that treaty, to intervene in the
dispute on a limited basis in order to make submissions on matters of treaty
interpretation.1 For example, Article 1128 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) permits its non-disputing treaty parties (NDTPs) to file sub-
missions in ongoing cases regarding their interpretations of NAFTA.2 This feature
was probably employed due to the nature of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS),
in which treaty partners do not appear as opposing parties in a given dispute; instead,
only one party to a treaty is typically a respondent in a dispute.
The submissions made by NDTPs are distinct from amicus curiae submissions, in
that NDTP submissions are only available to treaty parties that are not party to the
dispute-at-hand, and almost always only on matters of treaty interpretation.3 NDTPs
1Other international adjudicative regimes provide for third party participation in disputes, but that
can often be circumnavigated (for example, in the World Trade Organization (WTO), whether third
parties may participate in a dispute depends on whether the dispute is brought pursuant to Article
XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Article XXII:1 of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Article 4.11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) or other corresponding provisions in the covered agreements—all of which allow third party
participation (so long as they are WTO Members)—versus Article XXII:1 of the GATT, under
which the participation of a third party is subject to approval from the respondent) or are subject to
obtaining leave to intervene (see, e.g. Palchetti 2002, p. 139).
2Article 1128 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (adopted 17 December
1992), (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 612.
3Only the 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration
(Rules on Transparency) allow for the possibility of NDTP submissions on matters other than treaty
interpretation (which is also permitted thereunder, see Article 5(1)), providing in this regard in
Article 5(2) that:
The arbitral tribunal, after consultation with the disputing parties, may allow submissions on
further matters within the scope of the dispute from a non-disputing Party to the treaty. In
determining whether to allow such submissions, the arbitral tribunal shall take into consid-
eration, among other factors it determines to be relevant, the factors referred to in article
4, paragraph 3, and for greater certainty, the need to avoid submissions which would support
the claim of the investor in a manner tantamount to diplomatic protection.
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are also distinct from intervening parties, whose scope of participation in the dispute
is much broader. Many modern IIAs recognise these distinctions by, e.g. having
separate provisions governing the participation of NDTPs and non-disputing parties
(NDPs)—e.g. civil society—more generally.4 As will also be discussed below, such
distinction can further be seen in the situation that has arisen with respect to the
participation in investor-state disputes of the European Union (EU), a regional
economic union that only obtained treaty-making power in relation to foreign direct
investment with the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force in 2009,5 and which is not a
party to many of its member states’ treaties, meaning that it is an NDP as opposed to
an NDTP in disputes arising under such treaties. The EU has had difficulty success-
fully petitioning to participate in ongoing disputes involving its member states,
which may be contributing not only to the EU’s current attempt post-Achmea6 to
enforce the termination of its member states’ intra-EU treaties and create a standing
international investment court with an appeals mechanism, but also its current treaty
practice in concluding new IIAs, which contain NDTP mechanisms.7
The increasing value that states seem to be placing on the availability of NDTP
submission mechanisms is evident in part by the many recently-concluded treaties
that contain similar provisions to NAFTA Article 1128—for example, slightly over
one third of the known IIAs concluded in 2018 contained such mechanisms.8 This
trend does not come as a complete surprise: since the explosion of investment
disputes in the 1990s/2000s, states have frequently resorted to their ability to submit
NDTP submissions, above all in the NAFTA context, in which NAFTA Article 1128
submissions have been made by the NDTPs in at least 33 known-NAFTA cases.9
However, as will also be discussed further below, while arbitral tribunals fre-
quently cite NDTP submissions, they also have appeared reluctant to afford much
interpretive weight to the agreements reached by the parties in their submissions,
although a few tribunals have.10 In the NAFTA context, which will be the main
4Compare e.g. Article 14.D.7(2) of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which
permits NDTP submissions, and Article 14.D.7(3) of the USMCA, which permits amicus
submissions.
5Article 188L of the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, 2007.
6CJEU, Slovakia v. Achmea, Case C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158. For an explanation of Achmea, see
Ankersmit L. (2018) Achmea: The Beginning of the End for ISDS in and with Europe?, IISD,
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2018/04/24/achmea-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-isds-in-and-with-
europe-laurens-ankersmit/#_edn1.
7See Article 3.51 of the EU-Vietnam investment protection agreement (IPA) (2019), Article 3.17 of
the EU-Singapore IPA (2018) and Article 8.38 of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) (2016).
8See Investment Policy Hub, IIA Navigator, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements; UNCTAD, Taking Stock of IIA Reform: Recent Developments, IIA Issues
Note No. 3, June 2019, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d5_en.pdf.
9Furthermore, there are often multiple NDTP submissions made in a given case.
10See Magraw (2015), p. 142.
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focus of this chapter, such reluctance on the part of tribunals eventually resulted in
the NAFTA parties taking the next step and issuing binding interpretive statements
(which are permitted under NAFTA),11 in order to attempt to force the recognition of
their agreements. Such reluctance on the part of tribunals, it is argued herein, may be
contributing to the current backlash against ISDS by states and other stakeholders in
the investment law regime.
This chapter addresses certain aspects of NDTP participation—especially sub-
missions—in international investment law. Section 2 provides the background of
NDTP mechanisms, as well as issues that have arisen with respect to them, espe-
cially in the NAFTA context. Section 3 examines the possible connection between
failing to give due regard to the interpretive positions offered by treaty parties and
the current backlash against ISDS. Finally, Sect. 4 analyses trends in a sample of
recently-concluded IIAs and other related initiatives with respect to NDTP
submissions.12
From a methodological perspective, it is important to note that the IIA data
analysed in this chapter to identify, e.g., trends in IIA treaty-making, does not purport
to be a comprehensive examination of every known IIA. Rather, analysis was carried
out in two steps: the first being the identification of a base group of IIAs (via the
UNCTAD IIA Mapping Project and other sources)13 that are known to contain the
provisions whose prevalence in IIAs is analysed herein; and second, once the base
group of IIAs was identified by reference to the sources indicated, this base group was
expanded upon by comprehensively examining the treaties of specific states whose
treaties the author hypothesised might contain the analysed provisions (obviously for
purposes of this chapter, the NAFTA parties’ IIAs were all examined, for example). It
is therefore possible that the underlying data upon which the discussion in this chapter
is based on the available resources and/or skewed in favour of the informed fishing
expedition undertaken by the author: this notwithstanding, it is argued that the
available data supports the trends identified herein.
2 NDTP Submissions: Inception and Issues in NAFTA
Chapter Eleven Disputes
When NAFTA came into force in 1994, it could probably be considered to have been
the most comprehensive and sophisticated free trade agreement (FTA) that had ever
been concluded: not only were FTAs relatively uncommon at that time, since
international trade was governed almost exclusively by the multilateral General
11Articles 2001 (2) and 1131(2) of NAFTA.
12UNCTAD Mapping Project, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agree
ments/iia-mapping.
13For example, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2019, UN, p. 108, Table III.3, https://unctad.
org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf [hereinafter “UNCTAD 2019WIR”]; Gordon and Pohl
(2015) and Polanco (2019).
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but in addition, while subsequently it
became common for countries to include investment chapters or provisions in their
trade agreements, NAFTA was one of the first to do so. Further, NAFTA’s invest-
ment chapter, Chapter Eleven, was much more detailed than the typical bilateral
investment treaty (BIT) that was being concluded in hordes in the 1990s (the typical
BIT at that time had between eleven and thirteen provisions, while NAFTA had
thirty-nine).
One of NAFTA’s innovative features is that it is the first-known IIA to introduce
an NDTP provision, i.e. Article 1128, which provides that “[o]n written notice to the
disputing parties, a [NAFTA] Party may make submissions to a Tribunal on a
question of interpretation of this agreement.” In practice, since the first disputes
brought under NAFTA, the NAFTA parties have frequently exercised their right to
file submissions on matters of treaty interpretation in ongoing disputes (to date,
non-disputing NAFTA parties have filed NDTP submissions in at least 33 NAFTA
cases),14 which led to novel and controversial situations in international
investment law.
For example, in several early NAFTA disputes, it was debated whether NAFTA’s
fair and equitable treatment (FET) provision (NAFTA Article 1105) was subsumed
by the customary international law (CIL) minimum standard of treatment (MST) or
whether it was a stand-alone obligation. The three NAFTA parties (Canada, Mexico
and the United States) argued in multiple cases (e.g. in Mondev v. United States,15
Loewen v. United States,16 Methanex v. United States17 and Pope & Talbot v.
Canada18) that their pleadings (herein referred to as “state party pleadings” or
14See e.g. Halow.com.
15The United States argued that the SPPs of the parties—that is “formal, public submissions to
various Chapter Eleven tribunals”—amounted to subsequent practice establishing an agreement
under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (VCLT) that was
binding on the tribunal. Mondev International Ltd v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/
2, Counter-Memorial on Competence and Liability of Respondent United States, 1 July 2001,
pp. 33–34.
16The United States argued that its SPPs in Loewen and Mexico and Canada’s SPPs from domestic
proceedings amounted to subsequent practice establishing an agreement under VCLT Article 31(3)
(b), and that this should be given considerable weight. Loewen, Group, Inc and Raymond L Loewen
v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Counter-Memorial, 30 March 2001,
pp. 175–176.
17All three parties argued that they were in agreement: the United States in its pleadings as the
respondent in Methanex, and Canada and Mexico via NAFTA Article 1128 mechanism in
Methanex. See Methanex v. United States, UNCITRAL, Post-Hearing Submission of Respondent
United States of America, 20 July 2001, pp. 2–4. See alsoMethanex v. United States, UNCITRAL,
Response of Respondent United States of America to Methanex’s Post-Hearing Submission,
27 July 2001, pp. 2–6.
18Pope & Talbot v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Canada’s Submission respecting Post-Hearing Article
1128 Submission filed by Mexico and the US, 1 June 2000.
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“SPPs”), including their NDTP submissions, established an agreement on the inter-
pretation of NAFTA under Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT).19
Pope & Talbot played a starring role in this debate; therein, the respondent state,
Canada, argued that all three NAFTA parties agreed in their SPPs—Canada in its
memorials, and Mexico and the United States in their NAFTA Article 1128 NDTP
submissions—that NAFTA Article 1105 reflected the CIL FET standard.20 How-
ever, in an interim award, while the tribunal noted the parties’ agreement on the
interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105 in their pleadings, it ultimately dismissed
such agreement because of, inter alia, concerns that the interpretation did not reflect
the parties’ true intentions at the time NAFTA was drafted.21 Approximately three
months later, while not only Pope & Talbot but also several cases on the matter
remained pending, the NAFTA parties issued a binding joint interpretive statement,
the 31 July 2001 Free Trade Commission (FTC) “Notes of Interpretation of Certain
Chapter 11 Provisions” (FTC Notes), linking FET to CIL. As a result, the Loewen,
Mondev and Methanex tribunals found that they did not have to determine the status
of the parties’ interpretive agreements in their submissions; rather they applied the
FTC Notes.22
However, the saga did not end there: the Pope & Talbot tribunal, which still had
to issue its final Award, refused to apply the freshly-issued FTC Notes, determining
instead that even though interpretations issued by the FTC are binding, tribunals
have the power to determine whether an alleged interpretation is actually an inter-
pretation or rather a disguised amendment.23 Perhaps on no other occasion in the
history of NAFTA Chapter Eleven has the outcry from the legal community been
19Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969), 155 United Nations Treaty
Series 331. For an examination of SPPs in relation to subsequent agreement and subsequent practice
in ISDS, see Magraw (2015), p. 142.
20Canada also argued the same with regard to NAFTA’s expropriation provision, Article 1110.
Pope & Talbot v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Canada’s Submission respecting Post-Hearing Article 1128
Submissions filed by Mexico and the US, 1 June 2000.
21Pope & Talbot v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001, para.
79, pp. 112–114.
22For example, theMethanex tribunal determined that the FTC Notes were a subsequent agreement
under Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT and stated that it was therefore unnecessary for it to decide
whether the parties’ SPPs were an agreement. Methanex v. United States of America, UNCITRAL,
Final Award, 3 August 2005, (2005) 44 International Legal Materials 1345, part II, ch B, para. 21.
However, the Pope & Talbot tribunal defiantly refused to apply the FTC Notes in its subsequent
award. See Pope & Talbot v. Canada, NAFTA, Decision in Respect to Damages, 31 May 2002,
41 International Legal Materials 347, paras 11–16.
23Pope & Talbot v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Decision in Respect to Damages, 31 May 2002, para. 47.
The tribunal’s action also caused a backlash amongst the NAFTA parties and is the likely genesis of
subsequent treaty practice that can be observed in certain of the treaties concluded thereafter by the
NAFTA parties, which has also been taken up by other states. See Sect. 2 of this chapter.
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more vocal, particularly since the FTC Notes affected ongoing arbitrations, raising
issues of, inter alia, circumvention of due process and retroactivity.24
Furthermore, other arbitral tribunals found ways to sidestep the FTC Notes, even
if they recognised that they were binding per the terms of NAFTA. For example, in
the Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada case, which was initiated in 2006, the issue
again arose concerning the meaning of the FET standard in relation to CIL. While the
Merrill & Ring tribunal accepted that the 2001 FTC Notes were binding according to
NAFTA’s provisions, the tribunal noted that the interpretations in the FTC Notes
may not reflect the current state of CIL, the “evolutionary nature” of which the
tribunal was “mindful of” and “which provides scope for the interpretation of
[NAFTA’s FET article], even in the light of the FTC Commission’s 2001
interpretation.”25
The respondent, Canada, argued that if an evolutionary interpretation of FET was
appropriate at all, such evolution must have occurred subsequent to the issuance of
the FTC Notes, and that no such subsequent evolution of the standard had taken
place. The tribunal disagreed, effectively sidestepping the contents of the FTC
Notes,26 and proceeded to re-analyse the CIL standard that the FTC Notes tied to
FET27 (which the tribunal even noted that Canada had adhered to as the relevant
standard in its SPPs in other NAFTA disputes28), before instead concluding that
there was a specialised FET standard in business, trade and investment.29
The FTC Notes and their raison d’être were not only influential in NAFTA
disputes, but have also been taken into consideration in other ISDS cases. For
example, in a separate opinion in one ISDS case, arbitrator Pedro Nikken relied on
the FTC Notes as an indication as to why the majority’s “disguised recourse to
24See Pope & Talbot v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Decision in Respect to Damages, 31 May 2002,
paras 11–16; Alvarez and Park (2006), p. 347; Brower II (2001), pp. 43, 56 and fn 71; Brower II
(2006), p. 347; Weiler (2002), pp. 45, 346–348; Matiation (2014), p. 451; Methanex Corporation
v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 August 2005, Part
IV, Chapter C, para. 22.
25Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award, 31 March 2010,
paras 190 and 192.
26The tribunal stated that the FTC Notes “does not refer to the specific content of [CIL] at a given
moment and it is not an interpretative note of such content. Accordingly, the matter needs to be
examined in the light of the evolution of customary law over time”; Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v.
Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award, 31 March 2010, para. 194.
27The Neer standard established by the Mexico-United States General Claims Commission. See
LFH Neer & Pauline Neer (USA) v. United Mexican States, Decision, 15 October 1926 (1951)
4 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 60.
28Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award, 31 March 2010,
para. 195.
29Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award, 31 March 2010,
para. 200.
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evolutionary interpretation” was inappropriate,30 since the NAFTA parties issued
the FTC Notes precisely “as a reaction to” ISDS tribunals’ interpretations that the
NAFTA parties considered to be incorrect and “which went beyond what those
States had considered the extent of their obligations under the [NAFTA].”31
As will be discussed below, the NAFTA parties’ experience with respect to
NDTP submissions and whether the parties’ interpretive agreements are binding
on tribunals have had a significant effect both on their treaty practice, as well as the
practice of third states. It is also clear that states were not satisfied with the lack of
deference that tribunals seemed to give the interpretations put forth in NDTP sub-
missions, and in some instances, have adopted policies designed to strengthen their
control in the interpretive process or to change the system altogether.
3 NDTP and ISDS Backlash
Failures such as those described above to give due regard to the interpretive value of
NDTP submissions may, in conjunction with other factors, be contributing to the
current “backlash” against ISDS. In general, such backlash has been ongoing for the
last several years and has manifested itself in a variety of ways, including: (1) states
disengaging entirely from the ISDS regime, i.e. by terminating their IIAs or by
leaving important multilateral conventions, such as the Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID
Convention); (2) states renegotiating the terms of their existing IIAs, for instance to
provide for restricted access to ISDS or fewer substantive obligations; and (3) states
or regional economic unions, such as the EU, calling for a shift from ad hoc tribunals
in favour of the creation of a permanent investment law court.32
There are at least two discernible impacts—both of which fall under the second
category of backlash identified above, i.e. changes to the content of IIA terms—that
the NAFTA experience arguably has had on investment treaty making and policy,
both at the NAFTA level and more broadly:33 (1) the increased inclusion of NDTP
provisions in treaties, often now as a matter of right, and (2) the specification in
provisions on governing law that not only are the treaty interpretations offered by the
30Specifically, that the FET provision in the BIT in question (the Argentina-France BIT) should not
be read to encompass legitimate expectations. See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona
SA and Vivendi Universal SA v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability –
Separate Opinion of Pedro Nikken, 30 July 2010, para. 6.
31See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal SA v. Argentina,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability – Separate Opinion of Pedro Nikken, 30 July
2010, para. 6.
32See UNCTAD 2019 WIR, pp. 104 et seq. (describing various types of IIA reform) https://unctad.
org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf.
33The author does not discount that NAFTA might be one of several factors that has shaped the IIA
policy making of countries in recent years.
86 K. Magraw
treaty parties binding on tribunals, but that decisions that the tribunals take must be
consistent with such interpretations.34
In the NAFTA context, such backlash is visibly reflected in the text of the
renegotiated NAFTA (renamed the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement
(USMCA)).35 The USMCA has vastly reduced ISDS provisions, only granting
access to ISDS for investors in certain circumstances.36 However, despite this
greatly reduced access to ISDS, and with respect to the first impact identified
above, it is noteworthy that the NAFTA/USMCA parties not only preserved, but
strengthened, NDTP participation provisions (USMCA adopts the nomenclature
“Non-Disputing Annex Parties”), by granting the parties, e.g., the ability to attend
hearings and make oral and written submissions on a matter of interpretation,
indicating the value that the parties assign to the possibility of making such
submissions.37
With respect to the second impact, and almost certainly as a response to the FTC
Notes/Pope & Talbot situation, the USMCA provides in Article 14.D.9(2) that “a
decision of the Commission on the interpretation of a provision on this Agreement
under Article 30.2 (Functions of the Commission) shall be binding on a tribunal, and
any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that decision.”38
In contrast, NAFTA provided that “[a]n interpretation by the Commission of a
provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this
Section.”39
Canada, one of the NAFTA/USMCA parties, has gone even further in its 2016
treaty with the EU, the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA). CETA contains new-generation NDTP provisions permitting, amongst
other forms of NDTP participation, a provision allowing NDTPs to file submissions
on interpretation and to attend hearings.40 In addition, the CETA goes a step further,
providing that on appeal, the appellate tribunal may modify or reverse a tribunal’s
award based on “errors in the application or interpretation of applicable law,”41
which includes interpretations made by the treaty parties.42
34This category—and the trends analysed herein—relate solely to provisions generally stating that
parties’ agreed interpretations are binding on the tribunals. It does not examine separate but similar
provisions that provide for such in special circumstances, such as when there are implications for
financial services or taxation. See e.g. Article XI(1) of the Canada-Croatia BIT (1997).
35For example, ISDS is eliminated entirely between Canada and Mexico in the USMCA.
36N Bernasconi-Osterwalder, USMCA curbs how much investors can sue countries—sort of, IISD,
www.iisd.org/library/usmca-investors.
37Article 14.D.7 of the USMCA.
38The same provision has been present in the US Model BIT since 2004. Article 30(3) of the 2004
US BIT and Article 30(3) 2012 US Model BIT.
39Article 1131 of NAFTA.
40Article 8.38 of CETA.
41Article 3.28(2) of CETA.
42Article 8.31 of CETA. However, the European Court of Justice, perhaps anticipating a Pope &
Talbot-esque scenario, has already stated that binding interpretations issued by the CETA Joint
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The other CETA party, the EU, is leading one of the most aggressive campaigns
to change the status quo of ISDS, principally via its attempts to eliminate ad hoc
ISDS tribunals in favour of variations of standing international investment courts
with appellate mechanisms (one such example is contained in the CETA), as well as
through its dogged efforts to attempt to eradicate intra-EU member state IIAs. The
EU member states are party to hundreds of treaties, both between themselves and
with other states, and some are among the most active in ISDS disputes both
historically and recently.43 It is known that the EU has attempted to intervene in
several ISDS cases44—and has been denied participation on several such occasions
for various reasons, including its unwillingness to contribute to the arbitration
costs45—and it is likely that it has attempted to intervene in many more disputes
than can be identified publicly.46 To this end, the EU’s recent treaty practice seems to
prioritise ensuring that it may participate as an NDTP in future disputes; three of its
IIAs contain provisions allowing for NDTP submissions (and the EU-Mexico
agreement is reported to contemplate such),47 in addition to other provisions
aimed at ensuring participation and safeguarding the treaty parties’ ability to exert
some form of interpretive regulation over arbitral tribunals.
It is notable that even while attempting to reform the IIA landscape amid the
current backlash to ISDS, the EU in its treaties and the NAFTA parties in the
USMCA retain NDTP provisions: in the latter case this is all the more striking
given the limited scope of permissible ISDS disputes. This is reflective of a general
trend that can be observed concerning the increasing inclusion of provisions ensur-
ing and strengthening the participation of NDTPs in IIAs, which could be considered
Commission (i.e. the equivalent of the FTC) cannot have retroactive effect on pending or concluded
ISDS proceedings. ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, Opinion 1:17 (Opinion Pursuant to Article 218
(11) TEFU), 30 April 2019, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text¼&
docid¼213502&pageIndex¼0&doclang¼EN&mode¼lst&dir¼&occ¼first&part¼1&
cid¼4976548. For further discussion, see Titi (forthcoming).
43For example, the Netherlands (which is currently the second most frequent home state of investors
in ISDS disputes) and Spain (which is currently the second most frequent respondent state). See
Fact Sheet on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases in 2018, UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note, (May
2019), pp. 2–3, Figure 2 and 3, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d4_en.
pdf.
44See e.g. Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20,
Decision on Annulment, 26 February 2016; Madsar Solar & Wind Cooperatief UA v. Spain,
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, Ruling on Application to Intervene as a Non-Disputing Party, 9 January
2015; United Utilities (Tallinn) B.V. and Aktsiaselts Tallinna Vesi v. Estonia, ICSID Case
No. ARB/14/24, Decision on the Application for Leave to Intervene as a Non-Disputing Party,
2 October 2018.
45See Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg Sàrl v. Spain, ICSID Case
No. ARB/13/36, Procedural Order No. 7, 21 December 2015; UP and CD Holding Internationale
v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/35, Decision on Application for Leave to Intervene as a
Non-Disputing Party, 17 December 2014.
46See ICSID, Decisions on Non-Disputing Treaty Party Participation, https://icsid.worldbank.org/
en/Pages/Process/Decisions-on-Non-Disputing-Party-Participation.aspx.
47Article 3.51 of the EU-Vietnam IPA (2019), Article 3.17 of the EU-Singapore IPA (2018) and
Article 8.38 of CETA.
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both part of the backlash and more generally part of IIA reform as countries update
older-generation BITs that contained very few provisions to more comprehensive
and detailed IIAs.
4 NDTP Submission Trends in International
Investment Law
Turning back to NAFTA, the trends and backlash described above are reflected not
only in the USMCA text, but also, to varying degrees, in the IIA practice of the
individual NAFTA parties, which individually could be said to be on a sliding scale of
conservative to progressive with respect to IIA liberalisation and innovation, with the
United States falling on the conservative, protectionist end of the scale and Canada
sitting on the other (although this has not always historically been the case).48
Starting at the conservative end of the spectrum, since 2008, the United States has
stopped signing FTAs and BITs, and rather concludes Trade and Investment Frame-
work Agreements (TIFAs), which establish basic institutional frameworks aimed at
investment promotion and cooperation that contain no substantive obligations—it
has concluded at least 13 such agreements since 2013.49 This notwithstanding, the
2012 US Model BIT contains provisions providing for NDTP participation and
NDTP binding interpretations,50 and the United States had been involved in the
negotiation of several so-called “mega-regional” agreements, such as the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), which likewise has a NDTP provision.51 (However, the
United States withdrew from the TPP in 2017, causing the remaining Parties to enact
the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP), which retains the NDTP submission provision.)52 Of course, some of
the FTAs to which the United States is party contain NDTP provisions, such as
USMCA, showing the value that the US continues to place on the ability to make
NDTP submissions.
In the middle of the spectrum of the NAFTA countries lies Mexico, which despite
being a frequent ISDS respondent state, has concluded at least 22 BITs and 10 FTAs
48See Magraw (2019) (discussing the progression of the NAFTA parties’ respective policies
regarding international investment law in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries).
49The US signed its first TIFA in 1992 (with New Zealand) and concluded its most recent with
Paraguay in 2016. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2017, UN, p. 112, https://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf. TIFAs typically contain less than 10 provisions, and their
only firm commitment is the establishment of a joint council to monitor trade and FDI between the
signatories.
50See Article 28(2) of the US 2012 Model BIT.
51Article 9.23 of the TPP.
52The CPTPP incorporates by reference much of the TPP, including the investment chapter, while
suspending certain provisions that were included in the TPP at the behest of the US.
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since 2000, as well as drafted its 2008 Model Investment Promotion and Protection
Agreement.53 Like Canada, it is a signatory to the CPTPP, which provides for NDTP
participation. At least 10 of the IIAs to which Mexico is a party contain a provision
allowing for NDTP submissions, and Mexico concluded the second known treaty
providing for such.54 Furthermore, the EU and Mexican Investment Protection
Agreement, the draft of which contains a provision on NDTP submissions,55 is
reportedly even more progressive than the CETA.56
On the other side of the spectrum, all of Canada’s recent treaties except for one
have contained NDTP provisions,57 possibly based on its NAFTA Article 1128
experience.58 Canada did not sign any BITs between 1999 and 2005; in 2006, it
began concluding them again—to date, at least 44 (approximately half of its 44 IIAs
post-2006). Subsequent to NAFTA until 1999, it entered into several bilateral and
regional “cooperation agreements” (which do not contain substantive obligations;
rather they state the parties’ intentions to cooperate to liberalise and promote FDI,
and establish a joint committee). Starting in 2001, Canada concluded several bilat-
eral and regional FTAs, including the CETA in 2016, which establishes a joint body
with the power to issue binding interpretations and an NDTP provision.
Canada’s approach could be considered reflective of a broader trend that can be
generally discerned from the text of many recent IIAs, i.e. a growing number of
treaties containing increasingly sophisticated NDTP provisions, which has been
identified as one of the likely impacts of the NAFTA experience in the previous
section (although arguably in conjunction with other factors as well). For instance, in
addition to the increase of specific provisions addressing NDTPs as a separate
category of submissions from amicus curiae and establishing joint bodies with
mandates to issue binding interpretations of treaty provisions,59 a rising number of
IIAs and related instruments provide for NDTP submissions by right (i.e., such
submissions must be allowed by tribunals) on matters of treaty interpretation.
Globally, there are at least 82 IIAs that contain explicit NDTP provisions, not to
mention treaties that incorporate the 2014 Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based
53Mexico has recently joined the ICSID Convention. ICSID News Release (11 January 2018)
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/News.aspx?CID¼267.
54See Annex 5 of the Mexico-Venezuela-Bolivia FTA (1994).
55Article 23(3) of the EU-Mexico Agreement (2018), Section [X]: Resolution of Investment
Disputes, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/april/tradoc_156814.pdf.
56See Charlotin and Hepburn, Analysis: EU-Mexico investment text released, allowing for com-
parison with other agreements; permanent two-tier system of adjudication is envisioned, Investment
Arbitration Reporter (2 May 2018) https://www.iareporter.com/articles/analysis-eu-mexico-
investment-text-is-released-allowing-for-comparison-with-other-agreements-permanent-two-tier-
system-of-adjudication-is-envisioned/.
57See UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, IIA Navigator, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements.
58Newcombe (2005), p. 1.
59See Australia-Peru FTA (2018); Belarus-India BIT (2018); Central America-Republic of Korea
FTA (2018); CPTPP (2018); EU-Singapore IPA (2018); EU-Vietnam IPA (2019); USMCA (2018);
and the Netherlands Model BIT (2018).
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Investor-State Dispute Settlement of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (which provides for NDTP submissions):60 notably,
only five of the 82 known IIAs containing NDTP provisions—including NAFTA—
were concluded prior to 2003, and all of those five were concluded by at least one
NAFTA party; 2003 also appears to be the first year that non-NAFTA parties
concluded a treaty with a NDTP provision.61 Since then it has been off to the
races, as is evident from Fig. 1: 55 of the 82 known treaties identified in the data
analysis for this chapter that permit NDTP submission provisions were concluded
since 2010, demonstrating the massive uptick in the conclusion of such treaties in
recent years.62
This trend shows no sign of slowing down: approximately one-third of the treaties
concluded in 2018 contained an NDTP submission provision.63 As evident from
Fig. 2, nearly 60% of the sample IIAs containing NDTP provisions have been
concluded post-2010.
This is all the more noteworthy considering that the conclusion of IIAs has
declined since 2010, as visible in Fig. 3, making the high occurrence of NDTP
provisions in the 2018 treaties all the more significant.
The above trend could potentially be traced to the timeline of the very high-profile
disputes surrounding the NDTP submission and FTC Notes controversy described








Number of IIAs with NDSP Provisions by Year
Fig. 1 Number of IIAs with NDSP provisions by year (Source: UNCTAD IIA Navigator)
60See UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, IIA Navigator, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements. IIAs incorporating the 2014 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules
were not analysed for purposes of this chapter.
61Article 10.32 of the Chile-Republic of Korea FTA (2003).
62See UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, IIA Navigator, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements.
63See UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, IIA Navigator, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements.
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leading up to the 2001 issuance of the FTC Notes, and the binding nature of the FTC
Notes continued to be debated by tribunals in decisions issued from between 2001
and 2010.64 The subsequent reaction vis-à-vis increased inclusion of NDTP sub-
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Fig. 3 Number of IIAs signed, 1980–2018 (Source: UNCTAD 2019 WIR Figure 111.7, p. 99;
UNCTAD, IIA Navigator)
64See Sect. 2 above.
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affected by this ongoing debate. The above trends are also being seen at the
institutional and multilateral level: for example, the 2018 proposed ICSID arbitration
rule revisions contain such a provision for the first time65 and the 2014 United
Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration
contains a provision on NDTPs.66 States have very important and often primary
roles in shaping the direction of such rules and conventions.67
Turning to the second trend that is arguably also linked to the NAFTA experi-
ence, i.e. the coupling of provisions providing for binding interpretations and
consistent decisions, similar trends to the NDTP provisions can be identified from
the available data. NAFTA was the first known-IIA to contain a provision that the
parties’ interpretations are binding on a tribunal. Subsequent to NAFTA, approxi-
mately 14 IIAs that were concluded between 1994 and 2002 contained such pro-
visions, all of which were BITs concluded by a NAFTA party (predominantly
Mexico) and a third party. In 2002, the Pope & Talbot final Award was rendered.
In 2003, for the first time, two US IIAs contained the requirement that tribunals’
decisions must be consistent with the treaty parties’ binding interpretations.68 In the
sample of IIAs containing NDTP provisions concluded between 2003 and 2009,
approximately 27 provided either for binding interpretations alone (16) or binding
interpretations coupled with consistent decisions (11). Of these 11 providing also for
consistent decisions, over half were concluded by a NAFTA party (namely Canada
or the US). However, a handful of South American countries69 started including
them in their treaties during this period, and both were also provided for in the 2009
Comprehensive Investment Agreement of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), demonstrating that non-NAFTA parties were beginning to pick
65See proposed Article 49 of the Rule Revisions (or Article 58 of the Additional Facility Rules).
Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, ICSID, Working Paper Vol 3, August 2019, https://
icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/WP_3_VOLUME_1_ENGLISH.pdf.
66Furthermore, at least two treaties (both of which were concluded by Canada) specifically provide
that the Rules on Transparency apply (Article 8.36 of CETA and Article 29 of the Canada-Hong
Kong BIT (2016)); however, as the 2013 UNCITRAL Rules incorporate the Mauritius Convention,
the number of arbitral proceedings that may have to be conducted in accordance with the Mauritius
Convention (which entered into force in 2017), including the opportunity for NDTP to make
submissions, is much higher.
67For example, states are invited to submit comments on the ICSID Rule revisions. Mexico, for
example, has commented on the content of the proposed NDTP provision in the new ICSID rules.
‘Comentarios de México al Proyecto de enmiendas a las reglas del CIADI’, June 2019, https://icsid.
worldbank.org/en/amendments/Documents/Mexico_CommentsWP2_06.24.2019.pdf. See gener-
ally https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments.
68Article 15.21(2) of the Singapore-United States FTA (2003) and Article 10.21of the Chile-United
States FTA (2003).
69Namely, Chile, Colombia and Peru: Peru concluded a BIT with Canada in 2006 providing for
both binding interpretations and consistent decisions, and Chile did the same in the 2003 FTA with
the United States. The Chile-Peru FTA (2006), Chile-Colombia FTA (2006) and the Colombia-Peru
BIT (2007) then became the first three (known) non-NAFTA party IIAs to provide for both binding
interpretations and consistent decisions.
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up this IIA practice. In 2010 the Merrill & Ring decision was handed down; from
2010 onward, the inclusion of such provisions in IIAs took off.
All in all, and as can be seen in Fig. 4, since the “binding interpretation” provision
was first expanded upon to specify that tribunals’ decisions needed to be consistent
therewith in 2003, at least 38 treaties have been concluded that provide for both, and
although the NAFTA parties—especially Canada—have continued to include them
in their recent treaties, many of the most recent IIAs have been concluded by
non-NAFTA parties, including the EU.70
The trends observable in recent IIAs indicate that states wish to strengthen their
ability to participate in disputes, especially on matters of treaty interpretation, and to
further ensure that tribunals take due account of such interpretations, as reflected in
the numerous treaties concluded subsequent to this period that contain NDTP sub-
missions and/or provisions providing for binding interpretations/consistent
decisions.
5 Conclusions
The above tends to demonstrate that the lack of deference afforded by tribunals to the
interpretations of states given during disputes—or even to the treaty parties’ binding
interpretations, such as the FTC Notes—may be contributing to the current backlash
against the ISDS system, which has taken many forms. It is also evident that IIA






























































Binding Interpretaon alone & Consistent Decisions
Fig. 4 IIAs with provisions on binding interpretations and consistent decisions (Source: UNCTAD
IIA Navigator)
70See UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, IIA Navigator, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements.
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prior stances taken by some tribunals concerning NDTP submissions, often with the
states’ intent being to enhance their ability to participate as NDTPs in disputes
concerning treaties to which they are parties and to ensure that the decisions taken
by tribunals are consistent with the treaty interpretations that states provide. Thus,
even as some countries “disengage” from ISDS or modify their IIA and investment
policy practice, states (and regional economic unions) appear to highly value the
ability to submit NDTP submissions in on-going disputes, as is evident from recent
IIAs and similar trends in the international investment regime (such as the proposed
amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules), which shows no sign of slowing down
anytime soon.
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Abstract Host states are not the only sovereign parties that an investment dispute
can impact. The sovereign interests of an investor’s home state are also potentially
affected by an investment claim initiated by a national against an investment treaty
partner, and more mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that the home state
has access to the arbitration proceedings. This chapter argues for non-disputing state
party participation as a matter of right in investment treaty arbitration cases. Whether
or not the home state of the investor is informed of and allowed to participate in an
investment dispute has largely been left to the discretion of arbitral tribunals;
arbitration rules and jurisprudence have regarded the home state no differently
than non-governmental third parties seeking to participate in the arbitration as
amici curiae. From the perspective of increased transparency in the investor-state
dispute settlement system, this chapter posits that non-disputing state parties must be
accorded an elevated status in investor-state arbitration, with the following rights:
first, to be formally notified at the outset about an investment treaty dispute; second,
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to have access to the documents of the arbitration case; and, third, to make written
submissions with respect to the interpretation of the international investment agree-
ment invoked in the claim. The analysis begins by identifying the sovereign interests
of the home state that come into play in an investment treaty arbitration. The perils of
diplomatic protection are examined in this chapter, to provide the perspective from
which to delimit the parameters for non-disputing state party participation. A survey
of arbitration rules and jurisprudence outlines the level of participation thus far
accorded to home states in investment treaty arbitration.
1 Introduction
State parties in investment disputes have transparency concerns that differ from
those of investors. The home state of the investor is involved in an investment
dispute not as a party to the arbitration proceedings but rather as the investment
treaty partner of the host state, which is the sovereign respondent. The transparency
concerns of the home state mirror those of the disputing state party rather than those
of non-governmental non-parties that seek to participate as amici curiae in invest-
ment disputes. It is important to distinguish non-disputing state parties from
non-sovereign entities that seek to intervene in investment disputes, and highlight
that distinct sets of rules should apply to these entirely separate categories of
non-parties.
The participation of non-disputing state parties in the investor-state dispute
resolution process is relevant for the following reasons: first, the proposals and
observations of the investor’s home state during the treaty negotiation process are
reflected in the travaux preparatoires of the relevant investment agreement; second,
submissions in the form of amicus curiae briefs may be allowed by the investment
arbitration tribunal with respect to issues of treaty interpretation; and, third, involve-
ment of the home state would facilitate the enforcement of arbitral awards rendered
in favour of its investors.1 This chapter focuses on the second type of participation.
Issues regarding notification about ongoing investment treaty disputes will also be
considered. Examining non-disputing state party participation from a transparency
perspective, this chapter discusses diplomatic protection and its relationship to
investor-state dispute settlement, then proceeds to canvass the existing parameters
for non-disputing state party participation in investment treaty arbitration. Specifi-
cally, Sect. 2 considers why non-disputing state party participation was deemed
problematic in the past, in view of the goal of the investor-state dispute settlement
system to depoliticise investment arbitrations. Section 3 contrasts the transparency
concerns of non-disputing state parties with those of sovereign respondents in
investment disputes to demonstrate the need for participation by the investor’s
1Malintoppi and Haeri (2016), p. 566.
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home state even though it has neither claims nor liabilities in the dispute. Section 4
reviews provisions in Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the Arbitration Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration (Transparency Rules) to highlight the importance of non-disputing state
party participation in the transparency movement in investor-state dispute settle-
ment. That section also surveys investment treaty arbitration cases where the sover-
eign respondent’s treaty partners sought to intervene, demonstrating different
outcomes in the case of such participation. Finally, Sect. 5 argues that
non-disputing state party participation should be granted as a matter of right, rather
than be subject to a tribunal’s discretion, with respect to issues of interpretation of
the relevant investment treaty.
2 Diplomatic Protection: Why Non-disputing State Party
Participation Is Problematic
Diplomatic protection is highlighted in the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules as a
danger when allowing submissions by the non-disputing treaty party. Article 5 of the
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules emphasises “the need to avoid submissions which
would support the claim of the investor in a manner tantamount to diplomatic
protection.”2 In a thought-provoking book chapter, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler
has cautioned that non-disputing state party submissions “pose risks that
[non-governmental organisation] submissions do not raise.”3 She points out that
written submissions by an investor’s home state should address matters of treaty
interpretation only, because a submission by a home state containing case-specific
factual arguments in support of its own national might already be tantamount to
diplomatic protection.4 This sub-section explains why diplomatic protection is a
concern in relation to submissions by the non-disputing state party.
Before the advent of investment treaty arbitration, diplomatic protection was the
method by which a dispute between a state and a private party could be resolved.5 As
succinctly summarised by Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer:
Under traditional international law, investors did not have direct access to international
remedies to pursue claims against foreign states for violation of their rights. They depended
on diplomatic protection by their home states. A state exercising diplomatic protection
espouses the claim of its national against another state and pursues it in its own name.6
2Article 5(2) of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules.
3Kauffmann-Kohler (2013), p. 319.
4Kauffmann-Kohler (2013), p. 319.
5Reinisch and Malintoppi (2008), p. 712.
6Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), p. 211.
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Diplomatic protection is considered by some observers as a predecessor of
investor-state dispute settlement.7 The creation of a mechanism giving investors
direct recourse against host states without having to seek diplomatic protection from
their home states was intended to depoliticise investment disputes,8 by bringing
these disputes “within the realm of law rather than of politics and diplomacy.”9 With
direct access to international arbitration against host states, investors have been freed
from “the often politically motivated discretion of states whether or not to exercise
diplomatic protection.”10
This objective of depoliticisation is embodied in an express prohibition on
diplomatic protection contained in the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, which
established the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID
Convention). Article 27 of the ICSID Convention provides as follows:
(1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in
respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have
consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless
such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award
rendered in such dispute.
(2) Diplomatic protection, for the purposes of paragraph (1), shall not include informal
diplomatic exchanges for the sole purpose of facilitating a settlement of the dispute.
The Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited
(Belgium v. Spain), decided by the International Court of Justice in 1970,11 is often
cited as a prime example of a state-to-state dispute that was initiated to resolve an
investment claim. In that case, the Belgian Government stepped in to bring a claim
on behalf of its nationals, who were shareholders in the Canadian company subject
of the case, lodging a claim against Spain and seeking reparation for damage done to
the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company by the Spanish government.12
The interests of a home state in espousing a claim of its nationals was viewed by
the International Court of Justice as follows:
[T]he Belgian Government would be entitled to bring a claim if it could show that one of its
rights had been infringed and that the acts complained of involved the breach of an
international obligation arising out of a treaty or a general rule of law. The opinion has
been expressed that a claim can accordingly be made when investments by a State’s
nationals abroad are thus prejudicially affected, and that since such investments are part of
7Kauffmann-Kohler (2013), p. 305, citing inter alia Juratowitch (2008), p. 10.
8Malintoppi and Haeri (2016), p. 565; Kauffmann-Kohler (2013), pp. 305–306.
9Kauffmann-Kohler (2013), p. 306.
10Reinisch (2015), p. 259.
11Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, 5 February 1970, ICJ
Reports 1970, p. 3.
12Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, 5 February 1970, ICJ
Reports 1970, p. 3, paras 1 et seq.
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a State’s national economic resources, any prejudice to them directly involves the economic
interest of the State.13
Bilateral (and multilateral) investment treaties now represent the protection
extended by a home state over its nationals, achieved through the negotiation of
these treaties to ensure that the rights of its citizens are protected abroad. States no
longer have to espouse the claims of their nationals to seek redress from the state
where the investment was made, since investors now have direct recourse against
host states for investment treaty violations.
3 Comparison of Transparency Issues in Relation
to Sovereign Respondents and Non-disputing State
Parties
The transparency concerns of non-disputing state parties diverge to a certain degree
from the concerns of sovereign respondents, and are generally limited to: first, the
proper interpretation of the investment treaty pursuant to which the investment claim
was filed and, second, the non-disputing state party’s duties and obligations with
respect to its nationals, claimants in the dispute.
Procedurally, the differences begin at the initiation of the investment claim. The
requirements of due process dictate that host states named as respondents in invest-
ment claims are notified that a request for arbitration has been filed against them by
an investor.14 By contrast, whether the home state of the investor of a pending claim
is notified depends on the existence of provisions in the applicable investment treaty
or specific arbitration rules mandating such notification, or if one of the parties
voluntarily informs the non-disputing state party about the ongoing dispute. Neither
the ICSID Convention nor the ICSID Arbitration Rules contain a specific provision
mandating that the investor’s home state should be notified of the initiation of an
investment claim. (However, when ICSID registers a case, the names of the parties,
as well as the particular investment treaty being invoked, are among the basic case
information that is made publicly available.)15 Some treaties, however, provide for
such notification, as well as the requirement to supply the non-disputing state party
with the written submissions, transcripts, arbitral awards, and other documents
produced during the arbitration proceedings. Notably, NAFTA and the Central
American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) contain pro-
visions that direct the sovereign respondent to inform the non-disputing state parties
that an investment claim has been filed, and to furnish the other state parties with
13Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, 5 February 1970, ICJ
Reports 1970, p.3, para. 86, emphasis added.
14Article 36(1) of the ICSID Convention.
15See https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/pages/cases/pendingCases.aspx?status¼p.
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copies of submissions and awards, among others.16 The US model bilateral invest-
ment treaty (BIT) also contains a similar provision which has been adopted in some
US BITs.17
The filing of an investment claim by one its nationals against one of its treaty
partners can have a potential impact on the non-disputing state party, and more
mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that the non-disputing state party has
access to the proceedings and is informed about the case from the very beginning.
If the interpretation of provisions in the BITs is in issue, then the non-disputing
state parties should be given every opportunity to present their views on interpreta-
tion, as the outcome of the arbitration proceeding with respect to these provisions has
the potential to impact the interpretation of similar provisions in a state’s BITs with
other countries. An extended discussion in a separate section below argues that
non-disputing state parties should be allowed—as a matter of right—to file written
submissions on matters of treaty interpretation.18
Another aspect pointing to the necessity of providing information to the
non-disputing party relates to allegations made in the course of the arbitral pro-
ceedings relating to the conduct of the home state’s nationals in the host state. As
will be discussed below, allegations of corruption in relation to the investment
activity are becoming increasingly common in investment disputes (or, arguably,
corruption has always been common, but is only now being highlighted as states use
it as a jurisdictional defense). A non-disputing party may have an interest in
monitoring the actions of its nationals abroad, especially if they involve criminal
activity. One salient example embodying such a duty is the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act in the United States, which renders unlawful any bribery of foreign officials
committed by US nationals abroad.19
16Article 1127 of NAFTA provides: “Notice – A disputing Party shall deliver to the other Parties:
(a) written notice of a claim that has been submitted to arbitration no later than 30 days after the date
that the claim is submitted; and (b) copies of all pleadings filed in the arbitration”; Article 10.21
(“Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings”) of CAFTA-DR provides: “1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and
4, the respondent shall, after receiving the following documents, promptly transmit them to the
non-disputing Parties and make them available to the public: (a) the notice of intent; (b) the notice of
arbitration; (c) pleadings, memorials, and briefs submitted to the tribunal by a disputing party and
any written submissions submitted pursuant to Article 10.20.2 and 10.20.3 and Article 10.25;
(d) minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, where available; and (e) orders, awards, and
decisions of the tribunal.”
17Article 29(1) (“Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings”) of the 2012 US Model BIT, which
replicates the 2004 version of this article, provides that “the respondent shall, after receiving the
following documents, promptly transmit them to the non-disputing Party and make them available
to the public: (a) the notice of intent; (b) the notice of arbitration; (c) pleadings, memorials, and
briefs submitted to the tribunal by a disputing party and any written submissions submitted pursuant
to Article 28(2) [Non-Disputing Party submissions] and (3) [Amicus Submissions] and Article
33 [Consolidation]; (d) minutes and transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, where available; and
(e) orders, awards, and decisions of the tribunal.” This provision appears as Article 29 of the 2005
US- Uruguay BIT; and Article 29 of the 2008 US-Rwanda BIT.
18See below Sect. 5.
1915 USC § 78dd-1, et seq.
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An ongoing investment dispute has potential implications for the home state of
the claimant investor with respect to various aspects of governance, and the
non-disputing state party should be given access to the proceedings as a matter of
routine.
4 Non-disputing State Party Participation As Part
of the Transparency Movement in Investment Treaty
Arbitration
This chapter examines international legal instruments designed specifically for
investment treaty arbitration. It focuses on NAFTA Chapter 11, the ICSID Conven-
tion and 2006 Arbitration Rules, and the 2014 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. A
comparison of these three instruments reveals that there is as yet no uniform
approach to dealing with the participation of non-disputing state parties. NAFTA
expressly allows the practice but provides no guidelines, ICSID makes no distinction
between non-state third parties and non-disputing state parties, while the
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules devote an entire article to the matter.
4.1 NAFTA and Non-disputing State Party Participation
Article 1128 of NAFTA Chapter 11 provides: “On written notice to the disputing
parties, a Party may make submissions to a Tribunal on a question of interpretation
of this Agreement.” The wording of this provision makes it clear that the
non-disputing state parties have a right to be heard on an issue of NAFTA interpre-
tation.20 The scope of this provision notably does not extend towards addressing
issues of fact.21 This treaty provision is crafted in a way that limits the participation
of non-disputing state parties to issues of treaty interpretation.
Commentators have noted that Article 1128 provides no guidance or procedure to
operationalise this provision.22 The rule does not mandate written submissions nor
does it proscribe oral submissions.23 While the provision does not specifically
provide for the right of a non-disputing state party to attend the oral hearings in
the case, tribunals have generally allowed the presence of non-disputing state parties
in NAFTA hearings.24 The right of non-disputing state parties is arguably implied in
20Kinnear (2005), p. 8.
21Bjorklund (2013), p. 517; Kinnear (2005), p. 8.
22Kinnear (2005), p. 8; Bjorklund (2013), p. 517.
23Kinnear (2005), p. 8; Bjorklund (2013), p. 518.
24Bjorklund (2013), pp. 517–518.
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the provision because to deny them the ability to apprise themselves of issues raised
during the hearings would effectively render their participation right nugatory.25
4.2 ICSID and Non-disputing State Party Participation
As mentioned above, diplomatic protection is explicitly prohibited in the ICSID
context. However, the ICSID Arbitration Rules concerning third-party submissions
fail to draw clear parameters regarding the content of written submissions by
non-disputing state parties. Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, which allows
tribunals to accept written submissions by third parties, does not distinguish between
non-disputing state parties and non-governmental organisations. As such,
sub-paragraph “(a)” of that rule mandates the tribunal to consider the extent to
which “the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the deter-
mination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding”.26 As already men-
tioned above, allowing a non-disputing state party to present arguments regarding
the facts of a particular dispute, in support of its national investor, runs the risk of
being de facto diplomatic protection.27 However, it may be argued that tribunals will
construe Rule 37(2) with deference to Article 27 of the ICSID Convention.28
During the rule amendment process that led to the 2006 version of the ICSID
Arbitration Rules, the initial proposal for Rule 37(2) was worded as allowing a
“person or state” to make a written submission.29 However, some commentators
considered this phrase too restrictive, so the current wording reads “person or
entity”.30 As a result of having one rule applicable to non-parties, whether sovereign
or not, the ICSID Arbitration Rules in their current form, i.e. the 2006 version of the
Rules, have no specific provision limiting the submissions of non-disputing state
parties to matters of interpretation of the investment treaty. This is likely to change,
however, in light of the ICSID rule amendment process launched in October 2016.31
As of February 2020, a draft provision entitled “Participation of Non-Disputing
Treaty Party” appears as a proposed new provision of the ICSID Arbitration Rules.
This draft rule provides:
Rule 68
Participation of Non-Disputing Treaty Party
(1) The Tribunal shall permit a Party to a treaty that is not a party to the dispute
(“nondisputing Treaty Party”) to make a written or oral submission on the interpretation
25Bjorklund (2013), p. 518.
26Rule 37(2)(a) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, emphasis added.
27Kauffmann-Kohler (2013), p. 319.
28Kauffmann-Kohler (2013), p. 319.
29Obadia (2007), p. 368.
30Obadia (2007), p. 368.
31See https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments/Pages/About/about.aspx.
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of the treaty at issue in the dispute and upon which consent to arbitration is based. The
Tribunal may, after consulting with the parties, invite a non-disputing Treaty Party to
make such a submission.
(2) The Tribunal shall ensure that non-disputing Treaty Party participation does not disrupt
the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party. To this end, the
Tribunal may impose conditions on the filing of a written submission by the
non-disputing Treaty Party, including with respect to the format, length or publication
of the written submission and the time limit to file the submission.
(3) The parties shall have the right to make observations on the submission of the
nondisputing Treaty Party.32
This draft article sets out to create distinct rules for the non-disputing state party
by expressly allowing submissions on treaty interpretation and impliedly limiting
participation to this aspect.
In a previous iteration of this amendment, however, the proposed text would have
granted an ICSID arbitration tribunal the discretion to “allow a non-disputing Treaty
Party to make a written submission on any other matter within the scope of the
dispute,” following the rules for non-sovereign third parties.33 This previous draft
text, allowing submissions to matters beyond treaty interpretation, is similar to the
provision in the 2014 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, discussed below. However,
this text was deleted in subsequent drafts.34 Thus, the forthcoming amendment to the
ICSID Arbitration Rules hews closely to the NAFTA text discussed above.
4.3 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules and Non-disputing
State Party Participation
The imprecision of Rule 37(2) of the 2006 ICSID Arbitration Rules may have
inspired the drafters of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules to create separate
rules for third-party participation by non-governmental entities and non-disputing
state parties. Article 4 of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules governs “Submission
by a third person”, referring to “a person that is not a disputing party, and not a
non-disputing Party to the treaty.”35 Meanwhile, Article 5 governs “Submission by a
non-disputing Party to the treaty”. Accordingly:
32ICSID Secretariat (February 2020) https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/WP_4_Vol_1_En.
pdf, p. 68.
33ICSID Secretariat (2 August 2018) https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/III.Amendments_
Vol_3_AR.pdf, pp. 217–218.
34ICSID Secretariat (March 2019) https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/Vol_1.pdf,
pp. 275–276.
35Article 4(1) of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules.
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1. The arbitral tribunal shall, subject to paragraph 4, allow, or, after consultation
with the disputing parties, may invite, submissions on issues of treaty interpreta-
tion from a non-disputing Party to the treaty.
2. The arbitral tribunal, after consultation with the disputing parties, may allow
submissions on further matters within the scope of the dispute from a
non-disputing Party to the treaty. In determining whether to allow such sub-
missions, the arbitral tribunal shall take into consideration, among other factors it
determines to be relevant, the factors referred to in article 4, paragraph 3, and, for
greater certainty, the need to avoid submissions which would support the claim of
the investor in a manner tantamount to diplomatic protection.
3. The arbitral tribunal shall not draw any inference from the absence of any
submission or response to any invitation pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2.
4. The arbitral tribunal shall ensure that any submission does not disrupt or unduly
burden the arbitral proceedings, or unfairly prejudice any disputing party.
5. The arbitral tribunal shall ensure that the disputing parties are given a reasonable
opportunity to present their observations on any submission by a non-disputing
Party to the treaty.36
A reading of the above provision reveals that the UNCITRAL Transparency
Rules contemplate two types of submissions by non-disputing state parties: first,
submissions on issues of treaty interpretation and, second, submissions on matters
within the scope of the dispute. The first type of submission is treated as a matter of
right in Article 5(1), with the use of the word “shall”. Acceptance of a submission by
a non-disputing state party is required when requested by that non-disputing state
party. The second part of Article 5(1) contemplates inviting the non-disputing state
party to make a submission when it has not sought such participation motu proprio.
In the latter scenario, the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules instruct the tribunal to
consult the disputing parties before extending such an invitation.
The second type of submission, provided in Article 5(2), gives the tribunal the
discretion to accept submissions relating to other issues. Using the language “matters
within the scope of the dispute”, this provision appears to be an attempt to place
non-disputing state parties on an equal footing with the non-disputing parties
covered by Article 4, and also makes a cross-reference to the factors listed in Article
4(3). Highlighting a significant difference between the non-parties contemplated in
Articles 4 and 5, the provision also cautions tribunals about submissions by a
non-disputing state party that may rise to the level of diplomatic protection.37
36Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules.
37Article 5(2) of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules.
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4.4 Survey of Investment Treaty Arbitration Cases
with Non-disputing State Party Participation
NAFTA cases have seen relatively active participation of non-disputing state parties
because of the express provision allowing their participation.38 This level of partic-
ipation by home states has not been as prevalent in the wider universe of investment
disputes initiated pursuant to investment treaties.39 Explicit clauses regarding
non-disputing state party participation do exist in investment treaties,40 primarily
in the investment chapters of free trade agreements (FTAs) entered into by the
United States,41 but such provisions have yet to become standard features of
BITs.42 As will be discussed below, the lack of explicit guidance from treaty pro-
visions led to different consequences with respect to non-disputing state party
participation.
What follows are three examples where the non-disputing state party provided
comments on the proper interpretation of the BIT invoked in the dispute. Each case
presents a unique scenario as to the timing of the interventions, the party that
initiated the involvement of the non-disputing state party, and the outcome of the
non-disputing state party’s participation.
38Article 1128 of NAFTA.
39Two examples of non-disputing state party participation pursuant to express treaty provisions are:
the written submission by the United States in Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Oman (ICSID Case
No. ARB/11/33), pursuant to Article 10.19.2 of the 2006 US-Oman free trade agreement (FTA);
and the written submission by Canada in Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Peru (ICSID Case
No. ARB/14/21), pursuant to Article 832.1 of the 2008 Canada-Peru FTA. Worthy of note is that
these non-disputing state parties are also members of NAFTA.
40Ishikawa (2015), p. 147.
41A clause providing that “[t]he non-disputing Party may make oral and written submissions to the
tribunal regarding the interpretation of this Agreement” makes an appearance, inter alia, in the
following treaties: Article 11.20.4 of the 2007 US-Korea FTA; Article 10.19.2 of the 2006
US-Oman FTA; Article 10.19.2 of the 2004 Morocco-US FTA; Article 10.19.2 of the 2003
US-Chile FTA.
42Aside from US FTAs, other examples include: Article 86 of the 2005 Agreement between Japan
and the Mexico for the Strengthening of Economic Partnership, which provides: “On written notice
to the disputing parties, the Party other than the disputing Party may make submissions to a Tribunal
on a question of interpretation of this Agreement”; and Article 832.1 of the 2008 Canada-Peru FTA,
which provides: “On written notice to the disputing parties, the non-disputing Party may make
submissions to a Tribunal on a question of interpretation of this Agreement.” Considering that the
examples outside of NAFTA are treaties entered into by the United States of America, Mexico, and
Canada, it can be reasonably inferred that the existence of these provisions is a direct influence of
the NAFTA experience.
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4.4.1 Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia
Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia was initiated in 2002 pursuant to the 1992 Netherlands-
Bolivia BIT.43 Aguas del Tunari identified itself as “a legal person constituted in
accordance with the laws of Bolivia”, that could bring a claim pursuant to the
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT because it was “controlled directly or indirectly by
nationals of the Netherlands”.44 Referring to two entities incorporated under Dutch
law that owned shares in a Luxembourg corporation which directly owned 55% of
the shares in Aguas del Tunari,45 the claimant argued that the corporate structure of
the Bolivian sociedad anónima made it a national of the Netherlands, in accordance
with the BIT.46 This was the basis for the claimant’s assertions that the ICSID
tribunal had jurisdiction over the dispute. For its part, Bolivia presented objections to
the tribunal’s jurisdiction, arguing primarily that Bolivia did not consent to the
jurisdiction of ICSID.47 The sovereign respondent also argued that Aguas del Tunari
was not a national of the Netherlands within the meaning of the BIT, since it was not
“controlled directly or indirectly” by Dutch nationals.48
The interpretation of the BIT was at the crux of all issues presented by the parties
in the jurisdictional phase of the arbitration. The claimant introduced in the pro-
ceedings written exchanges between members of the legislative and executive
branches of the Dutch government, with the former seeking a response from the
latter on the question of whether multinational corporations could invoke the BIT.49
On the one hand, the claimant’s expert witness argued that the intragovernmental
communications contradicted each other and indicated “confusion as to the facts.”50
The sovereign respondent, on the other hand, seized upon these documents intro-
duced by the claimant to argue that the interpretation of the Government of the
Netherlands about who can invoke the BIT was the same as its own interpretation,
43Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 79.
44Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 81, cf. para. 80. One of the provisions defining “nationals” that
could bring a claim under the BIT enumerated “legal persons controlled directly or indirectly, by
nationals of that Contracting Party, but constituted in accordance with the law of the other
Contracting Party.”
45Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, paras 70-72, cf. para. 81.
46Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 82.
47Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 84.
48Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 85.
49Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, paras 252–257.
50Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 256.
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such that both state parties to the treaty “are on record as saying that [the BIT] does
not apply to this case.”51
In its Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, the tribunal devoted a
considerable part of the discussion to a “unique aspect of this proceeding, namely its
consideration of the relevance of several statements of the Netherlands, the
non-disputing state party to the BIT.”52 The tribunal decided to reach out to the
non-disputing state party for further elucidation on the disputed intra-governmental
communications. In a 2004 letter, described by the tribunal in its decision as “the first
inquiry of a non-disputing State Party to a BIT”, the tribunal addressed the Legal
Advisor of the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands “to secure the comments of the
Netherlands as to specific documentary bases for written responses which the Dutch
government provided to parliamentary questions.”53 Kaufmann-Kohler notes that
the tribunal “was mindful not to trigger the Netherlands’ diplomatic protection” by
using specific language to that effect and highlighting Article 27 of the ICSID
Convention.54
The tribunal also delineated the parameters of the reply sought from the Nether-
lands as a non-disputing state party. It wrote in its letter:
Given that the Government of the Netherlands is not a party or otherwise present in this
arbitration, the Tribunal concludes that information from the Government of the Netherlands
would assist the work of the Tribunal. Given further the above quoted Article 27 of the
ICSID Convention and the fact that the Netherlands is not a party to this arbitration, the
Tribunal is also of the view that such questions must be specific and narrowly tailored,
aimed at obtaining information supporting interpretative positions of general application
rather than ones related to a specific case.55
The Netherlands replied through the Legal Advisor of the Foreign Ministry with a
cover letter describing the intra-governmental communications as “based on infor-
mation from the press” which “may not necessarily have been correct”.56 Attached
51Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 249.
52Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 248.
53Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 258.
54Kauffmann-Kohler (2013), p. 314. The letter sent by the tribunal was quoted in its 2005 Decision
on Jurisdiction, at para. 258. With respect to diplomatic protection, the tribunal wrote: “The
Tribunal recognizes the obligation of the Netherlands under [Article 27 of] the ICSID Convention
to not provide diplomatic protection to its nationals in the case of investment disputes covered by
the Convention. In this sense, the Tribunal wishes to emphasize that it does not seek the view of the
Netherlands as to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in this matter, rather it seeks only to secure the
comments of the Netherlands as to specific documentary bases for written responses which the
Dutch government provided to parliamentary questions.”
55Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 258, emphasis added.
56Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 261.
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was a 1992 document entitled “Interpretation of the Agreement on encouragement
and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands
and the Republic of Bolivia.”57 Ultimately, the tribunal concluded that the Dutch
response provided no additional information that would be relevant to shed light on
the “general interpretative position” of the Netherlands on the BIT provisions at
issue.58
4.4.2 CME v. Czech Republic
CME Czech Republic v. the Czech Republic was an UNCITRAL arbitration initiated
in 2000 by a Dutch corporation pursuant to the 1991 Netherlands-Czech Republic
BIT.59 In 2001, the tribunal issued a Partial Award finding the sovereign respondent
liable for violations of the BIT.60 After the issuance of this Partial Award, the Czech
Republic called for consultations with the Netherlands, pursuant to Article 9 of the
BIT.61 This treaty provision allows either state party to “propose [to] the other Party
to consult on any matter concerning the interpretation or application” of the BIT.62
The Czech Government expressed “its concern over a number of aspects of the
Partial Award which were in its view inconsistent with the Treaty.”63 Specifically,
the Czech Republic sought to consult with the Netherlands regarding the correct
interpretation of the BIT provision which specifies the applicable law for resolving
an investment dispute;64 the assignment of claims arising under the BIT;65 and the
application of the BIT to investment disputes which had previously been raised by an
indirect holder of the same investment of a different nationality under a comparable
BIT. 66
57Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 259.
58Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 262.
59CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, paras 1-3. In para. 3, state succession is
clarified: “The Treaty entered into force in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on October
1, 1992 and, after the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ceased to exist on December 31, 1992, the
Czech Republic succeeded to the rights and obligations of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
under the Treaty”.
60CME v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 13 September 2001, para. 624.
61CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, para. 87.
62Article 9 of the Netherlands-Czech and Slovak Federal Republic BIT (1991).
63CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, para. 87.
64CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, paras. 88, 91, 218, 398.
65CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, paras. 88, 92, 220–224.
66CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, paras. 88, 93. On this third point, note that
the CME v. Czech Republic case is often discussed in relation to parallel proceedings in investment
arbitration, since the UNCITRAL case of Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic was brought
concerning the same investment but under the Czech Republic-US BIT.
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After a series of meetings between representatives of the Czech and Dutch
Governments, their “Common Positions” on these three issues were recorded in
the Agreed Minutes, dated 1 July 2002.67 In providing these minutes to the tribunal,
the sovereign respondent put forward the view that the common positions of the
contracting state parties to the BIT should bind the tribunal for the issues they
covered. The tribunal summarised the Czech Republic’s position as follows:
The Respondent’s position in respect to the agreed minutes on the Common Position of the
delegates of The Netherlands and the Czech Republic is that the two contracting States
reserved to themselves the exclusive competence to decide on how the Treaty should be
interpreted and applied. The Tribunal has not more competence to state how the Treaty shall
be interpreted and applied than any one of the State parties unilaterally. To the extent that a
tribunal makes an incorrect interpretation or misapplies the Treaty, the States parties can
overrule the tribunal’s mistake. [. . .]
The common positions, representing the interpretations and application of the Treaty agreed
between its contracting parties, are conclusive and binding on the Tribunal.68
In the Final Award, however, the tribunal did not elucidate how much deference,
if any, should be accorded to the common positions agreed upon by the state parties
with respect to the interpretation of the treaty provisions at issue. Instead, the tribunal
indicated that the common positions “support[ed] the Tribunal’s view” with respect
to one issue,69 “confirm[ed]” the tribunal’s analysis with respect to another,70 and
were contrary to the respondent’s position on a third issue.71 In refraining from using
the common positions as a source of interpretation and in using it instead as a
reference point to either support or confirm its reasoning, the tribunal appeared to
assert its own analysis over that of the contracting parties to the BIT, without
explaining to what extent it paid attention to the common positions.
4.4.3 SGS v. Pakistan
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance v. Pakistan was an ICSID case initiated in
2001 pursuant to the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT.72 This case is significant because it
is one of the first times that an investment arbitration tribunal had to consider an
umbrella clause in a BIT.73 In its Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, the tribunal
rejected the claimant’s argument that Article 11 of the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT
67CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, para. 89.
68CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, paras 216–217, emphasis added.
69CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, para. 437.
70CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, para. 400.
71CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, para. 504.
72SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, para. 2.
73SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, para. 164; Yannaca-Small (2006), pp. 15–16.
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elevated breaches of a contract to the status of breaches of the investment treaty.74
The tribunal ultimately ruled that, although it had jurisdiction over SGS’s claims
pursuant to the BIT, it did not have jurisdiction over claims based on breaches of
contractual commitments in a “pre-shipment inspection agreement” signed between
SGS and Pakistan.75 In its analysis of the proper interpretation of Article 11 of the
BIT, the tribunal noted that it had taken into account Pakistan’s views and faulted the
claimant for not submitting evidence about Switzerland’s interpretation of the
provision that would support its position:
The Tribunal is not saying that States may not agree with each other in a BIT that henceforth,
all breaches of each State’s contracts with investors of the other State are forthwith converted
into and to be treated as breaches of the BIT. What the Tribunal is stressing is that in this
case, there is no clear and persuasive evidence that such was in fact the intention of both
Switzerland and Pakistan in adopting Article 11 of the BIT. Pakistan for its part in effect
denies that, in concluding the BIT, it had any such intention. SGS, of course, does not speak
for Switzerland. But it has not submitted evidence of the necessary level of specificity and
explicitness of text. We believe and so hold that, in the circumstances of this case, SGS’s
claim about Article 11 of the BIT must be rejected.76
After the publication of this decision, the Swiss Government sent a letter to ICSID
to express its disagreement with the tribunal’s “very narrow interpretation” of the
umbrella clause provided in Article 11 of the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT, and
explaining the state’s intentions upon entering the treaty.77 The letter from the
Swiss authorities inquired as to “why the Tribunal has not found it necessary to
enquire about their view on the meaning of Article 11 in spite of the fact that the
Tribunal attributed considerable importance to the intent of the Contracting Parties in
drafting this Article and indeed put this question to one of the Contracting Parties
(Pakistan).”78 The letter from the Swiss Government also strongly expressed its
dismay at the tribunal’s interpretation: “the Swiss authorities are alarmed about the
very narrow interpretation given to the meaning of Article 11 by the Tribunal, which
not only runs counter to the intention of Switzerland when concluding the Treaty but
is quite evidently neither supported by the meaning of similar articles in BITs
concluded by other countries nor by academic comments on such provisions.”79
74SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, para. 166. Article 11 of the Switzerland–Pakistan BIT declares: “Either
Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into
with respect to the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party.”
75SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, para. 190.
76SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, para. 173, emphasis added.
77Kauffmann-Kohler (2013), p. 315; Yannaca-Small (2006), pp. 15–16.
78Kauffmann-Kohler (2013), p. 315.
79Malintoppi and Haeri (2016), p. 576.
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However, since this letter was a reaction to the already-rendered jurisdictional
decision, it had no influence on the outcome of the case.80
5 A Matter of Right: Non-disputing State Party
Participation with Respect to Investment Treaty
Interpretation
Non-party participation is a key aspect of transparency. The cases discussed in the
previous section demonstrate the different outcomes for non-disputing state parties.
In Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, the tribunal initiated communication to the
non-disputing state party to seek clarificatory comments regarding
intragovernmental communications on treaty provisions. In CME v. the Czech
Republic, the sovereign respondent sought consultations with its treaty partner, but
it is unclear what deference, if any, the tribunal accorded to the common positions of
the treaty parties. In SGS v. Pakistan, the non-disputing state party was effectively
excluded from the proceedings by not being informed, and thus did not have the
opportunity to participate. The inconsistent jurisprudence and arbitral practice reveal
that there is a long way to go in order to establish non-disputing state party
participation as a right of the sovereign respondent’s investment treaty partner.
Meg Kinnear presents three key reasons why non-disputing state parties should
be allowed to participate in investment treaty disputes. First, as parties to the treaty
being interpreted, “these states have the experience of having negotiated the treaty
and have a unique perspective on how the treaty should be interpreted.”81
Eloïse Obadia similarly points out that a non-disputing state party could file sub-
missions “concerning the treaty’s travaux préparatoires and the interpretation of the
treaty’s provisions in relation to jurisdictional matters.”82 A second reason is that
non-disputing state parties, as parties to the investment treaty, are also potential
respondents in future disputes under that treaty. “States thus may be subject to
numerous challenges and will be living with and interpreting the treaty obligations
at issue in numerous contexts for many years to come.”83 Finally, the interest of the
non-disputing state party vis-à-vis the investment treaty invoked in the dispute is
congruent with that of the sovereign respondent:
[A] State Parties’ interest in disputes is not just defensive. Rather, States have compelling
interest to ensure that an investment treaty actually provides investor protection and pro-
motes foreign investment in the host State. Investment protection and promotion is the
raison d’être for States’ entrance into such treaties and thus States have an interest in seeing
that BITs are interpreted coherently, logically and consistently. Consistency in BIT
80Kauffmann-Kohler (2013), p. 315.
81Kinnear (2005), p. 8.
82Obadia (2007), p. 368.
83Kinnear (2005), p. 8.
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interpretation is especially key because there is no formal system of stare decisis or
precedent within this treaty regime. The credibility of the entire investor-State dispute
settlement system is undermined when irreconcilable decisions are issued. [. . .] State party
participation is one way that States can ensure cohesive jurisprudence and the continued
integrity of the arbitral system.84
Just as the doors have opened for non-governmental organisations to participate
as amici curiae in investor-state disputes, so too must participation by non-disputing
state parties have started to become an established norm in investment treaty cases.
This can be further achieved by establishing investment arbitration rules that explic-
itly mandate notification of disputes to home states and allow non-disputing state
party submissions, even when the applicable investment treaty does not contain an
express provision regarding non-disputing state party participation. Transparency
must be inclusive for all actors in the investor-state dispute settlement system, and
there are cogent reasons to support the participation of non-disputing state parties as
a matter of right with respect to issues of treaty interpretation, instead of regarding
such participation as subject to the discretion of an investment arbitration tribunal.
References
Bjorklund A (2013) NAFTA Chapter 11. In: Brown C (ed) Commentaries on selected model
investment treaties. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 465–532
Dolzer R, Schreuer C (2008) Principles of international investment law. Oxford University Press,
Oxford
ICSID Secretariat (August 2018) Proposals for amendment of the ICSID rules – working paper.
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/III.Amendments_Vol_3_AR.pdf
ICSID Secretariat (March 2019) Proposals for amendment of the ICSID rules – working paper #2.
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/Vol_1.pdf
ICSID Secretariat (February 2020) Proposals for the amendment of the ICSID rules, ICSID
Working Paper #4. https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/WP_4_Vol_1_En.pdf
Ishikawa T (2015) Keeping interpretation in investment treaty arbitration ‘on Track’: the role of
state parties. In: Kalicki J, Joubin-Bret A (eds) Reshaping the investor-state dispute settlement
system. Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 115–149
Juratowitch B (2008) The relationship between diplomatic protection and investment treaties.
ICSID Rev Foreign Invest Law J 23(1):10
Kauffmann-Kohler G (2013) Non-disputing state submissions in investment arbitration: resurgence
of diplomatic protection? In: de Chazournes LB et al (eds) Diplomatic and judicial means of
dispute settlement. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 307–326
Kinnear M (2005) Transparency and third party participation in investor-state dispute settlement
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/36979626.pdf
Malintoppi L, Haeri H (2016) The non-disputing state party in investment arbitration: an interested
player or the third man out? In: Caron D et al (eds) Practising virtue: inside international
arbitration. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 565–583
Obadia E (2007) Extension of proceedings beyond the original parties: non-disputing party
participation in investment arbitration. ICSID Rev Foreign Invest Law J 22:349–379
84Kinnear (2005), p. 8.
114 R. E. Khan
Reinisch A (2015) Investors. In: Noortmann M et al (eds) Non-state actors in international law. Hart
Publishing, Oxford, pp 253–271
Reinisch A, Malintoppi L (2008) Methods of dispute resolution. In: Muchlinski P et al (eds) The
Oxford handbook of international investment law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp
691–720
Yannaca-Small K (2006) Interpretation of the umbrella clause in investment agreements. OECD
Working Papers on International Investment, 2006/03. OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/
10.1787/415453814578
Rebecca E. Khan is head of arbitration and international dispute resolution at the Manila-based
law firm Disini Law. She teaches international investment law, and government contract law in the
Master of Laws (LLM) programme of the University of the Philippines—College of Law, and is an
Associate Professor in the Juris Doctor (JD) programme at the De La Salle University—College of
Law. Her writing in the area of international arbitration has been published as book chapters in
Europe, the United States, and the Philippines. She holds a Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD)
degree, summa cum laude, from the Central European University in Budapest. She was a visiting
scholar at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidel-
berg. As a Fulbright scholar, she obtained her LLM in International and Comparative Law, with
highest honors, from the George Washington University in Washington, DC. Formerly a govern-
ment attorney, her international litigation experience includes arbitrations before the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), as well as disputes brought before the World Trade Organization (WTO). She was appointed
by the Philippine Supreme Court to its drafting committee for the Special Rules of Court on
Alternative Dispute Resolution. Rebecca was also part of the Philippine delegation to UNCITRAL
during the drafting of the Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Not a Third Party: Home State Participation As a Matter of Right in Investment. . . 115




1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
2 Facts and Risks to Take into Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
2.1 Prevention: The Aim Is No Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
2.2 The Risk Is Permanent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
2.3 The Landscape Is Permanently Changing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2.4 ISDS in Light of Important Cultural and Practical Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
2.5 States as Subjects of International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3 Model and Practices Developed by the Republic of Peru during 2011–2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.1 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.2 Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4 Fundamental Considerations and Recommendations for the Prevention of Disputes . . . . . 130
4.1 Some Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.2 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Abstract This chapter examines state perspectives on investor-state dispute pre-
vention drawing on the author’s personal experience and practice in Peru’s legal
defence team. First, it focuses on identifying risks states experience when confronted
with investor-state dispute settlement. Next, the chapter turns to particular experi-
ences and general considerations regarding dispute prevention. Finally, it concludes
with some recommendations for the implementation of certain dispute prevention
practices.
This chapter draws on the author’s experience as head of Peru’s legal defence team between 2011
and 2015. The author would like to thank Maria Fernanda Bonilla Vargas and Yurica Ramos
Montes for their generous assistance and research.
C. J. Valderrama (*)
Independent Practitioner, Washington, DC, USA
© The Author(s) 2021
C. Titi (ed.), Public Actors in International Investment Law, European Yearbook of
International Economic Law, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58916-5_7
117
1 Introduction
Between 2011 and 2015, Peru was ordered to pay compensation to foreign investors
equal to just about 0.002% of the total sum claimed against it (50 US billion dollars).
At the same time, the state received 140 times the amount paid to investors
(110 US million dollars) by initiating claims and counterclaiming against investors,
in a total of nine investor-state arbitration awards.1 The record appears to be
impressive, without any doubt, but it is still far from optimal. The optimal should
be no disputes at all, with the international responsibility and reputation of the state
never at risk.
Favourable awards are highly valuable, they emphasise how responsive and
respectful a state is regarding certain standards of investment protection and can
become evidence of its good performance in protecting foreign investors in its
territory. Awards can (and should) be used, by states, as favourable “precedents”
when facing new disputes. Nevertheless, not being challenged has, literally, no price.
It may seem very improbable but that should always be the objective for states: no
disputes.
In the real world, relations between state representatives and private investors
entail, by definition, the overly complex and careful practice of communicating their
mutual, but opposite, interest in the same businesses (or projects). For instance, it is
frequent that investors’ interests directly collide with public interests such as those of
their workers, suppliers, and/or local communities, as they represent social costs that
investors are usually inclined to argue should be carried by the state.
At the other end of the spectrum, state officials often seem to be more concerned
about their own job stability and personal responsibility rather than the real long-
term benefits their decisions represent for the state.2 When engaging in projects with
private investors intended to benefit the public interest, frequently, state representa-
tives appear to be more centred on immediate personal success rather than on
carefully assessing the overall longer-time effects of such projects.
Regarding public-private partnerships (PPPs) or concession contracts, when
unfortunate events occur and action needs to be taken, terms seem to be differently
interpreted by the parties. The ultimate question of whether it is the state or the
investor that should assume the costs of undesired and unexpected events is hardly
answered by the sole text of contract provisions. Sooner or later, one of the disputing
parties tends to resort to dispute resolution. Let us not forget that investors are
allowed to do whatever is not forbidden and state officials only what is expressly
authorised by law.
Following a few notices of intent and arbitration requests, state officials would
easily notice that many times counsel for the investors use these documents as lottery
cards, since they tend to disaggregate every single state action related to the dispute
1See https://www.mef.gob.pe/es/acerca-de-las-asociaciones-publico-privadas-apps/sicreci.
2Chew et al. (2018).
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and link it to the breach of a standard of protection in an investment treaty. For this
reason, claims initiated under investment treaties become unnecessarily long and
complex; the state usually needs to respond to each claim individually.
2 Facts and Risks to Take into Account
States need to use realistic and applied practices in order to prevent disagreements
from escalating into full-blown disputes. This section proposes some fundamental
issues states may wish to consider for the prevention of investor-state disputes.
2.1 Prevention: The Aim Is No Disputes
Disputes are better when avoided. The cost of a dispute is generally high, since it
entails, not only the money and time spent litigating but, mostly, the costs involved
in complying with the award, in case the state loses the dispute. Most probably, any
of these costs could be lowered if the dispute is avoided or settled at an early stage; in
other words, when it is still “potential”.
The reputational cost, for the state, should also be taken into account. This is a
variable the state should consider very carefully, because it always adds to other
variables that the international community, multilateral and commercial banks, and
other lenders, as well as foreign investors generally take into account. In the case of a
government committed to managing an economic crisis and in the midst of that
crisis, international claims start to arise,3 credit can become scarcer and more
expensive, and crisis management becomes more difficult for the government.4
Among the many types of disputes states face, investor-state disputes are not the
most difficult to resolve. For example, investor-state disputes can still be prevented
and managed on a case by case basis, due to the relatively low number of cases. On
the contrary, social unrest, such as workers’ unions’ and consumers’ protests, are
much more difficult to identify, assess, prevent, and resolve than investor-state
disputes. Social actors can have so many more different motivations than investors,
such as political or personal interests or even corruption, and unrest may be evidence
of a broader unease and dissatisfaction that can lead to violence.
The real problem occurs when popular unrest lies at the origin of state measures
that trigger investment disputes. In such cases, states must explain to an arbitral
tribunal, composed by foreign individuals, the profound nature and history of a
specific social conflict and why the measures adopted to appease the angry crowd are
3Simões (2012), pp. 9–37.
4Franck (2011).
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justified, even if they affect investments. This can be particularly hard to do.5 In such
cases state representatives will need to coordinate their actions, statements and
strategies very carefully in order to avoid exposing internal conflicts before interna-
tional arbitral tribunals. In other words, internal conflicts can exacerbate investor-
state disputes.
Again, foreign investors’ claims are much easier to identify and manage than
internal conflicts. Engaging in a dialogue with a company bringing a dispute requires
one phone call. There may be many foreign investors in each country, but not all of
them have potential or pending disputes against the state. In order to better “manage”
foreign investment, states could think about establishing records of foreign compa-
nies and other investors in their territories and follow up systematically and statis-
tically. This will allow the state to efficiently identify potential conflicts that may
escalate into international disputes in the near future.
Furthermore, dispute resolution mechanisms included in investment treaties, offer
a valuable window of time for states, known as consultations or cooling-off periods
that, if responsibly used, may avoid the initiation of an arbitration.6 The consulta-
tions period is a “golden” opportunity for states to formally determine the settlement
procedure in accordance to their own practice and timing preferences and do their
best efforts to settle the dispute. It is a period of time, usually six months long, that is
not regulated by the dispute resolution provision and during which disputing parties
usually approach each other to jointly agree on the next steps to be taken to reach a
solution. This approach often fails, for many reasons. But if the state has a previously
organised strategy, offering the investor a pre-designed settlement protocol and
schedule, the state may have the opportunity to have a better control over this period
and the dispute, and resolve it at that stage.
2.2 The Risk Is Permanent
Democracy, entails that every citizen has the right to be considered for public office
or post, irrespective of his or her political views, approach to private investment,
sympathy or antipathy towards a determined group, profession, or minority, or even
level of academic education. During the last few years, we have been able to observe
how constituencies in different countries have supported leaders and representatives
with protectionist views and preferences, promising voters to defend their industries
and products against foreign industries and importers. This worldwide observed
phenomenon keeps relations with foreign investors unstable; even where investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) has made states internationally accountable for any
mistreatment of foreign investors.
5Bear Creek Mining v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, 12 September 2017.
6Schreuer (2005); Sharma (2019), pp. 138–152.
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Even though, states are permanently seeking to improve their relations with
foreign investors by opening and promoting markets and/or by offering fiscal
stimuli, among other investment-attraction policies, those relations still need to
improve since they are always sensitive. The state should never assume that its
actions and decision-making processes will improve any time soon (nor the inves-
tors’). States and investors’ representatives are not being replaced by better prepared
and more sophisticated ones. For that reason, it would be useful to implement a more
institutionalised, permanent system to allow the state to consolidate its position and
arguments, when an investment dispute arises.
As will be explained below in more detail, the Republic of Peru found it
extremely useful to create a unit with the express mandate to represent the state in
investor-state disputes and coordinate its participation and defence.7 This unit is the
judge of its own competence, it possesses exclusive representation powers, and it has
the ability to determine the responsibility of those public officials and entities that
generated the dispute and/or refused to cooperate for the defence of the state. This
special unit provides the state with a strong capability to assess its relations with
investors in different public and economic sectors and collaborate with the relevant
officials in order to find creative ways to prevent and resolve potential disputes, by
reacting efficiently in a timely manner and in a case-by-case scenario.
After a few years, the unit was able to identify numerous examples of public
officials’ behaviours creating significant risks for the state of not only being involved
in international disputes but of also making disputes more costly and hard to defend.
In particular:
1. Newly appointed political authorities often make decisions miscalculating their
consequences, since they are often unaware of the existence of international
investment agreements (IIAs) and the investor-state dispute resolution mecha-
nisms contained in them.
2. Similarly, sometimes authorities exaggerate their confidence regarding their
ability to resolve potential disputes. The problem arises when they become
aware of their inability to solve the dispute and it may be too late to prevent the
arbitration, since the arbitration initiation notice has already arrived.
3. Frequent renewal of public appointments also changes ministry priorities and
creates potential miscommunications with investors and other stakeholders. It is
also common that newly-appointed officials have no clarity over any agreement
their predecessors were reaching with foreign investors or that they simply do not
agree with its terms.
4. It is also frequent that high-ranking bureaucrats tend to avoid certain decisions,
because they may entail personal responsibility, or even criminal liability, for any
mistake incurred.
5. Many times, public officials are not aware that their internal communication
exchanges could be used as evidence in an investor-state arbitration.
7See https://www.mef.gob.pe/es/obras-por-impuestos/documentos-importantes?id¼377.
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6. Most of the time, contracts are poorly drafted and their interpretation is even
worse.
7. Occasionally, public officials endeavour to stamp their personal and political
ideologies in their offices and positions, instead of acting neutrally in represen-
tation of the state.
Those are real situations that make state defence extremely difficult and expen-
sive. It is important to remember that, when facing an international dispute, states not
only confront the difficulties that the facts of the dispute represent but also, since
bureaucratic processes are slow and involve several actions and actors, these pro-
cesses can potentially create further risks.
For these reasons, states could seriously reflect on the possibility of creating a
specialised unit centralising the internal coordination and representation related to
investor-state disputes, in order to ensure sufficient flexibility and space to react in a
timely manner and prevent potential disputes. The more practice and experience the
unit and the state acquire, the most successful the prevention of disputes becomes.
There are no spell books granting states the power to prevent disputes. All depends
on their practice and experience.
2.3 The Landscape Is Permanently Changing
Investment protection is not a new phenomenon in the international sphere. In the
early 1600s’ trading monopolies were granted by sovereigns to a few companies
owned by independent investors who, directly and even personally, assumed the
risks of exploring, settling and developing successful mercantile activities overseas.8
Four centuries later, after joining efforts in different ventures, including expeditions
and wars, relations between sovereigns and their national private investors evolved
into investor-state relations as we know them today; sovereigns signed treaties
between them allowing their national investors to directly initiate disputes against
those other sovereigns that breach certain agreed standards of protection.9
In the last few years, there has been an explosive growth of a new generation of
companies in almost every sector of the world’s economy.10 From the rise of
8Brown (2010), p. 1.
9UNCTAD have registered 2,897 bilateral investment treaties and 390 treaties with investment
provisions so far. See https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements.
10Byanyima Winnie (2017) 8 Men Have the Same Wealth as 3.6 Billion of the World’s Poorest
People. We Must Rebalance this Unjust Economy”, World Economic Forum https://www.
weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/eight-men-have-the-same-wealth-as-3-6-billion-of-the-worlds-
poorest-people-we-must-rebalance-this-unjust-economy/; Tavierne Randall (2018) How Private
Companies Are Driving Growth, EY Building a Better Working World, https://www.ey.com/en_
gl/growth/how-private-companies-are-driving-growth; OECD (2018) Multinational enterprises in
the global economy heavily debated but hardly measured, https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/
MNEs-in-the-global-economy-policy-note.pdf; OECD (2002) Foreign direct investment for
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internet giants, the growth of mining, pharmaceutical and infrastructure companies,
to jet builders, airlines, mobile phones, and film producers. The value that these
companies represent to their sovereigns in terms of jobs, tax collection and techno-
logical improvement appears to be critical for their national economies. For this
reason, investment recipient states should ponder on these last few years’ events and
seriously consider that it is highly possible that sovereigns (home states) may be
willing to protect their national investors and their investments abroad.
States find it increasingly difficult to control companies’mergers, or to adapt their
tax systems to new realities;11 corruption can affect governments’ stability, and
companies bring multi-billion claims against states before arbitral tribunals under the
aegis of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).12
These facts suggest that foreign investors’ leverage vis-à-vis national and foreign
governments is increasing too. It is important to notice that, through the agreed
investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms, states have started to grant investors
the right to initiate disputes against them on public international law grounds. ICSID
awards are internationally binding;13 if a state fails to comply with an ICSID award,
then the investor’s home state will be able to initiate countermeasures against the
defaulter.
We can also identify other initiatives designed to balance international relations
due to the new relevance of a company at the international level. The Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is promoting a model con-
vention to create an international taxation system,14 looking forward to adjusting
online companies’ income tax collection to an effective territorial reality. The United
development maximising benefits, minimizing costs, https://www.oecd.org/industry/inv/
investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf; UNCTAD (1998) Foreign direct investment on the rise,
https://unctad.org/en/pages/PressReleaseArchive.aspx?ReferenceDocId¼3173; United Kingdom,
Department for International Development (2011) The engine of development: The private sector
and prosperity for poor people, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67490/Private-sector-approach-paper-May2011.pdf; Fortune,
100 Fastest-Growing Companies https://fortune.com/100-fastest-growing-companies/2019/momo/;
Forbes, Most Innovative Growth Companies https://www.forbes.com/growth-companies/list/#tab:
rank.
11The Economist (2019) France’s digital tax riles the White House, https://www.economist.com/
finance-and-economics/2019/07/11/frances-digital-tax-riles-the-white-house.
12Orta David, Allegations of Corruption in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Need for Reform
https://www.expertguides.com/articles/allegations-of-corruption-in-investment-treaty-arbitration-
the-need-for-reform/arkesfdy.
13Article 54(1) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) provides: “Each Contracting State shall recognize an
award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations
imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.
A Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal
courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the
courts of a constituent State”.
14See http://www.oecd.org/tax/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-ver
sion-20745419.htm.
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States of America is actively prosecuting corruption outside its borders through the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).15 In fact, most, if not all, of the corruption
scandals of the last few years were uncovered by the application of this act.
In short, investors may have better leverage than they did a few years ago, and this
may improve in the near future. States are urged to establish clear rules, relations,
and commitments, or dealing with investors may become expensive in the future. It
would be advisable for states to consider establishing a record of the foreign
companies investing in their territories and to monitor their activities, engaging in
a permanent open dialogue, in order to be capable to take the right measures at the
right time to prevent disputes. Among some suggested measures, we could mention:
1. The creation of a special unit to be exclusively devoted to research, assessment
and the drafting of concession contracts, including amendments. In other words,
states could consider building a flexible concession contract model. This unit
should be professionally prepared and have the capacity to act across all state
entities, including central and local governments. Moreover, it should be in
permanent dialogue with concessionaires, keeping contracts open to discussion
for adjustments and improvements to the benefit of both parties.
2. The creation of a register of foreign privately-held companies entering their
economies and following-up with them periodically, opening a window of
dialogue with them (like customer service).
3. Periodically the state could assemble all public officials related to foreign inves-
tors and establish open discussions with them, assessing all the different problems
they face, introducing mechanisms to allow collaboration with them in order to
prevent disputes and possibly granting them the legal tools they need to success-
fully deal with investors.
2.4 ISDS in Light of Important Cultural and Practical
Differences
It is important at this point to consider cultural differences when facing an interna-
tional dispute. Different cultures and nations have different approaches to the
concept of investment and the role of the state in relation to it; the same occurs
with dispute resolution, and its particularities. In fact, the approach to private-public
relations is different, even within the same regions. State officials must be aware of
the fact that, when reaching arbitration, the dispute may be resolved under a totally
different and strange environment for them, where not only cultural differences
between the state and investors become clear but also differences between counsel,
legal and procedural traditions, and arbitrators’ backgrounds. Therefore, when
making the decision to pursue an international arbitration, it may be better to be
15The United States Department Stares (2017) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. https://www.justice.
gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act.
124 C. J. Valderrama
aware of the extra costs these variables involve. For these reasons, state representa-
tives should be conscious of the fact that foreign investors are culturally different to
them. In that sense, notices and communications should be kept as clear, direct and
objective as possible, in order to avoid misrepresentations or future misunderstand-
ings with investors, legal counsel and arbitrators.
An important reason to consider avoiding international investor-state disputes is
the fact that the state will be navigating in strange waters, incapable of completely
understanding the context where its dispute is being resolved. As a rule, arbitrators
are not nationals of the disputing parties,16 but can be of the same nationality as
counsel and the experts retained by the parties, the latter representing a potential
closer common understanding regarding several variables discussed in the dispute,
including procedural customs. For example, international arbitration as an adversar-
ial system is not the same as the civil law litigation inquisitorial system. It is
particularly important for state representatives to consider these facts when assessing
whether to pursue an international arbitration or to aim to settle the issue before it
escalates into a full-blown dispute.
2.5 States as Subjects of International Law
A key issue to take into consideration is that investment arbitration may be the forum
where states are the most vulnerable (apart from international courts). Under public
international law, states’ decisions, actions and public statements bind them legally.17
In this forum, the state is not understood as the current government, where recently-
appointed officials can blame their predecessors for their mistakes, faults or incompe-
tence. In international arbitration, new governments will always need to defend the
mistakes committed by their predecessors, as if they are their own. Relatedly, since
states are usually divided in regions and provinces, and regional and provincial
authorities also represent and internationally bind the state, permanent and close
coordination with subnational governments is fundamental to avoid disputes and
further international claims.
16Titi (2020), p. 43.
17Dumberry (2016).
Investor-State Dispute Prevention: The Perspective of Peru 125
3 Model and Practices Developed by the Republic of Peru
during 2011–2015
3.1 Model
Like several other states, the Republic of Peru finds itself immersed in ISDS cases.18
It has signed around 40 IIAs19 and hundreds of contracts with foreign investors,
granting protection to their investment and consenting to solve any related dispute in
international arbitration. It is interesting to note that Peru grants access to interna-
tional arbitration under ICSID and under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in most of its concession
contracts, which, as I will explain later, is a very healthy policy for the prevention of
disputes.20
In order to manage the defence of its interests in international arbitration, Peru
established a coordination and response system called SICRECI (Sistema de
Coordinación y Respuesta del Estado en Controversias Internacionales de Inver-
sión) with the mandate to represent the state, from the reception of the investor’s
notice of dispute until the compliance with and enforcement of the final award
terminating the dispute.21 The system is aimed to carry out all the internal coordi-
nation efforts among all the entities that may have a direct or indirect role in the
disputed facts and in the conduct of the defence strategy, in close coordination with
the legal team that represents Peru before the international tribunal.22
Act 28933 of 2006, which established the SICRECI,23 also created a Special
Commission.24 The coordination mechanism is quite simple. The Special Commis-
sion centralises the defence of the state by acting as its exclusive representative
before the disputing investor and arbitral tribunal. As soon as the investor notifies the
state of the initiation of the dispute, the Special Commission requests the relevant
entities to submit their legal opinion about the dispute, with a detailed explanation of
the facts, all the relevant documents and their institutional position in relation to the
dispute.
With both elements at hand (the notice of dispute and the entity’s opinion), the
Special Commission decides on its own competence. If the dispute is considered to
18Peru’s website of the Minister of Economy and Finance reveals a total of 16 cases that have been





20Valderrama (2018), p. 105.
21See https://www.mef.gob.pe/es/acerca-de-las-asociaciones-publico-privadas-apps/sicreci.
22Peru, Supreme Decree No. 002-2009-EF, 13 January 2013.
23Peru, Act No. 28933, 15 December 2006.
24Article 7 of Act N28933, 15 December 2006.
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be an investor-state dispute, then the Special Commission is competent to represent
the state; on the contrary, if it is considered a commercial controversy, the entity
directly involved in the dispute will be responsible for its own defence with its own
means and budget.
Once the competence is decided by the permanent members of the Special
Commission,25 the Special Commission invites the relevant entities that are involved
or have contributed to the escalation of the conflict to join it.26 Immediately after
that, it proceeds to invite the investors to an introductory session, allowing them to
explain their concerns, points of view and claimed damages. After careful consid-
eration, the Special Commission sends a written response, proposing the formal
initiation of the settlement process or expressing the contrary position of the state,
offering the claimant investor a chance to rebut the state’s position. These actions
indicate the initiation of the cooling-off period.27
If a formal invitation to initiate a negotiation process is sent, a signed one-page
“Negotiation Protocol” is attached to the letter of invitation, containing the basic
rules for the negotiation process. That document is to be signed and returned to the
Special Commission in order to initiate the settlement. On the contrary, if the Special
Commission decides that a settlement is not possible, it will communicate its
decision to the investor. When appropriate, the Special Commission, as the exclusive
representative of the state, withdraws the right of the state to continue with the
cooling-off period and offers the investor the opportunity to immediately initiate the
arbitration proceedings.
Depending on the nature of the dispute and the investor, the dialogue continues or
is discontinued until the initiation of the arbitration. Often the cooling-off period is a
very active stage of the process and sometimes it is very efficient to resolve the
dispute. On other occasions, even though the dispute is not resolved, it is still very
helpful to substantially reduce the damages claimed.
Once the dispute is initiated, a well-managed cooling-off period is the best
method to prevent an arbitration. That is the reason of its mere existence: a reason-
able period of time for both parties in a dispute to make their best efforts to settle
their differences. It is key for the state to take advantage of this period and really
endeavour to terminate the dispute and avoid the arbitration. Cooling-off periods
typically last for six months, which is not a long period. Many times, when true
efforts are made, parties find out that they may need more time to continue with the
process and, assuming that both parties are engaged in trying to achieve a solution,
they mutually consent to extend the cooling-off period until a solution is reached.
The Special Commission is habilitated to seek an agreed solution with the investor
and, once a reasonable solution is agreed, authorisation from the cabinet of ministers
will be needed to sign the settlement agreement.
25Article 7.3 of Act No. 28933, 15 December 2006.
26Article 7.3 (f) of Act No. 28933, 15 December 2006; See Supreme Decree No. 125-2008-EF,
13 January 2013.
27Schreuer (2005); Sharma (2019), pp. 138–15.
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A few other times, public officials admit their mistakes and, by making a sincere
effort to better understand the investor’s viewpoint, change their positions conceding
the investor’s request. Here the case is solved in the most efficient manner. In these
cases, the Commission’s work consists in approaching the parties in conflict and
allowing them a space to calmly discuss. In any case, the great advantage of a
disciplined handling of the cooling-off period is that, if an arbitration commences,
the state is not taken by surprise but is on the contrary well-prepared to successfully
respond before an international arbitral tribunal.
Act 28933 stipulates that the state’s response system covers two levels of actions
to be accomplished by the Special Commission:28 (1) the prevention of disputes by
centralising relevant information, establishing an alert mechanism and standardizing
dispute resolution provisions in treaties and contracts, and (2) the management of the
defence of the state’s interests during the cooling-off period, and during the arbitra-
tion or conciliation. Efficient management of the defence is also key for the preven-
tion of (other) disputes.
The centralisation of information is indeed very important. The state needs to
have detailed knowledge of the content of the awards rendered in the arbitrations to
which it is party. Tribunals’ findings and interpretations that may be used against the
state in the future are certainly very important to take into consideration. The same
occurs with non-disputing parties’ submissions, interpreting treaty provisions.29
Records of settlement processes followed during the cooling-off period also help
the state to learn from its mistakes and perfect its practice in order to avoid future
disputes.
In addition, as a prevention practice, the Special Commission implemented a
state-of-the-art online alert mechanism, with very simple and clear instructions, in
order to raise the alarm of an incoming dispute. We also included a self-guided crash
course on ISDS for the stakeholders concerned. Unfortunately, the system was never
used and it now appears to have been removed from the government’s website. It
seemed that public officials were not convinced about using an online system that
would create records of their actions, thus possibly protecting themselves against
any presumption of responsibility for a dispute that may cost hundreds of millions of
dollars to the state. Public officials may prefer to make phone calls, or visit offices,
and discuss about potential disputes personally.
28Articles 7, 8 and 9 of Act No. 28933, 15 December 2006.
29State parties to a treaty that are not parties to the dispute may have a right under that treaty to make
submissions on a question of application or interpretation of the treaty (see e.g. Article 1128 of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See also ICSID Arbitration Rule 37(2) on
submissions by non-disputing party submissions. See further chapters by Rebecca E. Khan and
Kendra Magraw, this volume.
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3.2 Best Practices
Settling a dispute by mutual agreement is a right that parties to a contract have from
the very beginning of their contractual relationship. Mutual agreement can entail
mutually adapting to the other party’s position resulting in the common understand-
ing of the contract’s telos and provisions. Even before the initiation of the cooling-
off period—which prevents arbitration by encouraging the parties to seek a solution
within the scope of the dispute settlement provision—, there is a useful practice that
can help avoid initiating or aggravating a potential international dispute:
empowering public officials.
As mentioned above, Peru’s Special Commission has the capacity to decide on its
own competence by assessing the nature of the dispute in question. The course of
such an assessment is the perfect time to work closely with the relevant state entity
and its representatives to find strategies to prevent the dispute. This is also true
because this is the time when the officials involved in the dispute are more concerned
about its consequences and therefore they are more open to cooperating.
Often the dispute is ignited by public servants’ refusal to exercise their discretion.
Whether they are placed before a contract amendment, dispute settlement or any
kind of mutual concession with an investor, public officials may prefer not to sign
any binding document in order to avoid any allegations of corruption or to avoid
being prosecuted for any losses the state may suffer. In these cases, immediate action
is required. The unit responsible for the defence of the state must be ready to
officially communicate to the relevant officials its concerns about the risks such
actions or ommissions represent for the state, the fact that the claimant may have a
strong case and, if the dispute reaches the international stage, that the damage to the
state will be high and public. Such communication must expressly stablish that the
more efficient and less costly approach would be for direct and discrete negotiations
to be initiated in order to reach a settlement between the entity and the investor.
Finally, the unit should offer its assistance with the settlement process to the relevant
public entity. This action is aimed to grant sufficient support to relevant officials to
initiate the settlement negotiation procedures by creating a safe environment and a
presumption against corruption. The goal for the unit should be to obtain an express
statement from the investors formally withdrawing their international claims against
the state, so that the dispute can be archived per secula seculorum.
Another interesting practice is that Peru, as previously mentioned, includes
ICSID provisions in most of its concession contracts. Since such a forum is agreed
in the contract, the provision can be applied both ways30 and the IIAs’ umbrella
clause becomes irrelevant.31 But the most interesting fact about being able to bring a
claim against an investor before ICSID is that the system offers immediate
30E.g. see Peru v. Caravelí Cotaruse Transmisora de Energía SAC, ICSID Case No. ARB 13/24.
31Sasson (2017), pp. 199–242.
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recognition and ultimately enforcement of its awards in 160 national jurisdictions,
increasing the state’s possibility of claiming against an investor far beyond its
borders.
4 Fundamental Considerations and Recommendations
for the Prevention of Disputes
Prevention turned to be a big part of the daily work of our unit. In our experience,
once our unit became known across the country, it was almost permanently
requested to provide advise on many different matters, from the drafting of contract
provisions to complex or failing negotiation procedures. It was also asked to offer
training courses and to give lectures to authorities, colleagues and teams about the
risks of investment disputes and how to prevent them.
4.1 Some Further Considerations
States could take a few variables into consideration when planning a strategy to
prevent or arbitrate investment disputes. Prevention occurs in two key areas, which
will now be considered in turn.
4.1.1 In the Context of ISDS More Generally
When the state uses the ISDS regime to solve disputes with foreign investors, it may
be prudent to develop a comprehensive plan for the overall defence of the state in this
forum, considering a few wide-ranging actions that, in the mid- or long-term, would
allow the state to prevent disputes easily. It would be useful to periodically remind
public servants about the risks their statements and decisions represent for the state.
As mentioned above, there is no guarantee that (elected) public representatives fully
understand the entire consequences of their acts. Therefore, the special unit respon-
sible of the defence of the state should be permanently “touring” the different state
entities and address their members about investment dispute mechanisms and their
risks.
It is very important for the state to assume a strong and assertive defence in
investment cases, when prevention is not possible, and to confidently face investors.
It is important that the investors’ community perceives the state as strong and hard to
prevail against, in the case of a dispute. The state should remind investors that ISDS
is also of high risk for them too. This stance should be intended to discourage
investors with frivolous or not-so-strong claims from initiating arbitrations against
the state.
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The state would like to develop a uniform position regarding investment arbitra-
tion and be consistent with it. It may not be wise to be a party to investment
arbitration procedures and criticise the mechanism in other fora, since this may
create contradictions and bad relations with tribunals. If the state actively uses the
mechanism, it would be wise to focus its efforts on fully understanding it and
obtaining the best possible results. If, on contrary, the state rejects the mechanism,
then it should do its best not to be challenged before it, and withdraw from every
provision that ties it to its tribunals, or in any case amend such provisions in a
manner that may satisfy its needs. But if it is not consistent with its position and
statements in different fora can be perceived by tribunals as contradictory, this may
weaken the state’s defences in its disputes. It is also key to always comply with
awards and enforce them when appropriate. A good reputation has no price before a
tribunal. That tribunals are able to recognise that a particular disputing state party is
fair and respectful may influence on how they decide the dispute.
4.1.2 In the Context of a Particular Dispute
As already mentioned, it is of the utmost importance to pay immediate attention to
the threat of initiation of a dispute and react without delay. Many disputes can be
avoided with simple acts at the appropriate time. When the dispute is at its early
stages, the defence team can cooperate within the state in order to enhance its ability
to achieve a negotiated solution to the dispute that would prevent future international
responsibility of the state. The same is true with respect to the cooling-off
period, since a well-managed consultations period may avoid the initiation of an
arbitration or improve the outcome of the arbitration.
It is also key for the state to establish its position in relation to the dispute, facts
and the investor’s claims and arguments and organise its defensive strategy accord-
ingly. Otherwise it would be difficult to organise an effective defence. The three
following facts should be kept in mind: first, the claimant always has a position in
relation to the dispute; not having a position, puts the state at a serious disadvantage
when negotiating or organising its defence; second, the decision on the state’s posi-
tion should never be delegated to the lawyers; on the contrary, the lawyers must
defend the position of the state, or the proceeding will become too expensive; third,
initially the position may be erroneous and, if so, it can be corrected; on contrary if
there is no position, there will be nothing to correct or improve.
4.2 Recommendations
This chapter will close with some recommendations on how to build an efficient
dispute prevention mechanism. Such a mechanism should have the following
characteristics:
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1. The system and its organs (coordination & response unit) should be created by
law to avoid political criticism regarding its outcomes. Creating a system of
defence supported by a thoroughly discussed law, issued by the legislative
power, should reduce the risks of political challenge to the defence arguments
and strategies, avoiding internal conflicts that may weaken or challenge the
position of the state before investment tribunals.
2. A flexible defence structure capable of deciding its own competence. This is what
allows the specialised unit to act autonomously and, by doing so, to provide
assistance to other public entities. As previously mentioned, Peru’s Special
Commission’s capacity to determine its own competence offered the state the
opportunity to empower public officials and help them to prevent investment
disputes.
3. Exclusive representation of the state vis-a-vis the investor and the dispute with
the express ability to negotiate on behalf of the state. The unit responsible for the
representation of the state should be allowed to react rapidly and to act autono-
mously as the exclusive representative of the state. If the unit is subject to
bureaucratic procedures, then the system turns out to be useless.
4. Ability to control and unify public statements related to the dispute.
5. Ability to determine responsibility for causing the dispute and for lack of
cooperation for the state’s defence, and ability to request information, advice
and cooperation from all public entities and officials. In the case of Peru’s Special
Commission, this served to persuade public officials that, contrary to their beliefs,
they would become seriously liable for not settling the dispute immediately and
avoiding international arbitration.
6. Ability to approve funds and hire professionals for the defence.
7. Finally, it is important to include arbitration provisions in concession contracts.
These allow the state to internationally pursue damages from investors who
breach the contract. This requires the decision from the state to use ISDS to its
benefit which could turn out to be the best development for a state in the field of
investor-state arbitration.
References
Brown SR (2010) Merchant Kings – when companies ruled the World 1600–1900. Bloomsbury
Chew S, Reed L, Thomas JC (2018) Report: survey on obstacles to settlement of investor-state
disputes. NUS - Centre for International Law Working Paper 18/01
Dumberry P (2016) State practice. In: The formation and identification of rules of customary
international law in international investment law. Cambridge studies in international and
comparative law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 116–291
Franck SD (2011) Rationalizing costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration. Washington and Lee
University School of Law, Lexington
Sasson M (2017) Treaty versus contract claims, and umbrella clauses: when a contract breach may
become a treaty breach. In: Sasson M (ed) Substantive law in investment treaty arbitration: the
unsettled relationship between international law and municipal law, vol 21. Kluwer Law
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, pp 199–242
132 C. J. Valderrama
Schreuer C (2005) Calvo’s grandchildren: the return of local remedies in investment arbitration.
Law Pract Int Court Tribunals 4(1):1–17
Sharma A (2019) Interpretation of the cooling-off period in the Energy Charter Treaty. In:
Brekoulakis S (ed) Arbitration: the international journal of arbitration, mediation and dispute
management, vol 85(2). Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, pp 138–152
Simões J (2012) Arbitration as a method of settling disputes arising under sovereign bonds. Revista
Brasileira de Arbitragem IX(33):9–37
Titi C (2020) Nationality and representation in the composition of the international bench: lessons
from the practice of international courts and tribunals and policy options for the multilateral
investment court. CERSA Working Papers on Law and Political Science
Valderrama CJ (2018) Perú – buenas prácticas de cómo enfrentar demandas internacionales
iniciadas por inversionistas privado. ICSID Rev 33(1):103–124. Winter
Carlos José Valderrama currently acts as independent counsel for international dispute preven-
tion and resolution matters, focusing on international investment disputes arising under investment
treaties and government contracts. He also acts as arbitrator and counsel in relation to international
commercial disputes in various fora, including under the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) Arbitration Rules. Prior to establishing his independent practice, Carlos José worked as
counsel for the International Arbitration practices of Sidley Austin LLP and White & Case LLP.
Before that, he chaired for several years the Republic of Peru’s inter-agency commission
representing the state in international investment disputes. In that capacity, he oversaw Peru’s
defence in investment treaty arbitrations, hearing nearly US $50 billion in claims, all of which
resulted in favorable outcomes for the state. Some of those cases also involved the submission of
claims and counterclaims by the state. Also, in that role, he managed complex negotiations to
resolve or otherwise avert a number of international investment arbitrations, advised different state
agencies on treaty and contract provisions related to dispute resolution, and assisted such agencies
in evaluating risks and avoiding disputes. Before working for the Republic of Peru, Carlos José was
a consultant for the World Bank and the Organization of American States (OAS) focused on rule of
law and justice policy issues. He also practiced as an attorney at Navarro Abogados for 10 years, in
Lima, Peru.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Investor-State Dispute Prevention: The Perspective of Peru 133
The Role of Sub-Regional Systems
in Shaping International Investment




1 Sub-regional Systems in Europe: The Case of the Visegrád Group and Its Role
in International Investment Law-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
2 Economic Cooperation in the V4: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3 The V4 Countries and V4 Group’s Approach to FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
3.1 A Focus on the Question of Termination of Intra-EU BITs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
3.2 Forms of Economic Cooperation with Non-EU Countries: The Case of East Asia . 148
4 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Abstract The present chapter focuses on the role of the Visegrád group (or V4,
comprising Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) in international
investment law-making. The chapter starts with a brief overview of the V4 group as a
sub-regional system in Europe, including its modus operandi and main achievements
in the field of economic cooperation. Subsequently, it turns to the regulation of
foreign direct investment (FDI), both at the level of each V4 state and at EU level—
with particular regard to the implication of the EU’s exclusive competence on FDI.
Special attention is paid to the approach of the V4 countries towards the question of
termination of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties (BITs)—including an overview
of the related objections to jurisdiction that the four countries have raised over the
years in investor-state arbitrations based on intra-EU BITs—and to the relationship
of the V4 group with non-EU countries—especially with (selected) East Asian
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countries. The main question is whether—and to what extent—the V4 group as a
sub-regional system has a role to play in international investment law-making. The
chapter highlights the proactive and advocacy role that the V4 group has tradition-
ally played in manifold subject-matters, including the promotion and protection of
FDI, and supports the positive “soft power” the V4 may exercise in this respect.
1 Sub-regional Systems in Europe: The Case
of the Visegrád Group and Its Role in International
Investment Law-Making
Sub-regional formations among states geographically close to each other and with
similar political, social, economic, cultural, and historical experiences have become
more common since the late 1980s.1 Within the European context, a number of
sub-regional groupings of states exist, such as Benelux,2 the Nordic Council,3 the
Central European Initiative4 and the Baltic cooperation,5 to name just a few.6
Especially in Central and Eastern Europe, almost every country is involved in at
least one sub-regional grouping; one of the most significant examples in this respect
is the Visegrád group (or V4, among the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and
Poland).7
This chapter focuses on the role of the V4 in the context of international
investment law-making. The relevance of this topic is twofold: on the one hand,
the four Visegrád countries attract foreign investments from around the world and,
accordingly, it is important to understand how they shape their relationship with the
home countries of their foreign investors; on the other hand, the four countries are
also members of the European Union. Since the Treaty of Lisbon has included
foreign direct investment (FDI) within the exclusive competence of the EU and the
latter can now conclude international investment-related agreements with third
1Gebhard (2013), p. 26.
2The Benelux Union includes Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. See the official website
at https://gouvernement.lu/en/dossiers/2018/benelux.html.
3It includes 87 members, from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Faroe Islands,
Greenland and Åland. See the official website at https://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council.
4It is a regional organisation made up of 15 members: Albania, Austria, Belarus,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, North Macedonia,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. See the official website at https://www.cei.int.
5It includes Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. For more information, see https://vm.ee/en/baltic-
cooperation.
6Rudka (1997), pp. 196–197.
7Gebhard (2013), p. 26.
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countries,8 it is worth questioning whether the V4, as a sub-regional formation, may
have—and to what extent—a role to play in this respect. Interestingly enough, while
the V4 group tends to speak with one voice when promoting FDI from non-EU
countries in the region, the four countries seem to adopt a member-specific approach
on issues related to intra-EU FDI—as in the case of the question of the termination of
intra-EU bilateral investment agreements (BITs).
The following paragraphs start with a brief overview of the modus operandi of the
V4, which has a long-lasting tradition of cooperation in manifold topics, and
examine its approach to economic cooperation (Sect. 2) and investment promotion
and protection (Sect. 3) both within the EU (Sect. 3.1) and in the relations of V4
members with third countries (Sect. 3.2). Finally, the chapter offers some concluding
remarks (Sect. 4).
2 Economic Cooperation in the V4: An Overview
On 15 February 1991, the heads of government of Czechoslovakia (now the Czech
Republic and Slovakia), Hungary and Poland signed the Declaration of Visegrád,
which marked the establishment of the Visegrád group as a forum for sub-regional
cooperation.9 One of the first aims of the V4 was “full involvement in the European
political and economic system”.10 The V4 is not institutionalised11 but works
according to the principle of cooperation through high-level political summits,
expert and diplomatic meetings, activities of non-governmental associations in the
region, think-tanks and research bodies.12 Each V4 country holds the presidency for
one year and prepares a one-year plan of action.13
8Article 206 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In this respect, it
should be recalled that, as specified by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in
Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017, the EU and its member states share competences in concluding
international investment agreements (IIAs) with non-EU countries, when they include provisions on
portfolio foreign investment, investor-state dispute settlement and state-to-state dispute settlement
relating to provisions regarding portfolio investment. See CJEU, Opinion 2/15, Opinion pursuant to
Article 218(11) TFEU—Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of
Singapore, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, para. 305; for a comment, see the study commissioned by the
European Parliament, EU investment protection after Opinion 2/15: Questions of competence and
coherence. PE 603.476 (March 2019) at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank.
9Wołek (2013), p. 88.
10Visegrád declaration, 15 February 1991, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-
declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412.
11The only organisation within the V4 platform is the International Visegrád Fund, which was
established in 2000 with the aim to promote regional cooperation through grants, scholarships and
artist residencies. See the official website at https://www.visegradfund.org.
12For information on the work and activities of the V4 group, see the official website http://www.
visegradgroup.eu.
13See Aims and structure, Visegrád group, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about/aims-and-structure.
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V4 meetings may also take the form of the V4+ formula, when the V4 countries
meet with representatives from other EU states and/or EU institutions,14 as well as
from non-EU states.15 Moreover, the V4 cooperates with other sub-regional bodies,
such as Benelux and the Nordic Council.16 The outcomes of these meetings can be
political documents including remarks and reflections on EU legislative acts and
proposals, joint declarations or other political statements17—like the common posi-
tions of the V4 on the issue of the Western Balkans18 or the Eastern Partnership.19
Worth recalling are also the joint declarations of the ministers of V4 countries on
European Commission communications,20 EU proposals for regulations,21 or EU
directives.22 The V4 has also addressed letters to the European Commission.23 The
topics covered during meetings may range from agriculture and renewable energy, to
migration, financial and labour issues, to name a few.24
In the field of economic cooperation at the sub-regional level, it is worth recalling
that the V4 countries signed the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
on 21 December 1991, which came into force on 1 March 1993.25 CEFTA aimed to
create a free trade area in the region and to prepare the countries for their accession to
the EU.26 The EU has generally adopted a positive approach to this form of
14See most recently the Summit of the V4 Prime Ministers and German Chancellor that took place
in Bratislava on 7 February 2019. See the outcome declaration at http://www.visegradgroup.eu/
documents/official-statements/declaration-of-the-190208.
15E.g. the meetings on the Cohesion Policy. All the meetings and relevant outcomes, as well as all
the documents of the V4 that are referred to in this chapter are available at http://www.
visegradgroup.eu/calendar.
16See the relevant meetings listed on http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar.
17They all can be accessed (in English) here http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-
statements.
18E.g. Joint Statement on the Western Balkans of 29 November 2016, issued at the annual meeting
of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrád Group and the Western Balkans. The meeting
was also attended by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
and Vice-President of the Commission Federica Mogherini and by representatives from Bulgaria,
Croatia, Italy, Romania, and Slovenia.
19E.g. Joint statement on the 10th anniversary of the Eastern Partnership, 6 May 2019.
20E.g. Joint declaration of the Ministers of agriculture of the Visegrád group and Croatia on the
Commission Communication on the future of food and farming, 25 January 2018.
21E.g. Joint declaration of the Ministers of the interior on the proposal for a Regulation on the
European border and coast guard, 16 October 2018.
22E.g. Joint declaration of the agricultural Ministers of Visegrád group, Bulgaria and Romania on
the renewable energy Directive after 2020, 21 September 2017.
23E.g. Joint statement and Joint letter to EC prepared during the Summit of 22 June 2012; Joint
Letter to High Representative Ashton and Commissioner Füle of 5 March 2013.
24Strážay (2019), p. 67.
25Central European Free Trade Agreement, signed on 21 December 1992, http://www.
worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/cefta.pdf.download; amended in 2006, http://cefta.int/legal-
documents/#1463498231136-8f9d234f-15f9.
26Preamble of CEFTA (1992). See Rhodes (1998), p. 179 and Gizicki et al. (2014), p. 7.
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economic sub-regional integration: indeed, good relations among neighbouring
countries are a positive precondition to accession.27 CEFTA has also served as a
model of economic cooperation at the sub-regional level in order to prepare other
states for accession to the EU;28 after 1991, other Southeastern European countries
acceded to the Agreement.29 Upon accession to the EU on 1 May 2004, the V4
countries, along with Slovenia, withdrew from CEFTA, followed by Bulgaria and
Romania (2007) and by Croatia (2013), when the latter acceded to the EU—and
became bound to the EU common commercial policy.30
At the international level, the V4 countries interact with other countries in
international fora and have acceded to international economic organisations and
treaties, like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD),31 the International Monetary Fund (IMF),32 the World Bank33 and the
World Trade Organization (WTO)34 and are all parties to the Energy Charter
Treaty,35 the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency,36 and the New York Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,37 while all
V4 countries, with the exception of Poland, are parties to the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
(ICSID Convention).38
27See Balazs (1997), p. 92. The EU has had different approaches to sub-regional formations in the
region; for a general account, see Zelenická (2010).
28It should be noted that consensus has never been reached on a possible enlargement of the V4
group, since it would have “complicate[d] the process of decision-making, simply because there
would be more opinions and interests to be taken into account. [. . .] The so-called V4+ formula has
been used in order to intensify cooperation with other countries or groupings in selected areas of
joint interest”. Strážay T (2011) Visegrád - arrival, survival, revival. Selected V4 Bibliography.
Visegrád group, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/bibliography/visegradarrival-survival-
120628. See also Wieclawski (2016), p. 16 and Rhodes (1998).
29Slovenia (1996), Romania (1997), Bulgaria (1998), Croatia (2003), the former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of North Macedonia in 2006, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on behalf of Kosovo, Albania and Moldova
(2007). See the official website of CEFTA, http://cefta.int.
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3 The V4 Countries and V4 Group’s Approach to FDI
The V4 countries attract foreign investments worldwide According to Ernst &
Young’s 2018 European attractiveness survey, Central and Eastern Europe is per-
ceived as the second most attractive region for foreign investors worldwide, right
after Western Europe.39 The V4 countries have concluded manifold international
investment-related agreements (almost the 18% of the international investment-
related agreements that are currently in force worldwide) and are often involved in
investor-state dispute settlement (almost 12% of the currently known treaty-based
investor-state arbitrations have involved either Slovakia, Hungary, Poland or the
Czech Republic as respondents).40
Nevertheless, V4 countries cannot be considered as a homogenous group in terms
of their economic environment and attractiveness for FDI. There are still consider-
able differences among them. Suffice it to recall, for example, that Slovakia intro-
duced the euro in 2009 and has been a member of the euro zone since then, while the
three remaining V4 countries are still outside the euro zone.41
As already recalled, the introduction of the exclusive competence of the EU over
FDI has reduced the leading and exclusive role of member states in this respect. Still,
V4 countries play an active role, both at the national and at the sub-regional level:
first, at the national level, each and every one of the V4 countries has its own national
regulation of FDI;42 moreover, there have been actions to terminate intra-EU BITs, as
detailed in the next paragraph, while there are still many BITs with non-EU third
countries in force;43 at the sub-regional level, the V4 group has issued political
statements on FDI.
At the national level, each V4 country has developed its own investment promo-
tion policy and the four countries appear quite diverse in this respect; the only
common feature seems the willingness to attract FDI. Indeed, in recent years, the
four countries have adopted policies aimed at increasing FDI in the region: Slovakia
adopted the Act on Regional Investment Aid in 2018, providing new aids and
incentives to investors;44 the Czech Republic introduced in 2015 a new amendment
39Ernst & Young (2018) European attractiveness survey, https://www.ey.com/en_gl/attractiveness.
40For all the data see http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org.
41UNCTAD (2019), p. 152, Pawlas (2018), p. 99 and Yurchyshyn and Markevych (2015), p. 130.
42See Su et al. (2018), p. 1959 and Yurchyshyn and Markevych (2015), pp. 117–137. A list of the
most relevent national policy measures is available at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-
navigator.
43Slovakia has currently 41 BITs in force with non-EU third countries; Czech Republic, 69; Poland,
40 and Hungary, 41. For a general overview see Sandor (2019), pp. 457–493.
44Slovakia adopted new law in the field of investment aid. UNCTAD Investment Policy Monitor,
1 April 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measures/3272/slova
kia-slovakia-adopted-new-law-in-the-field-of-investment-aid.
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law on investment incentives;45 Poland adopted a new law on the promotion of
investment in 2018;46 while in 2014 Hungary established an institutional triangle—
comprising the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency, the Hungarian Export
Promotion Agency and EXIM Bank—in order to support the foreign trade-focused
policy of the Hungarian Government, covering the fields of investment promotion,
trade development and export financing.47 Furthermore, Poland and the Czech
Republic have created state-owned special economic zones, which are customs-
free and offer fiscal incentives to foreign investors;48 in 2018, Poland adopted a new
law on the promotion of investment that extended the fiscal incentives of the special
economic zones to its entire territory.49 Both Poland and Hungary had also adopted
FDI national review mechanisms50 before the introduction at EU level in 2019 of
45The Czech Republic adopted Act No. 84/2015, which entered into force on 1 May 2015,
amending Act No. 72/2000 Coll. (Act on Investment Incentives). See Amendments to the Invest-
ment Incentives Act. UNCTAD Investment Policy Monitor, 1 May 2015, https://investmentpolicy.
unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measures/2829/czechia-amendments-to-the-investment-
incentives-act.
46Poland adopted new law on the promotion of investments. UNCTAD Investment Policy Monitor,
10 May 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measures/3244/
poland-poland-adopted-new-law-on-the-promotion-of-investments.
47For the relevant information see the report prepared by the Hungarian Investment Promotion
Agency, Invest in Hungary. Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency, 2018, https://hipa.hu/
images/publications/hipa-invest-in-hungary_2018_09_20.pdf. At the same time, it quite interesting
that Hungary in 2012 introduced a permanent ban on foreign ownership of farmland. See Hungary
extends ban on foreign farmland ownership. UNCTAD Investment Policy Monitor, 12 December
2012, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measures/2334/hungary-
extends-ban-on-foreign-farmland-ownership-. Most recently, the CJEU found—in its Judgment
of 21 May 219 in European Commission v. Hungary, Case C-235/17—that this legislation was
in breach of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. See Charlotin D, EU’s top Court declines to
award compensation to intra-EU investors in Greek bonds, but finds Hungarian legislation aimed at




48UNCTAD (2019), pp. 153–154.
49See Poland adopted new law on the promotion of investments. UNCTAD Investment Policy
Monitor, 10 May 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measures/
3244/poland-poland-adopted-new-law-on-the-promotion-of-investments.
50Poland adopted the Act of 24 July 2015 on the control of certain investments. See Parliament
adopts legislation concerning the control of investments in strategic sectors. UNCTAD Investment
Policy Monitor, 24 July 2015, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/
measures/2740/poland-parliament-adopts-legislation-concerning-the-control-of-investments-in-
strategic-sectors. Hungary adopted the Law on the control of investments detrimental to the interests
of Hungarian national security on 11 October 2018. See Hungary introduces national security
review of foreign investments. UNCTAD Investment Policy Monitor, 11 October 2018, https://
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measures/3303/hungary-hungary-intro
duces-national-security-review-of-foreign-investments.
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Regulation 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct
investments into the Union.51
Turning to the role of the V4 group, it should be noted that, in general, the V4 has
always supported the promotion and protection of FDI in the region, as testified by
relevant references in V4 Presidency programmes.52 There is also an official record
of meetings that have been held at V4 level on the need for cooperation to exchange
data on foreign investments53 and to attract foreign investors in the region.54 Some
V4 Presidency programmes have also emphasised the need to present a common
position with regard to negotiations of international investment agreements at EU
level and at the bilateral level (among V4 countries) with non-EU third countries.55
Finally, it is worth noting the advocacy role of the V4+ meetings in relation to
non-EU third countries, aimed at, among others, reinforcing cooperation in trade and
the promotion of investment. The following sections investigate in more detail the
approach of the V4 countries to the question of termination of intra-EU BITs and
their relationship with non-EU countries, in particular with (some selected) East
Asian countries.
3.1 A Focus on the Question of Termination
of Intra-EU BITs
In the aftermath of the introduction of the exclusive competence over FDI for the EU
with the Lisbon Treaty, one of the debates has concerned the question of termination
of BITs between member states (intra-EU BITs).56 While it is beyond the scope of
this chapter to enter into the details of the debate, it is worth recalling the milestone
judgment that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued on 6 March
2018 in the Achmea case,57 where the Court found that “the arbitration clause in the
[intra-EU The Netherlands-Slovakia] BIT has an adverse effect on the autonomy of
51Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019
establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union.
52E.g. Slovak Presidency programme 2018/2019, Czech Presidency programme 2011–2012 and
Polish Presidency programme 2008/2009.
53E.g. Joint declaration of the Ministers of economic affairs on the future of economic cooperation,
19 April 2018.
54E.g. Memorandum of understanding for regional cooperation in the areas of innovation and
startups, 12 October 2015 and Bratislava declaration on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the
Visegrád group, 15 February 2011.
55E.g. Czech Presidency programme 2015/2016 and Slovak Presidency programme 2014/2015.
56For a general overview, see Dimopoulos (2011), pp. 63–93, Kokott and Sobotta (2016), pp. 3–19
and István Nagy (2018).
57CJEU, Slovakia v. Achmea, Case C-284/16, Judgment, 6 March 2018.
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EU law, and is therefore incompatible with EU law”.58 This judgement was followed
by Declarations of EU member states in January 2019.59 All V4 countries signed the
above mentioned Declarations and started to take actions in order to terminate their
intra-EU BITs, even before the Declarations, also pushing for the conclusion of a
multilateral agreement on the termination of intra-EU BITs.60 In Hungary, the Prime
Minister adopted a decision in December 2018 authorising the conclusion of an
agreement to terminate intra-EU BITs;61 Poland also started to terminate its intra-EU
BITs in April 2018;62 Slovakia supported the conclusion of a multilateral termina-
tion agreement in the immediate aftermath of the Declaration of January 2019,63
58CJEU, Press Release No 26/18, 6 March 2018, https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.
netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Achmea-ruling-ECJ.pdf.
59Declaration of the representatives of the governments of the member states on the legal conse-
quences of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Achmea and on investment protection in the
European Union, 15 January 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_
euro/banking_and_finance/documents/190117-bilateral-investment-treaties_en.pdf (which was
signed by 22 EU member states; Hungary signed a separate Declaration on 16 January 2019, like
Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Sweden.
60Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland signed the Declaration on 15 January 2019, while
Hungary signed a separate Declaration on 16 January 2019. Though Hungary committed to
terminate all its intra-EU BITs (like the other member states that had signed the Declaration on
15 January 2019), it had taken a different position on the consequences of investor-state arbitration
claims under the Energy Charter Treaty: “Hungary declares that in its view, the Achmea judgment
concerns only the intra-EU bilateral investment treaties. The Achmea judgment is silent on the
investor-state arbitration clause in the Energy Charter Treaty (hereinafter ‘ECT’) [. . .] Hungary [. . .]
considers that is inappropriate for a Member State to express its view as regards the compatibility
with Union law of the intra/EU application of the ECT [. . .]”. Declaration of Hungary on the legal
consequences of the Achmea judgment and on investment protection in the European Union,
16 January 2019, https://www.kormany.hu/download/5/1b/81000/Hungarys%20Declaration%
20on%20Achmea.pdf, points 8–9. Instead, the Declaration of 15 January 2019 stated that “inter-
national agreements concluded by the Union, including the Energy Charter Treaty, are an integral
part of the EU legal order and must therefore be compatible with the Treaties. Arbitral tribunals
have interpreted the Energy Charter Treaty as also containing an investor-State arbitration clause
applicable between Member States. Interpreted in such a manner, that clause would be incompatible
with the Treaties and thus would have to be disapplied [. . .]”. The same position was also uphold by
the European Commission in its Communication of 19 July 2018, Protection of intra-EU invest-
ment, COM/2018/547 final.
61As reported in Korom V, Sándor L, Hungary Gives the Green Light for the Conclusion of a
Termination Agreement for Intra-EU BITs. Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 14 January 2019, http://
arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/14/hungary-gives-the-green-light-for-the-conclu
sion-of-a-termination-agreement-for-intra-eu-bits.
62As reported in Orecki M, Foreign Investments in Poland in Light of the Achmea Case and
“Reform” of Polish Judicial System. Catch 22 Situation?. Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 22 April 2018,
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/04/22/foreign-investments-poland-light-achmea-
case-reform-polish-judicial-system-catch-22-situation.
63In the aftermath of the above mentioned 2019 Declaration, the Ministry of Finance of Slovakia
stated that “[m]ember States are currently negotiating a multilateral Agreement on termination of
intra-EU BITs and it should be signed by the end of this year. [. . .] In addition, in order to push
forward implementation of the judgement, the Slovak Republic [. . .] initiated necessary steps for the
bilateral termination of its intra-EU BITs”. See Declaration on the legal consequences of the
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while the Czech Republic had already started to request of its EU member state
investment treaty partners to terminate their BITs since 2009.64
However, the V4 countries have not had the same approach to the question of the
termination of intra-EU BITs. And indeed, while we can find an official record of
meetings that were held at V4 level on the issue,65 no official declaration has been
issued at the V4 group level so far.
Confronting the objections to jurisdiction that the V4 countries have raised during
the years in investment arbitration proceedings based on intra-EU BITs, it is possible
to have a general idea of their approach to this issue. The Czech Republic, Poland
and Slovakia66 had questioned several times the validity of intra-EU BITs. In
particular—and in some cases also before the Achmea judgment was issued—,
objections to the jurisdiction of investment arbitral tribunals were raised not by
virtue of the new exclusive competence of the EU on FDI after the entry into force of
the Lisbon Treaty; rather, the argument had been that intra-EU BITs should be
considered no more in existence after the countries’ accession to the EU in 2004.
Even though arbitral tribunals have always rejected such kind of objections to their
jurisdiction, it is worth recalling the main arguments that the Czech Republic, Poland
and Slovakia—as respondent states in the relevant investment arbitral proceedings—
had made before arbitral tribunals.
The claims were generally grounded on the application of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), on the one hand, and on the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), on the other. More particularly, the
respondent states objected to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals on the ground that:
(1) the relevant intra-EU BIT had been implicitly terminated according to Article
59 of the VCLT67—according to which the Accession Treaty to the EU had
judgment of the Court of Justice in Achmea. Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, Press
Department, 17 January 2019, https://www.finance.gov.sk/en/press/declaration-on-legal-conse
quences-judgment-court-justice-achmea.html.
64As reported in Peterson LE, Denmark and Czech Rep to terminate BIT; but not all EU members
agree with Czech view that intra-EU BITs are unnecessary. IA Reporter, 17 July 2009, https://www.
iareporter.com/articles/denmark-and-czech-rep-to-terminate-bit-but-not-all-eu-members-agree-
with-czech-view-that-intra-eu-bits-are-unnecessary.
65E.g. Report of the Slovak Presidency 2014/2015.
66On 18 June 2015, the Commission started infringement proceedings against five member states to
terminate intra-EU BITs (Austria, Romania, Sweden, The Netherlands and Slovakia). See European
Commission, Press release, 18 June 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5198_en.htm.
As regards Slovakia, it is reported that it had always claimed the non-validity of intra-EU BITs,
including during bilateral meetings with the European Commission [interview of the author with a
Legal Advisor of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, 27 August 2019], and had raised objections to
jurisdictions to investment arbitral tribunals, as illustrated in the chapter.
67Article 59 of the VCLT provides: “1. A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to
it conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter and: (a) It appears from the later treaty or
is otherwise established that the parties intended that the matter should be governed by that treaty; or
(b) The provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two
treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time. 2. The earlier treaty shall be considered as
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superseded earlier BITs; and/or (2) the relevant intra-EU BITs have become incom-
patible with EU law—given that several provisions included in the EU Treaties have
the same subject-matter as those of the relevant BITs—and, accordingly, they were
no longer applicable under Article 30(3) of the VCLT;68 and/or (3) according to
Article 344 of the TFEU, the European judiciary has exclusive authority to adjudi-
cate the disputes concerning the interpretation or application of EU law;69 and
Article 18 of the TFEU prohibits any form of discrimination between nationals of
member states based on their nationality70—and indeed, the relevant BITs would
provide the right to arbitration only to investors from a particular member state, but
not from other member states.
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, these objections were raised by
the Czech Republic in Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic—commenced in 2004 on
the basis of the Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT—and in Binder v. Czech Repub-
lic—commenced in 2005 on the basis of the Czech Republic-Germany BIT;71 by
Poland in PL Holdings v. Poland—commenced in 2014 on the basis of the Belgium-
Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU)-Poland BIT;72 and by Slovakia in
Oostergetel v. Slovakia—commenced in 2006 on the basis of the Netherlands-
Slovakia BIT;73 in Achmea v. Slovakia—commenced in 2008 on the basis of the
Netherlands-Slovakia BIT,74 and in EURAM Bank v. Slovakia—commenced in
2009 on the basis of the Austria-Slovakia BIT.75
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the same objections were
raised by the Czech Republic in WNC v. Czech Republic76 and A11Y v. Czech
only suspended in operation if it appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that such
was the intention of the parties”.
68Article 30(3) of the VCLT provides: “3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to
the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under Article 59, the
earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later
treaty”.
69Article 344 of the TFEU provides: “Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning
the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those
provided for therein”.
70Article 18 of the TFEU provides: “Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without
prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality
shall be prohibited”.
71Binder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 June 2007, paras 7–20.
72PL Holdings v. Poland, SCC Case No. 2014/163, Partial Award, 28 June 2017, paras 301–304.
73Oostergetel v. Slovakia, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on Jurisdiction, 30 April 2010, paras 63–64,
82 and 103.
74Achmea v. Slovakia, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award, 7 December 2012, paras 57–59, 86–94.
75EURAM Bank v. Slovakia, PCA Case No. 2010-17, Award on Jurisdiction, 22 October 2012,
paras 55–105.
76WNC v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-34, Award, 22 February 2017, paras 64–68 and
294–300. The tribunal rejected the Czech Republic’s objection; however, it acknowledged that “EU
law was modified by the Treaty of Lisbon, and the EC has been developing its views of the legal
questions involved with intra-EU investment treaties; [. . .] The Tribunal recognizes that a different
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Republic77—both commenced in 2014 on the basis of the Czech Republic-United
Kingdom BIT. As regards Hungary, it is interesting to note that, while before
Achmea it had not contested the validity or application of intra-EU BITs in
investor-state arbitral proceedings in which it appeared as respondent, after the
Achmea judgment, it started to invoke the non-applicability of arbitration clauses
included in intra-EU BITs as an objection to the jurisdiction of the investment
arbitral tribunals.78
After the Achmea judgment, parties to intra-EU BITs started to respond to
invitations for submission by arbitral tribunals regarding the relevance of the
Achmea case in the proceedings at stake. V4 countries had a similar approach in
claiming that the Achmea judgment was applicable; accordingly, they requested the
arbitral tribunals to declare that they lacked jurisdiction or, at least, that they should
decline to exercise jurisdiction in the cases at hand.79
view may eventually prevail”. See Hepburn J, Czech Republic defeats UK BIT claims over alleged
failings in 2008 privatisation process; Griffith/Volterra/Crawford consider umbrella clause and
MFN arguments. IA Reporter, 2 March 2017, https://www.iareporter.com/articles/czech-republic-
defeats-uk-bit-claims-over-alleged-failings-in-2008-privatisation-process-griffithvolterracrawford-
consider-umbrella-clause-and-mfn-arguments.
77A11Y v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, 9 February 2017,
paras 153–163. See Hepburn J, Bohmer L, Newly-surfaced A11Y v. Czech Republic decisions
reveal fortier-chaired tribunal’s reasoning on unusual umbrella clause, cooling-off periods and veil-
piercing—as well as tribunal disagreements on application of MFN and objective criteria for
investment. IA Reporter, 26 July 2018, https://www.iareporter.com/articles/newly-surfaced-
decisions-reveal-fortier-chaired-tribunals-reasoning-on-unusual-umbrella-clause-cooling-off-
periods-and-veil-piercing-as-well-as-tribunal-disagreements-on-application-of-mfn-and-ob.
78See Korom V, Sándor L, Hungary Gives the Green Light for the Conclusion of a Termination
Agreement for Intra-EU BITs. Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 14 January 2019, http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/14/hungary-gives-the-greenlight-for-the-conclusion-of-a-termina
tion-agreement-for-intra-eu-bits.
79See UP and CD Holding Internationale v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/35, Award,
9 October 2018, paras 207–279. Poland raised the same argument before the Swedish Supreme
Court challenging the Final Award of 28 August 2017 in PL Holdings Sàrl v. Poland, SCC Case
No. V 2014/163 (on 12 December 2019, the Swedish Supreme Court decided to request a
preliminary ruling from the CJEU) and it is likely that Slovakia too will raise a similar argument
in the ongoing Spółdzielnia Pracy Muszynianka v. Slovakia, UNCITRAL Case. See also the set of
awards, which were all issued on 15 May 2019: ICW Europe investments Ltd v. Czech Republic,
Photovoltaic Knopf Betriebs GMBH v. Czech Republic, Voltaic Network GMBH (Voltaic) v. Czech
Republic andWA Investments Europa Nova Ltd v. Czech Republic. These UNCITRAL cases based
on the Energy Charter Treaty and different intra-EU BITs, namely the Cyprus-Czech Republic BIT,
Czech Republic-United Kingdom BIT and Czech Republic-Germany BIT, have been structured in
the very same way as regards the relevant part on the question of jurisdiction. Indeed, in each one of
them, the arbitral tribunal (which had the same composition in all the cases) invited the parties to
submit detailed arguments on different aspects of the intra-EU jurisdictional objection, which was
raised by the Czech Republic after the Achmea judgment. However, in all the awards, the tribunal
did not directly address the intra-EU objection, considering that the Czech Republic had waived its
right to submit the objection under the applicable Swiss procedural law (which was the law of the
seat for all the above arbitrations). See ICW Europe Investments Limited v. Czech Republic, PCA
Case No. 2014-22, Award. 15 May 2019, paras 396–418, Photovoltaic Knopf Betriebs GMBH
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Most recently, an investment arbitrator has upheld—for the first time—the intra-
EU jurisdictional objection in his dissenting opinion80 attached to the jurisdictional
decision in the Adamakopoulos et al. v. Cyprus case,81 disagreeing with the
majority’s conclusion that EU law and the BITs did not have the same subject-
matter; he recalled the Achmea judgment, reaffirming that intra-EU BITs are incom-
patible with EU law and finding unconvincing the conclusions reached by other
arbitral tribunals—in the Wirtgen et al. v. Czech Republic82 or Magyar
et al. v. Hungary83 cases—according to which BITs are more favourable than EU
law and, in any case, they are not conflicting with each other.84
However, the situation is now set to change. On 5 May 2020, 23 EU member
states, including all V4 countries, signed an agreement for the termination of intra-
EU bilateral investment treaties.85 V4 countries are still respondents in a number of
v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-21, Award, 15 May 2019, paras. 337–359, Voltaic Network
GmbH v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-20, Award, 15 May 2019, paras. 438–460 and WA
Investments Europa Nova Ltd v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, Award, 15 May 2019,
paras 438–460.
80Statement of Dissent of Professor Marcelo G. Kohen in Adamakopoulos and others v. Cyprus,
ICSID Case No. ARB/15/49, 3 February 2020, para. 68.
81Adamakopoulos and others v. Cyprus, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/49, Decision on Jurisdiction,
7 February 2020, para. 342.
82Wirtgen et al. v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-03, Final Award, 11 October 2017.
83Magyar et al. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/27, Award, 13 November 2019.
84For a comment, see For the first time, an arbitrator declines jurisdiction under an intra-EU BIT—
but majority disagrees. IA Reporter, 14 February 2020, https://www.iareporter.com/articles/
analysis-intra-eu-nature-of-claims-should-have-led-tribunal-to-decline-jurisdiction-in-
adamakopoulos-v-cyprus-according-to-dissenting-arbitrator-marcelo-kohen.
85Agreement for the Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the
European Union, 5 May 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/200505-bilateral-investment-treaties-
agreement_en. This Agreement is based on the previous Statement: EU Member States agree on a
plurilateral treaty to terminate bilateral investment treaties, 24 October 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/
info/publications/191024-bilateral-investment-treaties_en. The draft treaty text was circulated
among member states on 10 October 2019 (See Revealed: Previously-unseen draft text of EU
termination treaty reveals how intra-EU Bits—and sunset clauses—are to be terminated; Treaty also
creates EU law-focused facilitation process designed to settle pending bit claims. IA Reporter,
4 November 2019, https://www.iareporter.com/articles/revealed-previously-unseen-draft-text-of-
eu-termination-treaty-reveals-how-intra-eu-bits-and-sunset-clauses-are-to-be-terminated-treaty-
also-creates-eu-law-focused-facilitation-p. However, member states still do not agree on the ques-
tion of the compatibility with the EU law of the intra-EU application of the Energy Charter Treaty—
and the Preamble of the Agreement of 5 May 2020 expressly states that “[. . .] this Agreement [. . .]
does not cover intra-EU proceedings on the basis of [. . .] of the Energy Charter Treaty. The
European Union and its Member States will deal with this matter at a later stage”. See Most EU
member states agree on a plurilateral treaty to terminate intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, but
differences still remain with respect to intra-EU applicability of Energy Charter Treaty. IA Reporter,
27 October 2019, https://www.iareporter.com/articles/most-eu-member-states-agree-on-a-
plurilateral-treaty-to-terminate-intra-eu-bilateral-investment-treaties-but-differences-still-remain-
with-respect-to-intra-eu-applicability-of-energy-charter-treaty.
The Role of Sub-Regional Systems in Shaping International Investment. . . 147
pending investment arbitral proceedings.86 It would be very interesting to follow
their development also in light of the Achmea judgment and the multilateral agree-
ment for the termination of intra-EU BITs.
3.2 Forms of Economic Cooperation with Non-EU
Countries: The Case of East Asia
Over the years, the V4 group has developed significant relationships with non-EU
countries.87 The forms of cooperation of the V4 group with East Asia are particularly
interesting, taking into account that the V4 region has hosted East Asian investment
since the 1990s, e.g. the Japanese Suzuki in Hungary,88 and have been shaped
through the above mentioned V4+ meeting formula, as in the case of Japan and
South Korea, or the 16+1 cooperation formula with China.89
The V4+Japan meetings have covered various issues including security, devel-
opment assistance for third countries, climate change and new energy, science and
innovation, culture, and tourism. Top-level meetings of the leaders of the V4
countries and Japan were held, together with regular meetings at the level of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Political Directors, working groups were consti-
tuted and seminars took place in selected areas of cooperation.90 As regards South
Korea, the V4+ South Korea meetings have increased more recently,91 with regular
contacts especially at the level of Political Directors. They have also covered a wide
range of issues, such as the North Korean nuclear programme and human rights
situation, security issues, cybersecurity, development assistance for third countries,
research and innovation, science and technology.92
As regards economic cooperation, in some cases, the outcomes of the V4+
meetings have called for further promotion of the economic relationship with the
EU, as in the case of the V4+ Japan Joint Statement of 2013, where
86See most recently, the UNCITRAL case Spółdzielnia Pracy Muszynianka v. Slovakia, arising out
of the Poland-Slovakia BIT. See Peterson LE, After ECJ ruling in Achmea case, a Kaufmann-
Kohler chaired tribunal rejects a belated bifurcation bid in Spoldzielnia Pracy “Muszynianka”
v. Slovakia case. IA Reporter, 10 May 2018, https://www.iareporter.com/articles/after-ecj-ruling-
in-achmea-case-a-kaufmann-kohler-chaired-tribunal-rejects-a-belated-bifurcation-bid
(31 October 2019).
87Dubravčíková (2019), p. 21.
88Economic relationships and FDI flows from East Asian countries have intensified in the last
decades. See Éltető and Szunomár (2015).
89Dubravčíková (2019), p. 22.
90For a full list of these meetings, see the table in Dubravčíková (2019), p. 26.
91Dubravčíková (2019), p. 27.
92For a comprehensive list of V4+Korea meetings, see Dubravčíková (2019), p. 30. See also Grešš
(2015), p. 12.
148 F. Cristani
[t]he V4 and Japan reaffirmed that a comprehensive Japan-EU Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) / Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would improve access to markets for
Japanese and V4’s companies and thus strengthen economic relations between both sides.93
In other cases, the V4+ has served as an opportunity to define the best conditions
for implementing existing EU international trade agreements, as in the case of the
Joint Statement during the First Summit with South Korea of 2015, according to
which
The V4 and the ROK acknowledged the economic effects of the EU–Korea Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) and affirmed their readiness to create favorable conditions for the
economic development under the framework of the EU–Korea FTA.94
In the East Asian context, it is also worth mentioning the relationship of the V4
group with China, which has not been developed through the V4+ formula but has
been mainstreamed within the framework of the 16+1 cooperation and China’s Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) project. Indeed, China has developed a strong economic
relationship with Central and European Countries (CEE).95 In the aftermath of the
global financial crisis, China put in place the so-called 16+1 cooperation format,96
with the first Economic and Trade Forum between China and CEE countries held in
Budapest in 2011. Since then, the 16+1 cooperation developed through several
economic projects and major investments from China in CEE countries. The 16+1
cooperation developed according to the Budapest Guidelines for Cooperation between
China and Central and Eastern European countries of 28 November 201797 and the
93Visegrád Group Plus Japan Joint Statement of 16 June 2013. The EU and Japan's Economic
Partnership Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2019. See European Commission,
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. In focus, 7 October 2019, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
policy/in-focus/eu-japan-economic-partnership-agreement.
94Joint Statement on the occasion of the first summit with the President of the Republic of Korea of
3 December 2015.
95This has also raised some political concerns among EU institutions and Western EU member
states. See Matura T, China and CEE: 16+1 is here to stay. Emerging Union –Opinion, 7 May 2019,
https://emerging-europe.com/voices/china-and-cee-161-is-here-to-stay and Matura (2019), pp.
388–407. During the 7th summit of Central and Eastern European countries and China that took
place in Sofia from 29 June to 7 July 2018, the Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov affirmed
that “[t]he 16+1 initiative is not a geopolitical platform but a win-win cooperation based on the
market laws”, while the Chinese Prime Minister re-stated that “[s]ome say that such a cooperation
might divide the EU but it is not true”, as reported in Almássy F, China – Central Europe: an
intensified rapprochement through the 16+1 initiative. Visegrád Post, 29 July 2018.
96The 16 countries are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary,
Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, North
Macedonia, Serbia. For an overview, Xin and Zhigao (2018) and Turcsanyi et al. (2014),
pp. 127–141.
97Budapest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries,
28 November 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1514534.
shtml.
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subsequent Sofia Guidelines of 9 July 2018,98 which reiterated the willingness of
participant states to develop a “cross-regional cooperation platform”.
Moreover, in 2013 China put in place the so-called BRI project, which is aimed to
connect 71 countries in Asia, Africa and Europe. The BRI is expected to cost more
than $1tn and it has raised a number of concerns as regards both the economic and
political implications.99 The BRI includes infrastructure projects (e.g. railways,
energy pipelines or highways), as well as the establishment of commercial
courts—in Shenzhen and Xi’an—that would deal with commercial disputes related
to the BRI—ideally based on the model of the Dubai International Financial Centre
Courts and the International Commercial Court in Singapore.100
China has encouraged strong economic relationships with V4 countries,101
including by sending so-called “investment promotion delegations” to V4 countries
and inviting officials in charge of foreign investment in V4 to China for exchanges
and training.102 In March 2018, during a meeting with vice foreign ministers of
the V4 countries in China, the Chinese State Councillor restated that “Visegrád
countries are representatives of European emerging market countries and the most
dynamic force within the EU”.103 It is worth noting that, according to some scholars,
this kind of cooperation between China and sub-regional groups could be regarded
as a “testing ground” for further cooperation between China and the EU.104
98Sofia Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries,
9 July 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1577455.shtml.
99The chapter does not go into detail on this particular topic, as it is outside its scope. In general, see
Kuo L, Kommenda N, What is China’s Belt and Road initiative?. The Guardian, 30 July 2018
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/nginteractive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-
road-explainer and Chatzky A, McBride J, China’s Massive Belt and Road initiative. Council on
Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, 21 May 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-
massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
100Kuo L, Kommenda N, What is China’s Belt and Road initiative? The Guardian, 30 July 2018
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-
silk-road-explainer and Chatzky A, McBride J, China’s Massive Belt and Road initiative. Council
on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, 21 May 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-
massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
101At EU level, it is worth recalling that the Council authorised the Commission to initiate
negotiations for a comprehensive EU-China investment agreement on 18 October 2013. The
most recent round of negotiations took place in Beijing in the week of 10 June 2019, as reported
in the factsheet European Commission, Overview of FTA and other trade negotiations, July 2019,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf. See also Liang Y, Chal-
lenges for the EU-China BIT negotiations. Columbia FDI Perspectives No 257, 29 July 2019, http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/publications/columbia-fdi-perspectives.
102Zuokui (2014), p. 31.
103Reported in Blanchard B, China hosts Visegrád group, calls them ‘dynamic force’ in
EU. Reuters—World News, 23 March 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-easteurope/
china-hosts-visegrad-group-calls-them-dynamic-force-in-eu-idUSKBN1GZ0A9.
104As discussed in Vetrovcova (2017), p. 74.
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4 Concluding Remarks
As members of the EU, and thus subject to the EU common commercial policy, V4
countries have had to face several challenges in the management of investment
regulation, with special regard to the question of the termination of intra-EU BITs—
in relation to which each V4 country seemed to have had its own approach, at least
until the Achmea judgment—and the regulation of economic interests with non-EU
countries, where instead the V4 group more often acts as a “solo” actor in promoting
economic cooperation with third economic partners, as in the case of Japan, Korea
and China. The V4 documents that have been examined in this chapter show that the
V4 countries have a deep interest in FDI promotion and protection. And indeed, the
V4 has played a proactive role in this regard, serving as a platform that has enabled
the countries to cooperate105 and also to express their concerns. In this respect, the
V4 can act as an amplifier in reinforcing national positions at EU level. Today, the
V4 has become a “recognised” voice in international fora: the Slovak Prime Minister
Robert Fico in 2012 highlighted that the V4 had “become a trademark known in
Europe, North Atlantic and beyond”.106 Also EU institutions tend to mention
increasingly the V4 countries in press releases that report some of their meetings.107
The ability to talk with one voice through the V4 platform has been labelled the “soft
power” of the V4;108 also in the field of FDI regulation, the V4 may use its soft
power to advocate sub-regional interests at EU level, as well as at the international
level, in order to influence future international investment law-making in a way that
takes (increasingly) into account (also) national concerns.
105See also the 2004 Guidelines on the Future Areas of Visegrád Cooperation, according to which
“future cooperation will be developed particularly: [. . .] Creating new possibilities and forms of
economic co-operation within the European Economic Area”. Guidelines on the Future Areas of
Visegrád Cooperation. Visegrád Group, 12 May 2004, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/cooperation/
guidelines-on-the-future-110412.
106Statement by H.E. Robert Fico Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic at GLOBSEC 2012,
Bratislava Global Security Forum, 12 April 2012, https://www.vlada.gov.sk//prejav-predsedu-
vlady-sr-roberta-fica-na-fore-globsec-v-anglickom-jazyku, emphasis added.
107See e.g. the following press releases of the European Commission: Future of cohesion policy:
Commissioner Hübner to address Visegrád group in Sopot, Poland. European Commission, Press
releases database, 1 July 2009, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1067_en.htm and Com-
missioner Hahn in Bratislava in the run-up to the Eastern Partnership 10th Anniversary. European
Commission, Press releases database, 3 May 2019, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-19-
2390_en.htm.
108Strážay T (2011) Visegrád - arrival, survival, revival. Selected V4 Bibliography. Visegrád
Group, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/bibliography/visegradarrival-survival-120628.
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Abstract By purchasing political risk insurance (PRI), investors can successfully
strengthen their position in the host state, allocating the burden of political risk to
third parties (insurance agencies). PRI is provided by international organisations,
such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and state-sponsored
insurance agencies, known as export credit agencies (ECAs) or public insurance
agencies. This chapter focuses on the insurance schemes of NEXI, Japan’s officially
sponsored ECA, which plays a dominant role in providing PRI to Japanese nationals.
The benefits of insurance agencies providing PRI schemes go beyond cash indem-
nification. PRI mechanisms include various policy requirements, operational condi-
tions, and performance standards that not only influence the engagement of the
insured investors, but also shape the regulatory authority of host governments and
affect local communities. PRI plays a particularly crucial role in the governance of
energy projects due to the complexity of this sector and its importance to states and
local communities. However, there are policy and operational implications of PRI
provision in the governance of energy projects with an adverse effect on local
communities. In response, most insurance agencies like NEXI, have taken measures
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for socially and environmentally responsible investments, requiring their insured
clients to comply with various social and environmental standards and establishing
surveillance mechanisms and in-house grievance facilities. Even if these practices
are moving in the right direction, their true functionality and effectiveness have not
yet been proved.
1 Introduction
Political risk insurance (PRI) typically provides coverage to foreign investments
against a host state’s harmful acts (political risks), such as currency inconvertibility,
expropriation, and political violence.1 PRI is provided by international organisa-
tions, such as the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
and state-sponsored insurance agencies, known as export credit agencies (ECAs) or
public insurance agencies.2 All major capital-exporting states support their investors
through ECAs or public insurance agencies. The largest state-sponsored insurance
agencies are the United States’ Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),
Germany’s PwC Deutsche Revision, and Japan’s Nippon Export and Investment
Insurance (NEXI).3
The benefits of insurance agencies providing PRI schemes go beyond cash
indemnification. ECAs are known as the “prominent victims” due to their function
of assuming political risks and deterring harmful host governments’ behaviour, so
that their insured clients can invest in risky markets.4 Moreover, it is not only the
insurance/guarantees that mitigate political risks (direct impact), but also the insur-
ance agencies’ market-leverage (indirect impact) that influence the governance of
investment projects. PRI mechanisms include various policy requirements, opera-
tional conditions, and performance standards that not only influence the engagement
of the insured investors, but also shape the regulatory authority of host governments
and affect local communities. PRI plays a particularly crucial role in the governance
of energy projects due to the complexity of this sector and its importance to states
and local communities.
However, there are general and specific implications of PRI provision in the
governance of energy projects. In general, international and national insurance
agencies may become indirect regulators of host states’ public policy, influencing
1Rowat (1992), pp. 103, 122.
2For an analysis of the various insurance schemes provided by international and national PRI
providers, see Rubins et al. (2020), chapter 3; Papanastasiou (2015), chapter 6; Salacuse (2013),
pp. 246–273; Ziegler and Gratton (2008), pp. 524–548.
3It is estimated that together these agencies represent over 80% of all outstanding national political
risk coverage, Rowat (1992), p. 119.
4Markwick (1998), p. 54; see also Shanks (1998), pp. 96–98.
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policyholders’ decisions on sensitive issues that are related to local communities’
concerns about the environment, human rights, local culture and domestic laws. In
specific, there are implications in the operation of PRI providers that are related to
the coverage of investment projects and the criteria that define the covered political
risks, the insured events and the check points for claim ascertainment.
Finally, in response to criticisms of certain PRI policies’ adverse effect on local
communities, almost all major insurance agencies have incorporated specific poli-
cies for socially and environmentally responsible investments, requiring their
insured clients to comply with various social and environmental standards and
establishing surveillance mechanisms and in-house grievance facilities.
This Chapter focuses on the insurance schemes of Japan’s sponsored insurance
agencies, (primarily NEXI and secondary the Japan Bank for International Cooper-
ation—JBIC). First, it explains their role in supporting Japanese investments over-
seas through the provision of PRI mechanisms with emphasis on energy projects.
After presenting the intense need to mitigate political risks in the energy sector and
the structure of the PRI industry and market, the specific instruments provided by
NEXI and how they address policy and operational implications of PRI provision are
analysed, especially in relation to responsible investment considerations.5
2 The Complexity of Energy Projects
Aside from addressing the implications of PRI policies in general, this chapter
focuses on the governance of energy projects, asserting that there is an intense
need to manage political risk in infrastructure and especially in the energy sector.
Political risks are more likely to occur in the energy sector than any other industry.6
The energy sector, by its nature, requires a high level of government involvement
and co-operation with the private sector, and, as a result, whenever intervention
causes problems for investors or their co-operation fails, the possibility of political
risks materialising significantly increases. Specifically, the high possibility of polit-
ical risk occurrence can be explained due to several peculiarities that are related to
the nature of the energy industry and the complexity of private sector participation in
energy investments.
5This chapter used sources and findings from Chapter 6 of the author’s book titled “The Legal
Protection of Foreign Investments against Political Risks. Japanese Business in the Asian Energy
Sector” (Quid Pro Books, New Orleans, 2015). The purpose of this chapter is to consider NEXI as
only an illustrative example of how most major public insurers incorporate specific standards and
mechanisms for dealing with environmental and social concerns. The findings of the chapter could
be addressed to all major insurance agencies which seem to adopt similar policies and practices
with NEXI.
6Energy investors rank political risk as the most challenging factor that affects their business. See
Van de Putte et al. (2012), pp. 284–299.
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The opening of infrastructure sectors to foreign investment has happened much
slower than in other industries.7 Although there is a variation in the degree of
openness, most developed or transitioning countries have now, for the most part,
introduced foreign entities into their infrastructure industries. However, infrastruc-
ture, and particularly the energy sector, is still characterised as the most restrictive
sector.8 Access to energy resources for foreign investors is either restricted or
severely limited, as most countries reserve them for their state-owned or domestic
corporations.9
Private investment in the energy sector differs from investments in any other
industry or services for various reasons. Firstly, the energy sector is characterised as
socially and politically “sensitive”.10 Issues such as the price of oil or electricity,
accessibility and quality of services, are always at the core of public interest and
politics. Any increase in prices or deterioration of services would be noticed
immediately by local communities and could result in social unrest. The operation
and provision of energy services can become an even more “delicate” situation when
foreign investors are involved, raising nationalistic concerns among the local soci-
eties.11 Resource nationalism is a big factor of political risk uncertainty for foreign
investors. It was named as the phenomenon according to which states confiscate or
nationalise international companies in the petroleum and extracting industry, and
this phenomenon is becoming more intense with resource scarcity, increasing energy
prices and geopolitical tensions.12
The energy sector is also regarded as “strategic”.13 It not only plays an indis-
pensable role in the economic growth and economic development of countries, but it
is also related to national security and public interest concerns,14 which is highly
significant in determining whether an expropriation is legitimate or not.15 Both
western and eastern economies consider energy as one of the most strategic sectors
(e.g. China,16 the Russian Federation,17 USA18). In addition, corporations operating
7The opening up started in the early 1990s, compared to other industries like the manufacturing
sector that started much earlier in the WWII period. UNCTAD (2008), pp. 152–153.
8Golub (2003) pp. 87, 100.
9Van de Putte et al. (2012), p. 284, Figure 6.
10The social dimension of infrastructure is stronger in sectors like water and energy services, see
UNCTAD (2008), pp. 161–162.
11Gomez-Ibanez (2007); see also Kessides (2004).
12Maniruzzaman (2009-2010), pp. 79–107.
13UNCTAD (2008), p. 155.
14UNCTAD (2008).
15One of the requirements for an expropriation to be lawful is the fulfilment of a “public purpose”.
16According to Chinese foreign investment policy, power generation and electricity distribution are
critical to the national economy. UNCTAD (2008), p. 155.
17The Russian Federation defines all natural monopolies as strategic sectors, UNCTAD (2008).
18The US Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 requires “investigation of any
transaction by a company controlled by foreign government, especially when it concerns critical
infrastructure”, UNCTAD (2008).
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in the hydrocarbons sector are well aware that geopolitics play a major role in this
business. Energy projects are particularly vulnerable to geopolitics.19 There is great
competition among western powers that are supporting their energy corporations
politically and financially to win bids for energy projects and obtain access to
hydrocarbons reserves, hence securing reliable natural resources for their economies.
This competition is even more complex with the involvement of China and other
new, large competitors from Asia.20 Political risks in energy projects increase even
more when natural resources are located in “weak governance zones” which are
territories highly disputed by neighbouring states or areas where the rule of law
cannot be enforced due to weak governance, political violence, civil wars and
corrupt local governments, or when the energy projects raise important environmen-
tal and human rights concerns.21
Another factor of energy projects’ complexity is the involvement of various
private actors. The private sector is increasingly needed for upstream and down-
stream projects, improvement, maintenance, and expansion of energy services. Most
countries, both developed and developing, either need private capital to bypass
public finance constraints, or look for private managerial skills in order to improve
efficiency and modernise their infrastructure services. On many occasions, multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) have proved successful at providing efficient and
affordable services to both developed and emerging economies.22
Moreover, the role of the state as the main actor in providing energy services has
changed and, to a great extent, governments’ activities have been replaced by the
private sector. It is quite often found that market mechanisms successfully provide
solutions to problematic public infrastructure services that were previously, tradi-
tionally and solely, operated by the state.23 One of the most popular forms of private
participation in energy projects is project finance. Especially in relation to hydro-
carbon exploration and exploitation, or power plant construction, there are usually a
variety of parties that are directly or indirectly involved with a particular investment
project.24
Some of the main parties are the sponsors of the project—usually construction
companies (contractors), financiers (such as big investment banks-lenders), suppliers
of machinery and equipment important for the project, operating-companies (oper-
ators), and many other subcontractors.25 The abovementioned companies are usually
19Hancock and Allison (2018).
20Sachs (2007), p. 82.
21MIGA (2007) Political Risk in the Extractive Industries: Voluntary Tools for Risk Mitigation
http://www.pricenter.com/documents/perspectivesmena.pdf, p. 1; Webb (2012), p. 395.
22ADB, Developing Best Practices for Promoting Private Sector Investment in Infrastructure (Asian
Development Bank, Manila, 2000).
23Multiple roles of government in infrastructure as: sponsor/investor, consumer/customer, rule-
maker/regulator and mediator/moderator, see Doh and Ramamutri (2003), pp. 337–353.
24Esty and Sesia (2010–2011).
25Babbar and Schuster (1998), pp. 23–32.
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private companies and each of them is responsible for undertaking a certain risk that
is connected to the nature of their contribution to the project. For instance, the banks
bear the financial risks, the contractors the construction risk, the suppliers the supply
risk. This follows the basic principle of project finance that “risks should be allocated
to the party that is best able to control the risk or influence its outcome”.26 Never-
theless, in an energy project, financing risks are eventually allocated according to the
will of the parties, as expressed in the contractual agreement. In developing coun-
tries, the state party [government or state-owned enterprise (SOE) purchaser] usually
assumes more risks, including some types of risk that they are not in the position to
control. In more developed countries where the investment climate is less uncertain,
host governments assume less risk.27 The empirical evidence for this has been
strongly supported by the “neo-liberal” and globalisation movements advocating
more liberalisation and privatisation of economic activities that are controlled by
governments, such as infrastructure industries.28
3 The PRI Industry
3.1 Main Types of Risks and Mitigation Instruments
Given the special nature of foreign investment projects, and particularly of those
related to the public infrastructure such as the energy sector, states and multilateral
investment-guarantee agencies have developed a mix of risk-mitigation instruments
that cover three broad types of risk: political risk, credit risk, and exchange-rate risk
(currency-devaluation risk).29 From a general point of view, only the first category is
related to the mitigation of political risk. However, what a political risk is, is not
always well defined. There are cases of non-commercial risks that can be also
covered by political risk mitigation instruments.30
Multilateral institutions and state-sponsored insurance agencies increasingly
focus on the mitigation of political risk in relation to the facilitation of infrastructure
project financing. The instruments that are used to mitigate political risk are typically
“termed partial risk guarantees” (PRGs), such as the guarantees provided by the
World Bank Group (WB Group) or PRI mechanisms used mainly by ECAs such as
NEXI. These political risk instruments mainly cover expropriation risks (“indirect”
26Hoffman (2008), p. 28.
27Babbar and Schuster (1998), p. 20.
28Classical economic theory has influenced and, to some extent, shaped international economic law,
supported by the “North”, the capital exporting countries. It has emphasised the free movement of
capital and the protection of investments through better standards of treatment and neutral arbitra-
tion tribunals for the resolution of investment disputes, Sornarajah (2004), pp. 51–57 and
pp. 293–294.
29UNCTAD (2008), p. 171.
30Matsukawa and Habeck (2007), pp. 1–5.
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or “creeping” expropriation was not usually covered),31 currency inconvertibility,
restriction on transfers of funds, war and civil disturbance risks.32
However, there has been an expansion in PRI coverage, which has come to
include breach of contract, arbitration award default, and various risks related to
project-specific undertakings. It is a significant shift from the traditional coverage of
political risk, moving towards the coverage of specific governmental obligations that
are contractually undertaken between the host state and the foreign promoter of an
infrastructure investment. Nevertheless, the borders between political and commer-
cial risks have become more blurred and, as has been said, “[o]ne may argue that
some of these risks fall in between traditional commercial risks and traditional
political risks”.33
3.2 The PRI Market
3.2.1 Historical Background
One of the first PRI investment programmes was initiated by the US Government
with the Marshall Plan in 1948. Its purpose was to encourage US investments
overseas under the reconstruction policy in post-war Europe. Thus, it was not until
the 1990s that the demand for PRI business increased significantly. After the fall of
the Soviet Union, and especially as a result of the open-market policy, globalisation
and liberalisation movements launched by the capital-exporting countries,
unforeseen business opportunities opened up for foreign investments in many
developing countries, especially in the areas of natural resources and energy. This
increased the demand for PRI tools.34 However, the 11 September 2001 terrorist
attack in the United States, the Argentine financial crisis,35 and the global financial
crisis that was induced by the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and the US subprime
mortgage crisis in 2008 affected the PRI industry significantly, changing the way
investors and insurers assume political risks. The possibility of suffering extreme
losses due to terrorism, but also the rising uncertainty of the global financial crisis
with its potential sovereign and corporate defaults, reinforced the debate as to
whether, with such unpredictable situations, the PRI market should be allowed to
31
“Creeping expropriation” or “indirect expropriation” are also replaced by the term “de facto
expropriation”. Creeping expropriation means that the host state has taken a series of measures with
a cumulative expropriatory effect, while indirectly emphasising the fact that the investor’s formal or
nominal title to the asset was not actually affected, see Shanks (1986), pp. 417 and 424.
32MIGA (2011), p. 56.
33Matsukawa and Habeck (2007), p. 5.
34MIGA (2010), pp. 54–55.
35Standard & Poor’s (2002) The Argentine Crisis: A Chronology of Events after the Sovereign
Default http://www.standardandpoors.com/europe/francais/Fr_news/Argentine-Chronology-of-
Events_12-04-02.html.
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continue on the same scale, or whether it should alter its policy on political risk
coverage.
To date, the PRI market, or political risk guarantee market,36 consists of two
broad categories: guarantees for export or trade credit and investment insurance.
Τhis chapter, referring to the coverage of political risk in relation to overseas
investment projects, focuses solely on the role of investment insurance.37 However,
potential protection of a foreign investment could also be offered by combining
guarantees for political risk provided by export credit or trade tools. There are certain
instruments that cover losses to exporters or lenders financing projects tied to the
export of goods and services (trade coverage). For example, regarding investments
in infrastructure, the export credit guarantees can cover losses due to political risk for
services that are connected to engineering, procurement and construction (EPC)
contracts. In addition, sovereign and corporate debt risk can be covered regardless of
whether the reason for the default is commercial or political.38
3.2.2 PRI Providers
As mentioned above, the PRI market consists of multilateral and public (national)
insurers and a significant number of private enterprises. The multilateral agencies
that provide risk mitigation instruments are mainly multilateral development
banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank Group, the Asia Development Bank
(ADB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IrADB) and the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Additionally, there are some multi-
lateral agencies that specialise in providing political risk guarantees, such as the
African Trade Insurance Agency, the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation,
the Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit, and the
most important, MIGA, which belongs to the WB Group.39
As far as the public or national agencies are concerned, they are generally
bilateral development agencies and ECAs. ECAs are the most important type of
PRI provider, existing in almost all of the big capital-exporting countries, as well as
in the recently transitioning economies, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa (BRICS), and in some other less powerful economies. ECAs can be
considered a large category of national agencies including export-import banks,
export credit guarantee agencies and investment insurance agencies.40 Their
36As mentioned before, they are the same but their names change depending on the provider: ‘PRI’
is used by NEXI and ‘political risk guarantees’ is used by MIGA.
37However, the area between traditional investment and export credit insurance has become blurred,
see Stephens (1998), pp. 148–168.
38Matsukawa and Habeck (2007), p. 4.
39MIGA (2011), p. 55.
40Matsukawa and Habeck (2007), p. 9. For a list of the major bilateral agencies and their risk
mitigation instruments, MIGA (2011), appendix B2, pp. 50–84.
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organisational structures vary depending on their particular country’s policies. For
example, in the United Kingdom it is part of the government, in Germany and France
they are private entities, and in Japan and the United States, ECAs are considered to
be autonomous public agencies and thus not absolutely independent from public
administration. ECAs are subject to international regulation by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organisa-
tion (WTO). Most of the ECAs provide guarantees for both political and commercial
risks, though it has been questioned whether their role allows them to provide long-
term commercial risk insurance for infrastructure project-financing.41 Finally, even
if the objectives of bilateral agencies differ from those of multinational organisations
(they pursue more nationalistic purposes),42 their activities are often complementary
in providing guarantees for many transactions related to energy project financing.43
3.3 Japan’s PRI-Agencies: NEXI in Cooperation with JBIC
3.3.1 NEXI: Background
One of the largest state-sponsored insurance agencies internationally is NEXI,44
which, along with the lending and guarantee function of JBIC, is Japan’s export
credit agency and public insurer, furnishing a variety of investment-related services
for Japanese investors. Japan’s investment insurance system was established in 1950
to support Japanese exports by providing guarantees against political risks such as
war, currency controls and expropriation. The system was managed by the prede-
cessor of NEXI, the Export-Import Insurance Division (EID) that was incorporated
into the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). In April 2001, NEXI was
established as an incorporated administrative agency, taking over the ministry-
managed service and acquiring administrative and operational autonomy. On
1 April 2017, NEXI was transferred to a 100% government-owned special stock
company, strengthening its ties with the government, so as to better support public
policy in NEXI’s business.45 Thus, NEXI continues to function under the auspices of
METI, which provides NEXI with its capital and reinsures insurance agreements
underwritten by NEXI. As of 1 April 2019, NEXI’s capital budget is JPY169.4
billion (100% state-owned) and 195 officers are employed there.46
41Short (2001), p. 1371.
42ECAs usually serve their countries’ national interests whereas MDBs do not tie their programmes
to the nationality of exporters or investors, see Hoffman (2008), p. 295.
43, p. 73 and see also Matsukawa and Habeck (2007), p. 10; Moran (1998), p. 140.
44NEXI website https://www.nexi.go.jp/en/index.html.
45NEXI (2017) Annual Report FY 2016, p. 7.
46See NEXI’s Profile https://www.nexi.go.jp/en/corporate/profile.html.
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Since May 1970, NEXI has been a member of the Berne Union (the International
Union of Credit and Investment Insurers), which is a forum where ECAs from
various countries exchange information on common issues of export credit and
investment insurance. The Berne Union announced in October 2008 a new set of
Guiding Principles that mandate member-agencies to adopt a uniform policy about
how to conduct investment insurance in general. NEXI is also a member of the Paris
Club, an informal international group that provides solutions to sovereign debt
problems between debtor and creditor countries. Finally, NEXI is a member of the
OECD’s working party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, signing the
Agreement on Officially Supported Export Credits called the OECD Consensus.47
The OECD working party issues recommendations in an effort to shape ECAs’
behaviour towards export credit and investment insurance as well as issues related to
fair competition,48 bribery, corruption, and environmental protection.49
NEXI’s mission is to facilitate the promotion of Japanese trade and investment by
mitigating political and commercial risks in export and overseas investments through
PRI provision.50 NEXI provides insurance for investments and exports in both
developing and developed countries. NEXI often operates in conjunction with
other programmes, provided by JBIC,51 or development programmes offered by
the Japan Investment and Cooperation Agency (JICA). NEXI is especially active in
providing insurance for large investment projects in several countries’ public infra-
structure, such as for megaprojects in the energy sector sponsored by Japanese
private entities. As it is stated in the medium-term business plan (FY2019–
FY2021), the promotion of infrastructure exports by Japanese companies and the
support to businesses that are related to infrastructure development programmes
overseas are primary objectives of NEXI in contributing to Japan’s efforts to
implement its national policies.52
NEXI has played a crucial role in protecting overseas investments against polit-
ical risk. Until today, the majority of large Japanese corporations have not been
willing to invest abroad without using NEXI’s PRI mechanisms. When it comes to
47Hoffman (2008), p. 296.
48Each of the member countries in the OECD Consensus has to limit export credit to no more than
85% of the contract value in order to protect competition from distortion, Hoffman (2008).
49Hoffman (2008). However, with regards to project financing, the OECD Consensus was amended
in 1998, allowing member-countries’ ECAs to support projects financed on a limited recourse basis
without any limitation. This exception is very important for foreign investments in the power sector,
as most of the project-financing mechanisms are related to infrastructure projects.
50Article 4 of Japan’s Trade and Investment Insurance Act of March 1950 (No. 67/1950) and the
Amendment Act of December 1999.
51JBIC also provides some political risk guarantees, but it mainly functions as a creditor of Japanese
investments with NEXI being the main insurer providing PRI for loans and equity for overseas
investment.
52NEXI (2018) Annual Report FY 2017, p. 60.
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the protection of overseas investments against political risk, the reliance of Japanese
corporations on NEXI is such, that it is conceived as a “last resort” mechanism.53
3.3.2 JBIC: Background
JBIC is Japan’s bilateral agency that provides debt financing to Japanese investors. It
was organised in 1999 as a financial institution of the Japanese Government, but it
has existed much longer, since 1950, when its predecessor, the Export-Import Bank
of Japan, was established.54 On 1 October 2008, JBIC became the international wing
of the Japan Finance Corporation (JFC), continuing to use its name for its interna-
tional finance operations and, on 1 April 2012, JBIC was established in accordance
with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation Act (JBIC Act), wholly owned by
the Japanese Government.55 One of JBIC’s missions, similarly to NEXI, is the
promotion of Japanese investors’ “overseas development and acquisition of strate-
gically important natural resources to Japan”, as well as “maintaining and improving
the international competitiveness of Japanese industries”.56
JBIC is the main financing arm of Japan’s public borrowing. Its principal
operation is to provide financial assistance including loans, bonds, and concession-
ary long-term and low-interest funds. JBIC offers limited guarantees that cover loans
and bonds but not equity like NEXI does. It mainly functions as a creditor of
Japanese investments and not as an insurer, in order to avoid “operation-
overlapping” with NEXI. Actually, JBIC’s main role is lending operations. It can
provide up to 60% of the total lending that is needed in each case. The remaining
40% is covered by commercial banks (co-financiers) for which political risk is
insured by NEXI. Consequently, the practical contribution of agencies such as
JBIC and NEXI is that private investors can achieve much better terms in borrowing
funds from commercial markets. Without the guarantees of JBIC and NEXI, the
maturity of loans offered by the markets cannot exceed a period of five, or maximum
seven, years, which is very short considering that most energy-financing cases have a
project-life of a period between ten to fifteen years. With JBIC-NEXI guarantees, the
maturity of loans can be extended to at least ten years and, if required, to a longer
period. JBIC provides financing tools such as overseas investment loans (OIL),
overseas untied loans (OUL) and buyer’s credit (BC),57 whose political risks are
covered by NEXI’s overseas investment insurance (OII), overseas untied loan
53NEXI (2018) Annual Report FY 2017.
54Japan’s Export Import Bank Law of 1950.
55JBIC, Annual Report FY 2018 (Japan Bank for International Cooperation, 2019), p. 3.
56JBIC, Annual Report FY 2018 (Japan Bank for International Cooperation, 2019), p. 101. When
projects contribute to these national policies, JBIC may even apply special interest rates on
borrowings. See also, JBIC Profile, Role and Function https://www.jbic.go.jp/ja/about/role-
function/images/jbic-brochure-english.pdf, pp. 2–3.
57See JBIC Profile, Role and Function https://www.jbic.go.jp/ja/about/role-function/images/jbic-
brochure-english.pdf.
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insurance (OULI), and buyer’s credit insurance (BCI) respectively. Therefore, NEXI
is the main insurer of Japanese investors with JBIC only playing a supplementary
role by providing some limited political risk guarantees and focusing mainly on
lending operations.
4 PRI Policy Implications
4.1 In General
Examining the overall function of PRI mechanisms, there is a “grey-zone” about the
political risk notion and how the PRI international or national agencies perceive
it. First, the distinction between political and commercial risks is blurred, mainly
because it is difficult to determine political risk. For example, it is not easy to
distinguish whether a default in the payment by a government-operated energy
utility, or a failure to deliver services, is due to political or commercial reasons.58
In addition, political risks emanate from the unpredictable behaviour (action or
inaction) of host governments interfering with a foreign investor’s business and
negatively influencing its profit.59 Such uncertainty arising from the host govern-
ment’s change of behaviour is exactly what political risk is all about.60 However, this
definition is problematic. Change of governmental behaviour towards private invest-
ments may often be justified as an exercise of regulatory authority, a legitimate
intervention in pursuit of public policies or to protect local communities’ interests.
Nevertheless, as Professor Celine Tan indicates, most PRI providers are more
concerned with the financial impact of a governmental intervention than with its
reasons; PRI agencies are less concerned about why a host government changes its
behaviour towards a foreign investment, than with how such change “affects the
financial viability of the project in question”.61 In particular, there is no solid
evidence that PRI agencies properly investigate the insured investor’s behaviour
with respect to allegations of collusion with the host government, or the effect of an
insured project on local communities’ concerns about the environment, the local
58On commercial risk and commercial risk management, see Boyce (2003).
59Rubins et al. (2020), paras 1.01–1.07.
60Most international investment agreements are driven by the needs of the capital exporting
countries which impose on their counter-parties (host states) rules and conditions of free entry
into specific sectors and require host states to refrain from intervening in the operation of foreign
investors, thus enhancing regulatory certainty. This phenomenon has been described as the “polit-
ical economy of certainty”, see Schneiderman (2008), pp. 205–206.
61Tan (2015), pp. 179–180.
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culture, labour rights, human rights, and violation of domestic laws.62 On the
contrary, most PRI policies refer to the protection of the insured investors or projects
against general acts of ill governance by host governments, without distinguishing
whether these acts are taken in favour of local communities’ interests that compete
with the insured investor’s interests.63
In general, PRI policies play a major role in determining both host governments’
and foreign investors’ behaviour. PRI providers, especially international agencies
like MIGA,64 or national credit and insurance providers such as JBIC and NEXI
from big capital-exporting countries like Japan, are important actors for the success-
ful implementation of megaprojects in the energy sector. These projects often need
diplomatic support from the investor’s home country to secure agreements with host
states, but also credit and investment insurance in order to minimise risks and secure
better terms of financing from international financial institutions and private banks.
Such support is usually given when a well-established PRI provider is involved in
the project through an insurance contract with the foreign investor. For this reason,
foreign investors are ready to accept all required conditions imposed by public
insurers’ operational policies, contractual terms and underwriting criteria. In that
sense, insurers may not only affect the design of the investment project, but also the
relationships between the insured investor and the host government. National PRI
providers, exercising the leverage of their home state’s economic diplomacy, may
often indirectly influence host governments to secure better terms and treatment for
their insured investors.65 Public insurers may become “covert regulators” that have
an impact on the wider public policy of the host government’s policyholders,
through their monitoring mechanisms of the contractual agreement and by framing
the risks and responsibilities between the parties.66
In particular, subrogation clauses and the PRI due diligence framework influence
the host states’ behaviour towards the insured investor, even if they are third parties
to PRI contracts. PRI providers require the insured investor to take into consideration
social and environmental criteria in order to cover the investment project. But at the
same time, PRI policies determine the allocation of risks and responsibilities
between the insured investor and the host state. As explained below, what PRI
62For example, it was reported by the World Bank’s Compliance Advisor and Ombudsman (CAO)
in its audit relating to MIGA’s involvement in the Dilukushi copper and silver mine in Congo, that
MIGA used its social and environmental due diligence framework to inspect the likelihood of future
claims by the insured client, rather than to assess the possibility of the insured project’s adverse
impact on local communities, see CAO (2005), CAO Audit of MIGA’s Due Diligence of the
Dikulushi Copper-Silver Mining Project in the Democratic. Republic of the Congo: Final Report,
pp. i–ii. 7–8).
63Moody (2005), pp. 6–7.
64For a description of the organisation’s role, its rules and insurance schemes, see
Protopsaltis (2014).
65Heimer (2002), pp. 117–129.
66Heimer (2002), p. 119.
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providers require from the insured investor is closely related to the host state’s
regulatory authority.
Capital exporting states tend to insert a subrogation clause into their international
investment agreements.67 According to the subrogation clause, the foreign investor’s
home state has the right to take over claims of its own investor that is compensated
through a PRI arrangement.68 For example, after indemnifying the investor, NEXI
substitutes the investor in all its legal rights and claims against the host government
through subrogation. For this reason, before compensation is paid, NEXI requires an
assignment to itself of all the investor’s rights, titles, and interests. If the host state
has not obtained a bilateral investment treaty with Japan, there is a theoretical
possibility that the host state will not recognise NEXI’s subrogation right, though
such possibility is considered as a rare case scenario. Nevertheless, some bilateral
ECAs and multilateral agencies offer insurance only to those investments that are
sited in countries that have obtained investment treaties with the investors’ home
countries.
In conclusion, the possibility of the home state (through its public insurer) taking
over its own investor’s rights could potentially prevent host states from taking any
regulatory or administrative measures.69 When host states are not willing to make
any administrative intervention or regulatory change that may affect an insured
energy investment (even when such change would serve public interests), this has
an adverse impact on host states’ regulatory sovereignty, resulting in regulatory
chill.
4.2 Operational Implications: NEXI’s PRI Instruments
4.2.1 In General
In order to better understand how a PRI policy is implemented and its implications in
the governance of energy projects, it is best to examine NEXI’s PRI instruments and
how they are used in NEXI’s operations. NEXI offers insurance for loans, equity
investments, assets and rights, and any other investment structure that is subject to
long-term exposure to political risk. As mentioned above, NEXI’s coverage is
related to trade and investment and is provided for protection against both political
and commercial risks.
Among the various PRI instruments that NEXI offers, the most important insur-
ance type suitable for investment in energy projects is OII and its specification, the
Investment and Loan Insurance for Natural Resources and Energy. NEXI offers this
67Similarly, Japan has included a subrogation clause in most of its economic partnership agreements
(EPAs), see Papanastasiou (2015), Chapter 5.
68Konrad (2013), pp. 31–32. See also Rubins et al. (2020), para. 3.134.
69Tan (2015), pp. 184–190.
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type of insurance as a hedge against both political and commercial risks. It covers
overseas investment for capital subscription or equity, for acquisition of business
rights and titles (real property, equipment, mining rights, licences, concession etc.)
and it even protects reinvestments in a third country. This last function of insurance
for reinvestment via an investment recipient is a unique type of investment insurance
provided by NEXI. It increases the protection provided to the Japanese subsidiary in
a host country by expanding the insurance to investments made in a third country
(the Japanese subsidiary performs direct business without establishing its own
subsidiary in the third country), and guarantees against losses suffered due to
political risk not only in the host country, but also in the third country. NEXI
provides supplementary contracts to address these risks, subject to special agree-
ment.70 However, there are some operational implications that affect the governance
of energy projects. These implications are related to the clarification of political risks
covered by NEXI, the events that are required by the agency’s criteria to trigger
political risk insurance and the list of check-points for claim ascertainment.
4.2.2 Covered Political Risks
Political risks covered by NEXI’s OII include expropriation and infringement of
rights, war, political violence or civil disturbance, currency inconvertibility and
non-transfer of funds, as well as natural disasters ( force majeure risk).71 In addition
to these risks, OII covers some commercial risks such as insolvency of debtor and
breach of contract by the other party which, under certain conditions, could be
considered to be political risks as well.72
In particular, with regard to an expropriation case, OII makes NEXI liable to
indemnify for losses suffered by the insured investor that result from expropriation
(direct and indirect) of stocks and equities caused by the host government’s inter-
ference, actions, or inaction, of central or local public entities, or any similar entity
such as an SOE or public utilities, e.g. an electric utility.73 Thus, in case a host
government claims that its actions are legitimate regulations, NEXI cannot compen-
sate for the damage that the insured suffered unless an arbitration award has been
issued. Similarly, in the case of an infringement of rights, investors are protected
from deprivation of important rights and assets such as titles of real estate, licences,
or any other right that is important in carrying out operations, e.g. power purchase
70NEXI (2009) NEXI Business Guide, Overseas Investment Insurance section, p. 8.
71Article 2 (16) item 1 of the Trade and Investment Insurance Act No. 67 of 1950.
72For example, if the other party to the investment contract is the host government (central or local,
public agencies or SOEs), which is usually the case in energy investments, any indemnity for losses
suffered due to the government’s breach of contract or due to insolvency caused by the govern-
ment’s political interference could be considered to be a PRI tool, provided that a supplementary
contract between NEXI and the insured investor is signed.
73NEXI, Policy Conditions for Overseas Investment Insurance, Partial Amendment of 14 March
2007, Chapter 2, Article 2, p. 1.
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agreement in the supply of electricity (expropriation of rights) and equipment, or raw
materials, etc. (expropriation of mobile assets).74 Therefore, NEXI will not
insure against losses due to an infringement of rights when a government’s acts
are in accordance with domestic or international law. Finally, the change of law or
regulation risk is also mitigated by OII, which covers losses that result from the
imposition of new laws. In this case, the new law or regulation should be unfair and
discriminatory or against an international treaty and cause losses.
Under these conditions, NEXI’s PRI instruments require a governmental measure
to be discriminatory in order to cover losses suffered by the insured investor. This
exclusion of non-discriminatory measures of general application from insurance cov-
erage is followed by most international and national insurers’ policy.75 However, in
the case of energy investments it is quite difficult to distinguish between a
non-discriminatory governmental measure and an indirect or creeping expropriation.
First, because the host state’s regulatory measures usually apply to all companies
involved in the industry. For example, a governmental decision about an electricity
tariff adjustment or energy prices affects all market participants.76 Second, it may be
impossible to determine whether a government’s measure constitutes discrimination,
as energy services are, for most states, a regulated monopoly. In such a case, the
foreign investor may be the only actor operating in one sector (usually that is the case
for electricity or gas networks, where a single transmission or electricity utility
provides services), so there is no other actor in the industry against whom to compare
the treatment of the alleged measure. Therefore, with no comparison it is difficult to
prove whether an act or omission by the host government that has an adverse effect
on foreign investment constitutes an indirect expropriation or a non-discriminatory
measure of general regulatory application.77
4.2.3 Insured Events
According to NEXI’s policy, in order for the abovementioned political risks to be
covered, there are certain events which need to occur. These events are in some cases
ambiguous. For example, NEXI requires, among others, the investor’s inability to
operate as a result of political risk materialisation (e.g. breach of contract, infringe-
ment of rights, war risk, etc.). Thus, the suspension of operation cannot be partial,
but rather there needs to be a full halt in operation. This may cause uncertainty in
74NEXI, Policy Conditions, p. 2.
75Kantor (2015), p. 179.
76For example, that was the case in the CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina arbitrations,
where the tribunals concluded that Argentina’s conduct was non-discriminatory because it applied
an across-the-board regulatory change (currency obligations and tariff adjustments) to all corpora-
tions in the gas transmission industry, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/8, Award, paras 468–469 (12 May 2005). LG&E Energy Corp et al v. Argentina,
ICSID Case No ARB/02/01, Decision on Liability, paras 146–148 (3 October 2006).
77Kantor (2015), pp. 179–180.
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cases of complicated projects such as energy investments which consist of various
kinds of operations (e.g. power plant operation, fuel supply operation, transmission
through the grid, etc.) and it raises questions about whether a claim for insurance is
valid when a partial halt of one kind of operation causes substantial damage. In this
case, the insured investor will not be able to satisfy any claim for insurance of losses
suffered due to breach of contract, and NEXI will not indemnify the losses if the
insured company continues the operation even partially. According to NEXI’s
policy, the covered event can only be “bankruptcy”, full “inability to operate”, or
full suspension of operation for more than three months.78
4.2.4 Claim Ascertainment
Even when the covered events occur, that does not mean that NEXI will automat-
ically satisfy the insured client’s claims. Another implication of almost all ECAs’
operations is related to “check points for claim ascertainment”. NEXI has developed
a list of check-points for claim ascertainment in order to examine whether the
insured’s claim in each case of the covered political risks is valid or not. ECAs
need evidence of the impact on the investment’s economic interests and operation
caused by the insured event, requiring a causal analysis between the event and the
damage suffered. However, the foreign investor is not always in a position to prove
the causality of damages when the events (e.g. government actions or inaction) are
indirectly connected with its damage, such as in the case of creeping expropriation or
when the overall result of the government’s actions only becomes apparent much
later. Several causes may coexist at the same time, for example a slump in electricity
sales (commercial market risk) and the host government’s unilateral increase of the
agreed fuel price supplied to the investor’s power company (breach of contract risk
or regulatory risk). Both of these causes have an adverse effect on the company’s
operation, but only the second can be an insured political risk covered by NEXI’s
insurance.
As regards expropriation, NEXI will only indemnify the insured for the losses
that are related to its equity share or for the seizure of its specific right when the
investment company is a joint venture among many shareholders. As for investments
in the energy sector, project-financing is the standard form of investment. For
example, power project finance is implemented through a special purpose vehicle
(SPV), a joint-venture company consisting of a multi-level group of shareholders,
such as sponsors, lenders, operators, EPC contractors, suppliers, and many others. In
such a complicated mix of shareholders, NEXI needs to identify the extent of the
insured’s right to the equity or assets of the particular investment, something that is
not an easy task.
78NEXI (2009) NEXI Introduction Brochure, p. 16.
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4.3 PRI Policy Implications and Responsible Investments
Following criticisms about PRI approaches to environmental protection, human
rights, and concerns about the violation of domestic laws, and in response to
allegations of the adverse effect of insured projects on local communities, most
international and public insurers have addressed policies for responsible invest-
ments. The term responsible investment implies an effort by the international
community to integrate into international investment law policies that take into
consideration non-investment related factors, such as protection of the environment
and human rights concerns. In this vein, some recent international investment
treaties require responsible business conduct, including safeguards for the promotion
of sustainable development, the protection of labour rights and the environment, the
provision of anti-corruption policies and corporate social responsibility.79
According to these policies, PRI providers require their prospective clients to
comply with various social and environmental standards in order to insure their
investment against political risks. For example, MIGA was the first insurance
provider to adopt performance standards in eight areas of business practice,80
following up from national providers, most notably OPIC.81 Similarly, NEXI has
issued the Guidelines on Environmental and Social Considerations in Trade Insur-
ance (Guidelines), which allow it to examine whether the potential insured project
takes into account the environmental and social considerations required by the
Guidelines.82 Energy investment projects are likely to have a significant adverse
environmental and social impact and, therefore, they are classified into Category A
in NEXI’s screening process, which means that the project-sponsor needs to comply
with stricter standards.
In addition, the majority of national PRI agencies have incorporated monitoring
instruments in order to assess the insured projects’ performance and to verify
79Cotula L, ‘Raising the Bar on Responsible Investment: What Role for Investment Treaties?’, IIED
Briefing (March 2018), https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17454IIED.pdf. See also Webb (2012)
pp. 394–415.
80The first performance standard is named as “assessment and management of environmental and
social risks and impacts”, see MIGA (2013) Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability
www.miga.org/documents/Policy_Environmental_Social_Sustainability.pdf, cited in Tan
(2015), p. 187.
81OPIC (2010) OPIC: Environmental and Social Policy Statement www.opic.gov/sites/default/
files/consolidated_esps.pdf, cited in Tan (2015), p. 187.
82NEXI’s Guidelines are identical with JBIC’s Guidelines (see JBIC Guidelines for Confirmation of
Environmental and Social Considerations https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/business-areas/environment/
confirm.html); NEXI’s Guidelines were established taking into account the Common Approaches at
OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees. In addition, NEXI also uses
standards established by other international organisations, such as the World Bank Safeguard
Policies or International Finance Corporation (IFC), which are similar to those used by MIGA.
See ΝΕΧI (2017) Guidelines on Environmental and Social Considerations in Trade Insurance, p. 4
and Exhibit 1: Environmental and Social Considerations Required of Covered Projects https://
www.nexi.go.jp/en/environment/pdf/ins_kankyou_gl-e.pdf, pp. 8–10.
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investors’ compliance with the agency’s social and environmental standards
throughout the life-cycle of the insured projects. Some PRI providers like MIGA,
require their insured investors to establish consultative methods with local commu-
nities and all other concerned parties and to envisage the creation of grievance
procedures in order to receive complaints from affected communities.83
NEXI confirms the appropriateness of environmental and social considerations in
three stages: screening, social and environmental review, and assurance of environ-
mental and social considerations (post-commitment). NEXI uses a screening pro-
cess, according to which it implements a detailed review of each project. It reviews
whether the potential insured client adopts appropriate environmental and social
practices, “so as to prevent or mitigate potential impacts on environment” including
“social issues such as involuntary resettlement and respect for the human rights of
indigenous peoples”.84 NEXI includes the result of its assessment on the project’s
environmental and social considerations in its conclusion of an insurance contract,
and encourages the project sponsors to take more measures in case there is a high risk
of adverse impact on local communities and the environment.85 If the measures
taken are insufficient, NEXI may refuse to conclude the insurance contract.86 In
concluding its assessment process and issuing the insurance contract, NEXI also
carries out project reviews requiring the insured client to submit an environmental
and social monitoring report once a year87 and the results of public consultations
with all relevant parties.88 Within the limits of commercial confidentiality, NEXI
will disclose the project information in Japanese and English on NEXI’s website and
invite any third party that is adversely affected by the insured project to raise its
objections.89
However, there are limitations on the monitoring of the insured investors’
compliance with the social and environmental standards established by the insurance
agencies. The most important weakness is the irregularity of the monitoring process
that is observed in public insurers’ practice. The mechanism for monitoring insured
projects and their compliance with contractual obligations is inadequate. For exam-
ple, NEXI’s Guidelines do not make any reference to a specific monitoring mech-
anism. NEXI relies on information provided by the clients based on the monitoring
83See MIGA (2013) Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability www.miga.org/documents/
Policy_Environmental_Social_Sustainability.pdf, pp. v–vii, cited in Tan (2015), p. 187.
84ΝΕΧI (2017) Guidelines on Environmental and Social Considerations in Trade Insurance https://
www.nexi.go.jp/en/environment/pdf/ins_kankyou_gl-e.pdf, p. 4 and pp. 8–10.
85ΝΕΧI (2017) Guidelines on Environmental and Social Considerations in Trade Insurance,
NEXI’s decisions are mainly based on the applicant’s environmental and social impact assessment
(ESIA) reports.
86ΝΕΧI (2017) Guidelines on Environmental and Social Considerations in Trade Insurance, p. 6.
87ΝΕΧI (2017) Guidelines on Environmental and Social Considerations in Trade Insurance, p. 6
and Exhibit 1: Environmental and Social Considerations Required of Covered Projects, pp. 8–10.
88ΝΕΧI (2017) Guidelines on Environmental and Social Considerations in Trade Insurance,
pp. 9–10 and Exhibit 2.
89ΝΕΧI (2017) Guidelines on Environmental and Social Considerations in Trade Insurance, p. 7.
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that they conduct themselves and mainly confirms the monitoring results through
document reviews.90 Moreover, there is no specific provision for on-site inspections
of projects.
Finally, MIGA and some public insurers have created in-house public complaints
facilities or an ombudsman, operating independently of the agency’s direction.91
Local communities, or any affected individual, may directly address its complaints
to these facilities about the insured projects’ adverse social and environmental
impact. Similarly, NEXI has incorporated the Objection Procedures on Environmen-
tal Guidelines, according to which a third-party that is affected by the insured project
can request from NEXI to investigate its complaints.92 For the investigation of the
complaints, NEXI appoints an ad hoc organ (up to two examiners) that is under the
direct control of NEXI’s chairman, but works independently from the section in
charge of the underwriting business.93
Nevertheless, NEXI’s objection procedures reveal that the examiners’ case-by-
case function does not constitute a permanent complaints facility similar to those
established by the WB Group, which are in-house well-established offices with
human and financial resources, operating independently of the agency’s direction
and vetted with more powers and additional functions, such as audits and
mediation.94
In general, there are similar limitations where most national PRI providers are
concerned. Moreover, all international and public insurers are only eligible to
monitor the compliance of the insured projects with regards to the violation of
their agency’s internal rules, guidelines and standards, but they are not in a position
to examine violations of international law which is more inclusive and protective for
local communities.95 However, their operation is considered far more adequate
compared to new public insurers from emerging economies or private providers. It
has been reported that private insurers do not include any structure of a compliance
and grievance mechanism, considering such an approach as unappealing to
90NEXI, What is the purpose of monitoring? How will you respond to the results of monitoring?
https://www.nexi.go.jp/en/environment/faq/002406.html.
91For example, the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) is an independent facility established
for the WB Group. It is responsible for evaluating IFC’s and MIGA’s compliance with social and
environmental standards and for addressing complaints regarding any adverse impact of their
operations. OPIC’s Office of Accountability (OA) has a similar function, CAO (2014) CAO
Operational Guidelines, p. 4. See also, OPIC (2014) Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Office of Accountability: Operational Guidelines Handbook for Problem-Solving and Compliance
Review Services, p. 3, section 3.1 cited in Tan (2015), p. 188.
92NEXI (2017) Objection Procedures on Environmental Guidelines https://www.nexi.go.jp/en/
environment/pdf/08b_1.pdf.
93NEXI (2017) Objection Procedures on Environmental Guidelines https://www.nexi.go.jp/en/
environment/pdf/08b_1.pdf, Articles 17–23.
94NEXI (2017) Objection Procedures on Environmental Guidelines https://www.nexi.go.jp/en/
environment/pdf/08b_1.pdf, Article 21, which provides that the Examiner serves for a two-year
term and may be re-appointed once.
95Tan (2015), p. 189.
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investors, which prefer to avoid additional screening, and as a competitive advantage
over public insurers.96
5 Conclusion
With regard to the high possibility of political risks occurring in the energy sector,
national and multilateral agencies perform the most crucial task in the protection of
energy investments through the provision of various PRI schemes. By purchasing
PRI, investors can successfully strengthen their position in the host state by allocat-
ing the burden of political risk to third parties (ECAs) that play the role of “prom-
inent victims”.
In the case of Japanese energy investments, NEXI, Japan’s officially sponsored
ECA, plays a dominant role in providing PRI to Japanese nationals, while JBIC is
the main public financier of Japanese investments. Similarly, MIGA of the WB
Group has the most important role among multilateral agencies in guaranteeing
foreign investments made in developing countries against political risks.
NEXI has a unique position in supporting Japanese energy investments by
applying tailor-made criteria. NEXI (including JBIC’s financing support) has in
principle a “nation-based”97 purpose of supporting the economic and industrial
policy of the Japanese Government by promoting and securing Japanese investment
projects overseas. Multilateral agencies like MIGA apply more general criteria in
order to decide which projects are eligible to receive PRI.98 As regards PRI schemes,
both NEXI and MIGA have deployed a comprehensive set of instruments covering
several contingencies of a government’s default on its obligations towards its
counterparty.
Due to several implications of PRI policies in the governance of energy invest-
ments, investors need to consider that signing an insurance contract does not mean
eliminating all cases of political risk they may face during a long-term investment
project in a foreign country. Especially in relation to energy project financing, a more
tailor-made and commercialised approach is required by insurance agencies. More-
over, the effectiveness of PRI protection against political risk not only depends on
the insurance policy, but also to a large extent, on the specific contractual arrange-
ment between the investor and the host state or its agencies.
Moreover, subrogation clauses and surveillance instruments constitute an opera-
tional and regulatory framework of PRI providers that influences the behaviour of
96Gordon (2008), p. 104.
97A term borrowed from the non-political concept of “economic nationalism” which is based on the
idea of countries supporting their national industries and products at any cost and protecting them
against “open competition”.
98Some of these criteria are related to host states’ economic development, privatisation policies,
open markets and non-distortion of competition.
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host governments towards both the insured investor and their own people. In
response, insurance agencies have taken measures for socially and environmentally
responsible investments, requiring their insured clients to comply with various social
and environmental standards. However, even if these practices are moving in the
right direction, their true functionality and effectiveness have not yet been proved.
PRI schemes should represent more of a bottom-up approach to the
responsibilisation of energy investments. PRI providers should take advantage of
the demand for their services by energy corporations in order to secure better societal
and environmental performance. The sine qua non condition of verifying the insured
clients’ compliance with the investment insurance standards is carried out through
two indispensable processes, the creation of a regular and specialised monitoring
mechanism and the incorporation of a fully independent and permanent public
complaints facility. Moreover, if PRI providers manage to increase the local com-
munities’ involvement in the monitoring of the insured investor’s compliance with
various standards, they can reduce the risk of social or environmental damage and
enhance the project’s viability by creating a more stable investment environment.
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Abstract This chapter analyses the concept of the “national security interest”,
which is widely recognised as allowing a state to determine which areas of its
economy are restricted or prohibited to foreign investors. This chapter seeks to
identify what constitutes a threat for a state and how that threat is managed both
domestically and internationally. Despite the recognition of a state’s right to take
measures it considers essential to its security, there are limits. The rules established
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and other
international instruments are non-binding but can serve as a guide for states in
determining the limits of the national security approach. International investment
agreements can restrict the right of states to take security-related measures. Finally,
customary international law, in light of the good faith obligation, can serve as a basis
for assessing measures taken by a state and pave the way for a better balance between
the rights of a state and those of foreign investors.
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1 Introduction
States seek to protect their economy from foreign investment if the latter poses a
threat to their national security. This mechanism takes the form of state measures
regarding the access of foreign investment to certain categories of the national
economy. Although not new, this mechanism seems to be gaining momentum
since 2010. A recent report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) has documented the increase in national security measures and has
predicted that the trend will continue.1 Indeed, the liberalisation of the world
economy in the 1980s led to an increase in foreign investment. As a result, foreign
investment has flown in areas of vital interest to host states, particularly in areas such
as energy and infrastructure. This has made recipient countries aware of the fact that
such foreign investments can potentially endanger entire economic areas and jeop-
ardise their independence. These foreign investments are therefore likely to be
subject to control by the host country.
The term “foreign investment”may refer to private foreign investment, sovereign
wealth funds (SWFs) or state-owned enterprises (SOEs),2 the latter being new
categories of institutional investors who are engaged in commercial activities. The
difference between private foreign investors and SWFs or SOEs is that the latter are
created, controlled and financed by the home state.3
National screening measures can have an impact on foreign investment as they
can restrict or prohibit foreign investors from investing in strategic sectors. Interna-
tional investment agreements (IIAs) in general, including some of the most recent
IIAs,4 recognise national security concerns and the right of a state to take measures
for the protection of its essential security interests. The issue then becomes one of
determining what constitutes a legitimate national security interest and its limits. The
chapter will consider these two issues in turn.
2 National Security Interest
In order to address legitimate national security interests, a state will identify the risks
incurred in relation to the foreign investor (Sect. 2.1) and specify how it intends to
manage that risk (Sect. 2.2).
1OECD and UNCTAD, Twenty-first Report on G20 Investment Measures, 24 June 2019 (“this
development is set to continue in the near future, given firm announcements or plans for further
changes in this area in a number of G20 economies”, p. 2).
2For the differences between SOEs and SWFs, see Bassan (2011), pp. 21–23.
3Gilson and Milhaupt Curtis (2009), pp. 345–362; Bassan (2011), pp. 21–23; Sornarajah (2011),
pp. 267–288.
4This is the case of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) for instance.
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2.1 Risk Identification
States identify risks as a threat to their integrity, whether economic or political. Risks
may evolve as a host state’s environment changes, i.e., as its geopolitical environ-
ment and security situation evolve. In the past, threats were related to espionage.
Today, threats concern wider areas. They may be related to the military or natural
resources. They may also come from control over the acquisition or ownership of
certain sensitive assets, or from investments in critical infrastructure, such as elec-
tricity and distribution, railways and water supply.5 Risk can generally be limited to
certain vital sectors of a host state or it may relate to natural resources, such as
energy. It may also concern transport, fisheries, broadcasting, technology and
telecommunications, or other advanced technologies. The last area of risk is related
to personal data and companies that control the data.6
The identification of a risk may vary from state to state. In Lithuania, for example,
sectors considered key to national security are those related to energy, transport,
information, technology and telecommunications, finance and credit, and military
equipment.7 In Australia, the sensitive sectors include mining and agricultural land.8
Specific risks, however, are associated with SWFs9 and SOEs10 and fall into two
categories: political risks and economic risks.11 The political risks stem from the fact
that SWFs and SOEs may serve the policy of their home state, and not simply pursue
a purely economic objective, leading to the adoption by the host state of specific
5For a list of issues or threats covered in selected national security plans, see OECD Study on
Security-Related Terms in International Investment Law and in National Security Strategies, OECD
2009, p. 14, Table 2.
6Shima (2015), https://doi.org/10.1787/5js7svp0jkns-en.
7OECD, Investment Policy related to National Security. Notification by Lithuania, 23 October
2018, DAF/INV/RD (2018) , p . 6 . h t tps : / /www.oecd.org/officia ldocuments /
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote¼DAF/INV/RD(2018)6&docLanguage¼En.
8Australia, “Government Statement: Mining Interests in theWoomera Prohibited Area”, Minister of
Defence press release, 17 May 2010. “On 17 May 2010, the Minister of Defence (Australia)
announced that any prospective mining investment proposals in the Woomera Prohibited Area, a
weapon testing range, where foreign involvement is a factor, and requires Foreign Investment
Review Board (FIRB) approval, applicants should first seek assessment from the Defence Depart-
ment before making any application to the FIRB”, OECD and UNCTAD, Third Report on G20
Investment Measures, 14 June 2010, Annex 1.
9Among many examples, let us mention that of the Kuwait Investment Authority (1982), the Korea
Investment Corporation (2005) and the Norwegian Government Pension Fund (2005).
10OECD (2018), Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Compendium of
National Practice; OECD, Corporate Governance of SOEs: Guidance and Research, 2011–2017;
OECD Corporate Governance Series; OECD (2016), State-Owned Enterprises as Global Compet-
itor: A Challenge or an Opportunity; OECD (2015), OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of
State-Owned Enterprises.
11OECD (2016), Risk Management by State-Owned Enterprises and their Ownership,
October 2016.
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requirements related to activities of such investors.12 The economic risks are likely
to result from the potential impact of SWFs and SOEs on the host state’s, market,
which may create financial instability. Foreign investors may become a significant
shareholder or owner of a sector of a state’s economy. Examples include the
purchase of the port of Piraeus by the Chinese company COSCO under the Chinese
Belt & Road Initiative (BRI)13 or, even though less fortunate, if one may say so, the
failed attempt by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation to acquire Unocal, a
US oil company.14
2.2 Risk Management
Risks resulting from foreign investment in certain sectors of a host state’s economy
are therefore managed by the host state. Policies adopted by the host state to protect
national interests may be taken at the national level (Sect. 2.2.1) or at the interna-
tional level (Sect. 2.2.2).
2.2.1 Risk Management at the National Level
A recent OECD-UNCTAD study shows that state policies to “safeguard essential
security include a broadening of the scope of transactions that are subject to
review—in particular to include assets that provide the acquirer access to sensitive
personal data and advanced technology—, an extension of the timeframe for the
screening process and a lowering of trigger thresholds to also include smaller
investments and stakes”.15 In a first step, this chapter will examine some general
screening measures. In a second step, it will consider the recent impact of COVID-19
on screening measures.
12France, Décret n 2019 – 1590 du 31 décembre 2019 relatif aux investissements étrangers en
France, JORF, 2 January 2010.
13S. Eddi Stones & Mason Hayes, China’s Acquisition of Piraeus Port in Greece, as in 2016
COSCOGroup & China Shipping Group merged to create China COSCO Shipping, https://is.muni.
cz/el/1421/podzim2018/KSCB163/piraeusportpresentation.pdf.
14Barboza, Chinese Company Ends Unocal Bid, Citing Political Hurdles, New York Times
2 August 2005. More examples are given by Carney (2018), p. 14.
15OECD and UNCTAD, Twenty-first Report on G20 Investment Measures, 24 June 2019. http://
www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/21st-Report-on-G20-Investment-Measures.pdf.
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2.2.1.1 General Screening Measures
A few examples illustrate risk management at the national level.16 France is one of
the states that have already modified their policies. In 2012, France drew a list of
sectors requiring prior authorisation for foreign investors.17 It modified its foreign
investment screening mechanism in order to safeguard its essential security interests.
In recent legislation, which entered into force on 1 January 2019,18 France notably
restricted access to foreign investors by identifying sectors that require authorisation
for foreign investors and reserving the right to refuse a foreign investment.19 For its
part, the revised German Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance, which entered into
force on 29 December 2018, established a revised screening procedure requiring a
lower voting threshold for acquisitions by non-European investors and changes to
the review procedures in sensitive sectors, such as key infrastructure and defence-
related industries.20 In 2012, Italy set up a review mechanism for transactions in
specific sectors (defence or national security, strategic activities in the field of
energy, transport and communications)21 and, in 2019, it extended the list of
strategic assets requiring notification to the government of any contract related to
the list.22 Under Federal Law No. 155-FZ of 1 July 2017,23 the Russian Federation
16UNCTAD Report on National Security-Related Screening Mechanisms for Foreign Investment,
December 2019, Table 1, pp. 9 and 10. For a survey of country practices related to national security,
see Wehrlé and Pohl (2016); For an analysis of EU framework for foreign direct investment control,
see Bourgeois (2019); For a detailed analysis of the EU FDI regulatory regime, in particular the
German scheme as well as concrete examples of the potential implementation of the screening
mechanisms, see Garrod et al. (2020).
17France, Décret n2012-691 du 7 mai 2012 relatif aux investissements étrangers soumis à
autorisation préalable, Decree n2012-691 du 7 mai 2012 relatif aux investissements étrangers
soumis à autorisation préalable. OECD, UNCTAD and WTO, Eight Report on G20 Trade and
Investment Measures (mid-May to mid-October 2012), 31 October 2012, http://www.oecd.org/daf/
inv/8thG20report.pdf, p. 51.
18France, Décret n 2018-1057 du 29 novembre 2018 relatif aux investissements étrangers soumis à
autorisation préalable, JORF, 1 December 2018; OECD and UNCTAD, Twenty-first Report on
G20 Investment Measures, 24 June 2019.
19France, Décret n 2019 – 1590 du 31 décembre 2019 relatif aux investissements étrangers en
France, JORF, 2 January 2010.
20Germany, “Investment policy related to national security”, Notification by Germany to the
OECD, 13 February 2019; Neunte Verordnung zur Änderung der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung,
14 July 2017, OECD and UNCTAD, Twenty-first Report on G20 Investment Measures,
24 June 2019.
21Italy, Law of 11 May 2012, n. 56, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica italiana No. 111, 14 May
2012, OECD and UNCTAD, Eighth Report on G20 Investment Measures, 31 October 2012.
22Italy, Law Decree No. 22/2019 of 25 March 2019, passed into law on 13 May 2019, OECD and
UNCTAD, Twenty-first Report on G20 Investment Measures, 24 June 2019.
23Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 155-FZ of 1 July 2017 on amendments to Article 5 of the
Federal Law on Privatization of State and Municipal Property and to the Federal Law on Procedures
for Foreign Investment in Business Entities of Strategic Importance for National Defence and State
Security, “Amendments to law on the privatisation of state property and on procedures for foreign
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excluded certain foreign investors from participating in the privatisation of state and
municipal property, while Canada’s Guidelines on the National Security Review of
Investments (2016) are related to national security and intend to provide greater
clarity to existing policies.24
In 2008, Australia revised its 1975 Foreign Acquisitions and Takeover Act25 to
add foreign investment control tools and criteria. In 2010, Australia introduced
restrictions on investment in the mining sector.26 In February 2018, it clarified the
review process for acquisitions in certain sectors, such as distribution and electricity
transmission, and stated, for security reasons, that conditions and restrictions on
foreign acquisitions and takeovers may be required on a case-by-case basis.27
South Africa’s Competition Amendment Act 2018 authorises the South African
President to “constitute a national security review committee on foreign investments
which will conduct mandatory reviews of inward foreign investment to safeguard
South Africa’s essential security interests. Sectors as well as critical infrastructure
assets to which the review mechanism will apply are to be listed”.28
In the European Union, the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investment in
the Union entered into force on 10 April 2019 and has been fully operational since
11 October 2020.29 The regulation sets in place a mechanism for the exchange of
information between member states enabling them to review a foreign investment
for reasons of public order and security. The Regulation also allows the European
Commission to give non-binding opinions where a foreign investment may pose a
investment in business entities of strategic importance for national defence and state security”,
Presidential Executive Office, 1 July 2017. See also “Amendments to laws on foreign investment
and procedure for investing in business entities of strategic importance for national defence”,
Presidential Executive Office, 19 July 2017. OECD and UNCTAD, Eighteen Report on G20
Investment Measures, 9 November 2017.
24Canada, “Guidelines on the National Security Review of Investments” and “Attracting global
investments to develop world-class companies”, Government of Canada news release, 19 December
2016. OECD and UNCTAD, Seventeenth Report on G20 Investment Measures, 30 June 2017.
25Bath (2012), p. 34.
26Australia, “Mining Interests in the Woomera Prohibited Area Government Statement”, Minister
of Defence press release, 17 May 2010; OECD and UNCTAD, Third Report on G20 Investment
Measures, 14 June 2010, Annex 1.
27Australia, “New conditions on the sale of Australian electricity assets to foreign investors”, joint
media release, by the Treasurer, the Minister for Home Affairs and The Minister for Immigration
and Border Protection, 1 February 2018. OECD and UNCTAD, Nineteenth Report on G20
Investment Measures, 4 July 2018.
28South Africa, Competition Amendment Act, 2018; OECD and UNCTAD, Twenty-first Report on
G20 Investment Measures, 24 June 2019.
29European Union Foreign Investment Screening regulation enters into force, Brussels, 10 April
2019, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id¼2008; European Commission (2018),
Screening of Foreign Direct Investment – An EU Framework, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2019/february/tradoc_157683.pdf. For a critical approach, Bismuth (2018), pp. 45–60. For an
analysis of the European Union Policy on foreign investment prior to this Regulation, see Chaisse J
(2012)
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potential threat to essential security interests of more than one member state or the
European Union as a whole.30
In August 2018, the US Congress passed the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act (FIRRMA), which expands the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review investments or acquisi-
tions by foreign investors in US companies. It does so by including in its jurisdic-
tion new categories of transactions involving foreign investors when matters of
national interest are at stake, such as real estate transactions, changes in foreign
investor rights and potential foreign control of a US business.31
CFIUS’ filings related to “critical technologies and in certain industries” are also
made mandatory, alongside the voluntary filing system for transactions involving
foreign investors.32 The terms are defined broadly to take account of any situation
involving a foreign investment that may be detrimental to the national interest. The
Final Regulations implementing FIRRMA came into force on 13 January 2020, as
the Treasury Department issued two final regulations implementing changes to
CFIUS’ jurisdiction and process.33 The first regulation consists of provisions
pertaining to certain investments in the US by foreign persons.34 The second
regulation comprises provisions pertaining to certain transactions by foreign persons
involving real estate in the United States.35
Moreover, as SOEs and/or SWFs can endanger strategic industries, states have
introduced additional screening requirements.36 In Australia, for example, SOEs are
subject to extensive disclosure requirements and their investments subject to prior
governmental consent.37 In the Russian Federation, SOEs are subject to prior
30European Union, Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the
Union, Official Journal of the European Union, 21 March 2019. See also European Parliament,
Framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union, OJ C
262, 25.7.2018, p. 94; European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 February 2019 on the
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework
for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union (COM(2017)0487 – C8-0309/
2017 – 2017/0224(COD)) OJ C 247, 13.7.2018, p. 28, OECD and UNCTAD, Twenty-first Report
on G20 Investment Measures, 24 June 2019. See also Garrod et al. (2020), pp. 345–362.
31Larson et al. (2012), pp. 3–23.
32Zimmerman (2019), pp. 1267–1303.
33See https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-
in-the-united-states-cfius.
34Provisions Pertaining to Certain Investments in the United States by Foreign Persons (31 C.F.R.
part 800), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Part-800-Final-Rule-Jan-17-2020.pdf.
35Provisions Pertaining to Certain Transactions by Foreign Persons Involving Real Estate in the
United States (31 C.F.R. part 802), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Part-802-Final-
Rule-Jan-17-2020.pdf.
36Lowery (2015), p. 413.
37UNCTAD World Investment Report (2018), Investment and new Industrial Policies, esp.
pp. 177–179; UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor (IPM) Special Issue on National Security-
Related Screening Mechanisms for Foreign Investment, December 2019, p. 11.
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approval for transactions involving minority shareholdings in domestic enterprises
and are prohibited from acquiring majority shareholdings.38 Similarly, the latest
revision of the French legislation on foreign investment requires investors to disclose
their links with a foreign state or public body.39
2.2.1.2 Recent Impact of COVID-19 on Screening Measures
The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 created a public health emergency with social
and economic repercussions that caused a major economic shock. The pandemic
introduced a potential risk to strategic industries which has led to new considerations
related to the protection of citizens at EU level and at national level.40
The European Commission recalled the importance of protecting EU citizens,
industry and economy by preserving production and value chains, by ensuring the
necessary supplies to health systems, jobs and liquidity, and by protecting EU
citizens from “predatory buying” of strategic assets by foreign investors.41 In this
context, the European Commission invited EU member states to adopt measures to
protect their citizens and industries by providing guidance concerning foreign direct
investment flows.42 Accordingly, the Commission stated that EU member states
“need to be vigilant and use all tools available at Union and national level to avoid
that the current crisis leads to a loss of critical assets and technology. This includes
tools like national security screening and other security related instruments. The
Commission will guide Member States ahead of the application of the Foreign Direct
Investment Screening Regulation”.43
38UNCTAD Investment Policy Monitor (IPM) Special Issue on National Security-Related Screen-
ing Mechanisms for Foreign Investment, December 2019, p. 11.
39France, Décret n 2019 – 1590 du 31 décembre 2019 relatif aux investissements étrangers en
France, JORF, 2 January 2010.
40This is the case in Australia, Italy and Spain, OECD Investment Policy Response to COVID-19,
OECD Tackling Coronavirus (COVID-19) Contributing to a Global Effort, 17 April 2020, https://
read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref¼129_129922-gkr56na1v7&title¼OECD-Investment-Policy-
Responses-to-COVID-19, pp. 4–5.
41European Commission Communication, Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19
Outbreak, COM (2020) 112 final (13 March 2020) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/
communication-coordinated-economic-response-covid19-march-2020_en.pdf.
42European Commission, Communication, Guidance to the Member States concerning foreign
direct investment and free movement of capital from third countries, and the protection of Europe’s
strategic assets, ahead of the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation) –
25/3/2020 C (2020) 1981 final https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158676.
pdf.
43European Commission, Communication, Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19
Outbreak, COM (2020) 112 final (13 March 2020) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/
communication-coordinated-economic-response-covid19-march-2020_en.pdf, emphasis in
original.
186 P. Accaoui Lorfing
At the national level, the Commission encouraged EU member states to use their
existing FDI screening mechanisms to counter potential risks related to health
infrastructure, supply, and “other critical sectors as envisaged in the EU legal
framework”.44 EU member states should also adopt measures to restrict capital
movements as needed to protect strategic assets from foreign investors’ “predatory
buying” pursuant to Article 65(1)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) that establishes the right of member states “to take mea-
sures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security”.45 For state
members that do not yet have a screening mechanism46 and those with a screening
mechanism that does not take into account these specific risks, the Commission
argues in favour of the creation of “a full-fledged screening mechanism and in the
meantime to use all other available options to address cases”.47 The screening
mechanism may result either in the prohibition of foreign investment in certain
industries or in limiting it, such as by imposing compulsory licences.48
India too has introduced restrictions on FDI policy to protect the country from
takeovers and/or acquisitions of Indian companies during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In this regard, the Government has issued a Press Note setting out restrictions and
requiring prior government approval for any investment to be made within Indian
territory and prohibiting investment in certain areas (defence, space, atomic
energy, . . .).49
44European Commission, Communication, Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19
Outbreak, COM (2020) 112 final (13 March 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/
communication-coordinated-economic-response-covid19-march-2020_en.pdf.
45Article 65(1)(b) of the TFEU provides: “The provisions of Article 63 shall be without prejudice to
the right of Member States [. . .] to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national
law and regulations [. . .] or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or
public security”, emphasis added.
46Sweden and Denmark are among the countries that do not have an FDI screening mechanism.
47European Commission, Communication, Guidance to the Member States concerning foreign
direct investment and free movement of capital from third countries, and the protection of Europe’s
strategic assets, ahead of the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation) –
25/3/2020 C (2020) 1981 final https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158676.
pdf.
48As stated in the Annex to the Guidance, p. 2. European Commission, Communication, Guidance
to the Member States concerning foreign direct investment and free movement of capital from third
countries, and the protection of Europe’s strategic assets, ahead of the application of Regulation
(EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation) – 25/3/2020 C (2020) 1981 final https://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158676.pdf.
49Press Note 3 (2010 series) dated 17 April 2020 “Press Note: Review of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) policy for curbing opportunistic takeovers/acquisitions of Indian companies due to the current
COVID-19 pandemic”. It amended paragraph 3.1.1 of the 2017 FDI Policy. It establishes restric-
tions on entities from a country that shares a land border with India, in addition to restrictions
imposed on citizens of Pakistan or entities incorporated in Pakistan. Restrictions also apply to the
“beneficial owner” of an investment in India who is, however, located in or is a citizen of one of the
countries affected by the new measures. Paragraph 3.1.1(a) in its revised version states: “A
non-resident entity can invest in India, subject to the FDI Policy except in those sectors/activities
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The link between COVID-19 and the change in approach to FDI is obvious. The
new policy aims to protect the state from FDI that may endanger domestic industries,
which the state considers to be in its national interest to protect. The tool to be
deployed is the screening mechanism. This approach is based on the need to take into
account considerations other than economic interests, such as the protection of
public health, states’ awareness of the threat and the urgency of the measures to be
taken in the national interest.
2.2.2 Risk Management at the International Level
The management of the risk of a threat to national security interests is also present at
the international level, where two aspects can be taken into account. The first aspect
concerns the diverse formulations of what constitutes a threat to a host state as
incorporated in IIAs. The second aspect is the variety of approaches adopted by IIAs
to address the issue.
2.2.2.1 Various Formulations of “Threat” in IIAs
IIAs refer to a threat to the national security interests of a host state in several ways.50
Some IIAs, such as the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between Hungary and the
Russian Federation (1995) use the term “national security”.51 Other IIAs, such as the
Indian-Singapore Economic Cooperation Agreement (2005) use instead the term
“essential security interests”.52 Alternatively, other IIAs use the term “public
order”53 which can also be combined with the term “essential security interests” to
point to a threat to national security. This is the choice made by the Recommendation
of the OECD Council on “Member country measures concerning National
which are prohibited. However, an entity of a country, which shares land border with India or where
the beneficial owner of an investment into India is situated in or is a citizen of any such country, can
invest only under the Government route. Further, a citizen of Pakistan or an entity incorporated in
Pakistan can invest, only under the Government route, in sectors/activities other than defence,
space, atomic energy and sectors/activities prohibited for foreign investment”.
50For a very interesting analysis and illustration, see OECD, Study on Security-Related Terms in
International Investment Law and in National Security Strategies, 2009. See also Yannaca-Small
(2007), p. 98 and Titi (2014), p. 76.
51According to Article 2(3) of the Hungary-Russia BIT (1995), the “Agreement shall not preclude
the application of either Contracting Party measures, necessary for the maintenance of defence,
national security and public order, protection of the environment, morality and public health”.
52According to Article 6.12(1) of the Indian-Singapore Economic Cooperation Agreement (2005),
“[n]othing in this Chapter shall be construed [. . .] to require a Party to furnish any information, the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or to prevent a Party from
taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests”.
53For the highly complex and varied use of the term “public order”, see OECD, Security-Related
Terms in International Investment Law and in National Security Strategies, 2009, pp. 8–10.
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Treatment of foreign-controlled enterprises in OECD member countries and based
on considerations of public order and essential security interests”.54 The German
Model BIT (2009) also uses this wording. It provides that “[m]easures that have to
be taken for reasons of public security and order, shall not be deemed treatment less
favourable within the meaning of this Article”.55 This is also the approach adopted in
the Estonia-United States BIT (1994) which states: “This Treaty shall not preclude
the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public
order, the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration
of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security
interests”.56
2.2.2.2 Variety of IIA Approaches to the Protection of National Interests
In contrast with older generation BITs that do not generally include essential security
interests exceptions, recent IIAs tend to do so.57 The following paragraphs will focus
on recent IIAs that provide for the protection of the states’ national interests. Two
approaches seem to emerge: a broad and a narrow approach.
Host states may adopt a broad approach in the drafting of the provision on
national security inserted in an IIA, allowing for a wide range of measures to be
covered. For instance, the exception may allow the host state to take measures “for
its national interests” without qualifying the policy fields concerned. An example is
given by Article 18 on “Essential Security” of the US Model BIT (2012) which
states that:
54The recommendation was adopted by the OECD Council on July 16, 1986 at its 646th meeting.
55Article 3 of the German Model Treaty (2009) on “National and most-favoured nation treatment”
states:
(a) The following shall more particularly, though not exclusively, be deemed “activity”
within the meaning of Article 3 (2): the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and
disposal of an investment. The following shall, in particular, be deemed “treatment less
favourable” within the meaning of Article 3: unequal treatment in the case of restrictions on
the purchase of raw or auxiliary materials, of energy or fuel or of means of production or
operation of any kind, unequal treatment in the case of impeding the marketing of products
inside or outside the country, as well as any other measures having similar effects. Measures
that have to be taken for reasons of public security and order, public health or morality shall
not be deemed “treatment less favourable” within the meaning of Article 3.
56Article IX(1) of the Estonia-United States BIT. The same approach was adopted, for example, in
Article IX of the Latvia-USA BIT; Article IX of the Poland-USA BIT, Article XII (Reservations of
Rights) of the Romania-Egypt BIT; Article 2 of the Russia-Hungary BIT. See Yannaca-Small
(2007), p. 116.
57On essential security interests exceptions, see Titi (2014), pp. 76 et seq. See also Yannaca-Small
(2007), p. 98.
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Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed:
1. to require a Party to furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of which it
determines to be contrary to its essential security interests; or
2. to preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfilment
of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.
A broad approach may also provide for the right of a state to take measures for
the protection of its national interest in specific fields but in general terms. Article 2
(3) of the BIT between Russia and Hungary, which entered into force in 1996,
recognises the right of a state to take measures “necessary for the maintenance of
defence, national security and public order, protection of the environment, morality
and public health”.
Finally, the broad approach is even more evident in cases where security mea-
sures are excluded from the scope of the dispute settlement provision. Article 19 of
the Austria-Mexico BIT on “Exclusions”, gives the following example:
The dispute settlement provisions of this Part shall not apply to the resolutions adopted by a
Contracting party which, for national security reasons, prohibit or restrict the acquisition of
an investment in its territory, owned or controlled by its nationals, by investors of the other
Contracting party, according to the legislation of each Contracting Party.
This provision establishes in very clear terms that measures adopted by the state
in its national interest and related to the specific policy decisions are excluded from
the scope of the dispute settlement clause. The provision deprives therefore the
tribunal of jurisdiction in the circumstances listed. The extraordinary measure taken
on grounds of national security which excludes the jurisdiction of the tribunal should
be expressly worded to be taken into account.58
When the essential security interests provision establishes that the state may take
the measures “that it considers necessary” the broad approach gives the state a
discretion to determine what is related to its national interest and the exception is
deemed to be of self-judging character.59 The broad wording of a self-judging
“national interest” clause raises the question of whether the state has complete
discretion in interpreting it. This question has been the subject of debate in the
case law and in legal scholarship.60 Normally, the national security measure will be
open to scrutiny by the tribunal according to the test of proportionality, i.e. the
58CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 12May 2005, para.
370. Contra: Burke-White and von Staden (2008), pp. 381 et seq.
59CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 12May 2005, para.
366 (“the State adopting the measures in question is the sole arbiter of the scope and application of
that rule, or whether the invocation of necessity, emergency or other essential security interests is
subject to some form of judicial review”).
60As this issue is not developed further in this chapter, we invite the reader to refer for further
analysis to Titi (2014), p. 190 et seq.; Schill and Briese (2009), p. 69; Muchlinski (2009),
pp. 59 et seq.
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reasonableness of the measure in its context,61 and it will remain subject to a limited
good faith review.62
Alternatively, host states may take a narrow approach to formulating IIA pro-
visions on the protection of their national security interests. The narrow approach
covers exceptions for measures a state takes to protect its “essential security inter-
ests” in one or more specific policy fields or sectors. The narrow approach may also
define the precise conditions under which the “vital interest” of a state may be
invoked, whether, for example, in the military sector or in a specific industry.
An example is provided by Article 18(4)(b) on “General Exceptions” of the
Canadian Model BIT (2014) which reads as follows:
This Agreement does not
(a) prevent a Party from taking an action that it considers necessary to protect its essential
security interests:
(i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic
and transactions in other goods, materials, services and technology undertaken
directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military or other security
establishment,
(ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations, or
(iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or international agreements
respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices; [. . .].
The Canadian provision is limited in scope as it identifies areas in relation to
which the state may take measures to protect its essential security interests (arms
trafficking, during wartime, or nuclear non-proliferation). This provision is of a self-
judging character as the state will determine what “it considers necessary” in the
enumerated areas. The same approach is taken in Article 2102 of the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on “National Security”63 in Chapter XXI on
61Titi (2014), p. 196; Schill and Briese (2009), p. 109.
62LG & E Energy Corp., LG & E Capital Corp., and LG & E International, Inc. v. Argentina,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para. 214 (“Were the Tribunal to
conclude that the provision is self-judging, Argentina’s determination would be subject to a good
faith review anyway”); Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award, 5 September 2008, para. 182 (“If Article XI [of the US-Argentina BIT] granted unfettered
discretion to a party to invoke it,” this discretion would be subject to “good faith,” while preventing
a Tribunal “from entering further into the merits”); Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP
v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 22 May 2007, para. 339 (stating “that Article XI
is not self-judging and that judicial review in its respect is not limited to an examination of whether
its invocation, or the measures adopted, were taken in good faith”).
63The same approach is that of Article 2102 of NAFTA on “National Security”, which provides: “1.
Subject to Articles 607 (Energy –National Security Measures) and 1018 (Government Procurement
Exceptions), nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: [. . .] (b) to prevent any Party from taking
any actions that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests (i) relating
to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic and transactions in other
goods, materials, services and technology undertaken directly or indirectly for the purpose of
supplying a military or other security establishment, (ii) taken in time of war or other emergency
in international relations, or (iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or international
agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
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“Exceptions”. Other instruments adopt the same approach such as the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in Article XIV (bis).64
3 Limits to the National Security Interest
Irrespective of the approach chosen, the right of a state to take security-related
measures is subject to certain limits. Limits on a state’s power to invoke the national
security interest may include those set by the OECD and other guidelines and
principles (Sect. 3.1), IIAs (Sect. 3.2) and customary international law (Sect. 3.3).
3.1 The OECD and Other Guidelines and Principles
The OECD has issued a number of instruments with the aim of recommending tools
that states can use when they adopt concrete measures based on considerations of
public order and essential security interests. The OECD Codes of Liberalisation of
Capital Movements (2019) and Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations65
expressly recognise the right of each OECD member state to take measures which
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests.66
Adopted on 21 June 1976, revised periodically and last updated in 2011, the
OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises recalls
the importance of multinational enterprises in the field of international investment.
The OECD Declaration stresses the need for international cooperation between a
host state and multinational enterprises. The principles of transparency, national
treatment and consultation must be respected in order to minimise or avoid occasions
when host states impose conflicting requirements on multinational enterprises.
Adopted on 16 July 1986, the OECD Recommendation on Member Country
Measures concerning National Treatment of Foreign-Controlled Enterprises in
OECDMember Countries and based on Consideration of Public Order and Essential
Security Interests, recommends transparency of such measures when they are noti-
fied to the OECD.67 This OECD recommendation invites adhering countries to limit
the use of national treatment measures for foreign-controlled enterprises to areas
64Article XIV (bis) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) states that “[n]othing in
this Agreement shall be construed [. . .] to prevent any Member from taking action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests”.
65Article 3 of the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations (2019).
66Article 3 of the OECD Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (2019).
67The OECD Recommendation of the Council on Member Country Measures concerning National
Treatment of Foreign-Controlled Enterprises in OECD Member Countries and Based on Consid-
erations of Public Order and Essential Security Interest, OECD/LEGAL/0226 http://
legalinstruments.oecd.org.
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where public policy and essential security interests are at stake. The Recommenda-
tion also invites adhering countries to narrow the scope of these measures by
adopting alternative regulations that would allow foreign-controlled enterprises to
operate in the host state.
The OECD Recommendation on the National Treatment Instrument also encour-
ages host states to ensure that foreign-controlled enterprises operating in their
territory are treated no less favourably than domestic enterprises.68 Where a host
state considers that the foreign investment constitutes a threat to its national security
interests, the Recommendation establishes the procedure consisting of (1) a decla-
ration of principle by adhering countries, (2) notification of their exception to the
OECD and (3) a monitoring procedure to deal with such an exception within the
OECD. Although the National Treatment Instrument is a non-binding voluntary
commitment by both adhering and non-adhering countries to the OECD, its purpose
is to treat measures taken by a host state in its national interest as an exception. This
exception is limited in nature and scope.
In the same vein, the OECD Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment
Policies relating to National Security (2009) establish non-binding principles.69
Their purpose is to set out the exceptional nature of the measure taken in the national
interest. The Guidelines also aim to avoid protectionism that may result from the
introduction by a state of national policies aimed to safeguard national security
interests. The Guidelines, such as the principles of non-discrimination, transparency
and predictability, proportionality of measures and accountability of implementing
authorities, are intended to guide states in adopting measures in the national inter-
est.70 The requirement of non-discrimination means that the measures taken must be
of “general application” treating “similarly situated investors in a similar fashion”
and they must be “taken with respect to individual investments based on specific
circumstances of the individual investment which pose a risk to a national secu-
rity”.71 The requirements of transparency and predictability imply that the measures
taken must be made public by all means, whether in a public register72 or on the
internet, with an assessment of the criteria made available to the public. This
68The National Treatment’s instrument is a non-binding and voluntary undertaking by adhering and
non-adhering OECD countries https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/
nationaltreatmentinstrument.htm.
69Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National Security, Recommen-
dation adopted by the OECD Council on 25 May 2009, and the same text is found in the OECD,
Recommendation of the Council on Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies relating
to National Security, OECD/LEGAL/0372.
70OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies
relating to National Security, OECD/LEGAL/0372.
71Annex on Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National Security, in
OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies
relating to National Security, OECD/LEGAL/0372.
72As stated in the Annex “Codification and publication. Primary and subordinate laws should be
codified and made available to the public in a convenient form (e.g. in a public register; on internet).
In particular, evaluation criteria used in reviews should be made available to the public”.
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includes prior notification to the interested party of proposed changes to investment
policies, consultation with the other parties, and, at the procedural level, the estab-
lishment of strict time limits for the review of foreign investment screening pro-
cedures and the protection of commercially sensitive information of foreign
investors. Furthermore, disclosure of investment policy measures should be made
through press releases, annual reports and/or reports to parliament, bearing in mind
the obligation to protect sensitive and classified information.73
The requirement of regulatory proportionality means that national security mea-
sures must link investment restrictions and risks to national security. It also means
that particular attention must be paid to how the national interest exception is drafted
and interpreted. As noted above, the broad approach to the provision on security
interests gives the state greater flexibility in determining what is necessary to protect
its national security. The proportionality requirement is therefore useful as it sets
limits and provides guidance that a state should take into account.74 Finally, a state is
accountable to its citizens. The state is also required to adopt international account-
ability mechanisms and grant foreign investors the possibility of a recourse against
it.75
In the same vein, the G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment
Policymaking (2016) establish non-binding principles of transparency and coher-
ence, among others, to guide investment policymaking. These instruments recognise
the importance for a state to take measures for its national security. As recommen-
dations, they can serve as a guide to states when taking measures to safeguard
national security interests in order to limit their impact on investment flows.
Finally, with regard to SWFs, the Santiago Guidelines, also known as Generally
Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP), adopted on 11 October 2008, are a
voluntary set of 24 best practice guidelines for SWF operations.76 Their objective
is to maintain (1) a stable global financial system, (2) adequate risk control and (3) a
regulatory structure. They are seen as common international standards of transpar-
ency, independence and governance that all SWFs can follow.
73OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies
relating to National Security, OECD/LEGAL/0372.
74OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies
relating to National Security, OECD/LEGAL/0372.
75As stated in the Annex on Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies relating to
National Security, in OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Guidelines for Recipient Country
Investment Policies relating to National Security, OECD/LEGAL/0372: “All countries share a
collective interest in maintaining international investment policies that are open, legitimate and fair.
Through various international standards, governments recognise this collective interest and agree to
participate in related international accountability mechanisms (e.g. the OECD notification and peer
review obligations in relation to restrictive investment policies). In particular, these help constrain
domestic political pressures for restrictive and discriminatory policies. Recipient governments
should participate in and support these mechanisms”.
76OECD, Note on Current and Emerging Trends on “Acquisition – and Ownership – Related
Policies to Safeguard Essential Security Interests. New Policies to Manage New Threats”,
12 March 2019.
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3.2 Limits Set Out in IIAs
Limits to the state’s national security interests also derive from the limits set out in
international investment agreements. The right of a state to adopt security-related
measures is likely to be limited by IIAs. This is particularly true in the absence of a
provision on “security interests” in the IIA (Sect. 3.2.1), where the security related
provision is narrowly drafted (Sect. 3.2.2) or where state parties exclude certain areas
from the provision on “security interests” (Sect. 3.2.3).
3.2.1 The Absence of a Provision on “Security Interests” in IIAs
According to a 2009 UNCTAD study, only a few BITs include a national security
interests’ exception.77 The absence of any provision on “security interests” in BITs
limits the right of a state to take security-related measures. Accordingly, the impact
of the state measure taken for reasons of public interest will be assessed by an arbitral
tribunal in the light of the investor protection provisions of the applicable BIT. In
other words, the absence of a provision on “security interests” in BITs or free trade
agreements (FTAs) with an investment chapter allows the investor to be better
protected against state action related to essential security interests.
3.2.2 The Restrictive Wording of the Provision on “Security Interests”
A state’s right to adopt security measures is also limited when the security-related
exception is drafted in a restrictive manner, such as in the case of the previously-
discussed Canadian Model BIT, which limits what may constitute a security interest
to trafficking in arms, munitions and war material, and the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons.78 If a related claim is brought before an arbitral tribunal, the latter
will then assess the state measure in light of the wording of the provision of the BIT.
Any security-related state measure that is outside the scope of the provision on
“essential security interests”will be assessed in light of the standards of protection in
IIAs and is likely to lead to state responsibility.
3.2.3 The Limited Application of “Essential Security Interests”
to Specific Provisions
A state’s right to take security-related measures is ultimately limited by the scope of
the treaty’s exceptions. For instance, this will be the case when only “expropriation
or nationalization or similar measures” are covered by the scope of the treaty’s
77UNCTAD (2009), p. 72.
78Article 18(4)(b) of the Canadian Model BIT (2014).
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exceptions, provided that other conditions specified in the clause are met.79 For
example, the China-Philippines BIT states:
1. Either Contracting Party may for reasons of national security and public interest, expro-
priate, nationalize or take similar measures (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”)
against investments of investors of the other Contracting party, but the following conditions
shall be met:
(1) under domestic procedure;
(2) without discrimination
(3) upon payment of fair and reasonable compensation.80
Where the state undertakes, in a BIT or FTA, to limit its right to adopt security-
related measures to a specific provision, such as that relating to expropriation, it can
no longer adopt measures outside the scope of the specific clause without incurring
liability.
3.3 Customary International Law
Limitations on a state’s adoption of security-related measures also arise under
customary international law. Customary international law may play an important
role in assessing a state’s security-related measures, even in the presence of an
essential security interests exception. We will consider the example of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) panel report in Russia – Measures concerning traffic in
transit of 5 April 2019 in the context of a dispute between Russia and Ukraine.81 The
questions dealt with allow for an analogy with the subject of our chapter. The WTO
Panel addressed the interpretation of Article XXI(b)(iii) of the 1994 General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on “Security Exceptions”,82 the measures at issue
and their existence,83 whether the measures were “taken in time of war or other
emergency in international relations”, and whether the conditions of the introductory
part84 of Article XXI(b) of the GATT were satisfied.85
With regard to the facts and very briefly, in its dispute with Ukraine, the Russian
Federation invoked the national security exception in Article XXI of the GATT
concerning restrictions on road and rail transit traffic through the territory of the
79See also Article 4 of the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU)-China BIT (2005).
80Article 4 of the China-Philippines BIT (1992).
81WTO Panel Report, Russia –Measures concerning traffic in transit, 5 April 2019. The Panel was
composed of Georges Abi-Saab (Chairperson), Ichiro Araki and Mohammad Saeed (members). As
the Panel was composed of eminent members, its reasoning makes it a reference in this matter.
82WTO Panel Report, Russia – Measures concerning traffic in transit, 5 April 2019, para. 7.5.3.1.
83WTO Panel Report, Russia – Measures concerning traffic in transit, 5 April 2019, para. 7.5.4.
84WTO Panel Report, Russia –Measures concerning traffic in transit, 5 April 2019, para. 7.5.3.1.1.
85WTO Panel Report, Russia – Measures concerning traffic in transit, 5 April 2019, para. 7.5.6.
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Russian Federation.86 The Russian Federation justified the national security excep-
tion as being necessary for the protection of its essential security interests. The Panel
analysed Article XXI of the GATT in light of the principle of good faith as codified
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.87 In the Panel’s view, Article XXI
of the GATT provides for “essential security interests” in a strict sense, understood
as being limited to the “quintessential functions of the state”.88 The Panel further
recognises the right of “every member to define what it considers to be its essential
security interests”.89 However, the state is not free to raise any concerns as “essential
security interests”. This right is limited by the principle of good faith90 which
applies, on the one hand, to the interpretation of what constitutes an essential security
interest and, on the other hand, to the assessment of the link between the measure and
the conditions set out in the provision.91 Therefore, the obligation of good faith
requires that WTO members should not use the exceptions in Article XXI of the
GATT as a means of circumventing their obligations.92 In addition, “the Member
invoking the Exception should articulate the essential security interest said [. . .]
sufficiently enough to demonstrate their veracity”.93
As the Panel’s analysis shows, the self-judging security exception is assessed
according to the principle of good faith. This implies that the right of a state to invoke
the exception can only be admitted in exceptional circumstances. The state must
86Article XXI of the GATT provides:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it
considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to traffic in arms, ammunition and implement of war and to such traffic in
other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of
supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
87Article 32(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that “[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.
88WTO Panel Report, Russia – Measures concerning traffic in transit, 5 April 2019, para.
7.130, p. 56.
89WTO Panel Report, Russia – Measures concerning traffic in transit, 5 April 2019, para.
7.131, p. 56.
90WTO Panel Report, Russia – Measures concerning traffic in transit, 5 April 2019, para. 7.132.
91WTO Panel Report, Russia – Measures concerning traffic in transit, 5 April 2019, para. 7.138.
92WTO Panel Report, Russia – Measures concerning traffic in transit, 5 April 2019, para. 7.133.
93WTO Panel Report, Russia – Measures concerning traffic in transit, 5 April 2019, para. 7.134.
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ensure there is a link between the measure taken and the conditions set out in the
exception. The principle of good faith plays an important role in limiting the manner
in which the state may invoke the national security interests exception. As in WTO
law, so in investment law, good faith could pave the way for an arbitral tribunal to
assess the manner in which a self-judging essential security interests provision is
implemented by a state.
4 Conclusion
The foreign direct investment screening mechanism is a national instrument that a
state may create to protect what it considers to be a national security interest. This
mechanism takes the form of state measures targeting foreign investment relating to
certain categories of the national economy by restricting or prohibiting FDI from
entering its territory. This mechanism has evolved over the last decade. In the
context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the trend became even more pronounced.
The right of states to take measures to safeguard their national interests is, however,
limited at the international level by IIAs and customary international law because of
its possible impact on investors’ rights. A narrow drafting of the national interest
exception and restrictive review in the light of the principle of good faith could
ensure both respect for the exercise of state sovereignty and investor protection and
thus pave the way for a better balance between the rights of states and investors.
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